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WRITINGS

OF THE LATE

JOHN M. MASON, D.D.

CONSISTING OF

SERMONS, ESSAYS, AND MISCELLANIES,

INCLUDING ESSAYS ALREADY PUBLISHED IN THE "CHRISTIAN MAGAZINE."

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

SELECTED AND ARRANGED BY

REV. EBENEZER MASON.

VOL. III.

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY THE EDITOR.

1832.

"Entered, according to act of congress, in the year 1832, by Rev. Ebenezer Mason, in the clerk's office of the southern district of New York."

SLEIGHT AND ROBINSON, PRINTERS.

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PROPERTY OF
PRINCETON
THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY

ON RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSY.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CHRISTIAN'S MAGAZINE.

As one of the avowed designs of this work is to assert the truth and refute error, it has to combat in the outset a fashionable and imposing prejudice. It seems to be taken for granted, that how perfect soever the right of judging and professing for ourselves, there exists no right of inquiry into the judgment or profession of others. In religion, at least, this maxim is held to be incontrovertible by many who never think of applying it to any other subject. To disquisitions on topics in which all denominations agree, they can listen with pleasure; they can even permit the peculiarities of each to be detailed in succession; but from every thing which wears the form of *controversy* they turn away with spontaneous contempt. Their aversion is so fixed that hardly any plea of excel-

lence will be allowed in behalf of a work which stands convicted on the charge of being controversial. The fact is sufficient to preclude every other trial, and to infer condemnation as a matter of course.

That these summary and oftentimes injurious decisions have been unprovoked on the part of disputants, I shall not affirm. On the contrary, I will freely concede that the unfairness, the heat, and the rudeness, which too frequently occur in polemical writings, are most offensive to the discreet reader, and make him shy of authors from whom he may expect such entertainment.

But while there can be no apology for conduct which offers equal violence to the rules of good breeding and the precepts of Christianity, there is ground to suspect that more is attributed to its influence in producing the prevalent dislike to controversy than it can justly claim. For as our age must not arrogate to itself the praise of all the meekness and candor which have been in the world, so it is certain that men great and good, pacific and modest, have studied the most controverted themes in an age when harshness and incivility were more common than they are now. In accounting, then, for that prejudice which we are considering, much must be deducted from the current professions of courtesy

and candor, and transferred to that *indifference* which will not be at the pains to examine on which side lies the right of a question concerning eternal hope! For such a morbid state of feeling we can suggest no remedy, and can only pour out our most fervent prayer that the first admonition which it shall be compelled to regard may not be that awful voice, "Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime hadst thy good things!" The prejudice itself, unlike those lessons with which truth and wisdom preoccupy the heart, will appear, upon a close inspection, to be as destitute of solidity as it is assuming in manner; for, in the

1st place, It admits not of dispute that the holy scriptures point out an opposite course. Their injunction is, to *buy the truth and sell it not. To cease from the instruction that causeth to err from the words of knowledge—earnestly to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints—to try the spirits whether they are of God.* All these directions imply, not that men are to spend their lives in laying the foundations of their faith, but that they are to employ their opportunities and faculties in selecting the true from the false; that they are to prize it when selected; to enrich it with fresh acquisitions; and to defend it with their utmost skill. How this can be done without controversy, so long as there are "de-

ceivers in the world," it is incumbent on them to show who would suffer the truths of the gospel to be sacrificed, one after another, by men of "corrupt minds," rather than raise a finger or press an argument for their protection. It is indeed not more lamentable than true, that a host of candidates beset the inquirer. Every sect cries out, *we are the people, and the law of the Lord is with us;* every partisan enforces the pretensions of his sect. But this, though frequently urged, is the weakest of all reasons for keeping aloof from investigation. The amount is, "the danger of going astray is great, the consequences fatal; therefore I will shut my eyes." Good sense would say, "the danger of error is great, the consequences fatal; therefore I will use all my diligence that I may not be misled;" for certainly, if "straight be the gate and narrow the way which leadeth unto life," we have the strongest inducement possible to search out and embrace the "few who find it." We are, therefore, reduced to this alternative, either that there is no truth at all, or that we are bound to seek it through every peril, to distinguish its voice amid all clamors, and to possess it at any price. If this condition seem hard, let it be remembered,

2. That it is not left to our discretion whether we shall choose or not.

The determination to choose *nothing* is a determination *not to choose the truth*, and this draws after it the condemnation of those who *love darkness rather than light.* The most high God having given us his word as the rule of our faith and duty, a neglect to seek its counsel because men wrangle about its meaning, is to make the hazard of going wrong a reason for never being anxious to go right. It would be like the excuse of a servant, who, having in common with others received his master's orders to repair to a certain place, should resolve not to stir because his fellow-servants quarreled about the road. Their disobedience could never justify his. Nor is there a man upon earth who would not pronounce it to be the plea of a fool, that out of his pure love of peace he had never been at the trouble to ascertain the import of his master's instructions! The fact is, that no medium can be assigned between receiving and rejecting the truth. If rejected, we seal our own perdition—if received, we must reject whatever is hostile to it; that is, we must institute a comparison between conflicting claims, which is precisely the object of controversy.

Pursuing the argument a little farther, we shall perceive, in the

3d place, That in disclaiming all controversy, we set out with a principle which it is impossible to carry through.

In what department of society, or on what subject of discourse, do the thoughts of men accord? The law has long been celebrated for its fertility in litigation. Medicine is hardly inferior to the bar; agriculture keeps up a sharp debate with commerce; and the politician has always to navigate a "tempestuous sea." Not a project, a character, nor an incident, can be introduced into common conversation without calling forth different strictures, according to the views, habits, relations, and tempers of the company. And it is by no means unusual for some, who abhor controversy in *religion*, to be both talkative and disputatious, if not dogmatic and bitter, on other matters. The world is a vast scene of strife. A man must either take it as he finds it, and bear his part in the general collision, or else go out of it altogether. It is the inevitable consequence of imperfect knowledge and depraved appetite, of that confusion of intellect and corruption of heart which flow from sin. When, therefore, we are under the necessity of either being exiled from society, or of giving and receiving contradiction; and when we submit to this necessity without murmuring in all cases but those which concern religion, what is it but to declare that principles affecting our duty toward God, the highest happiness of our nature, and our responsibility for a future

state, are the only things not worth contending for?

The pretense, that religion is a concern too solemn and sacred for the passions of controversy, is like the pretense with which some justify their "restraining prayer before God;" that he is too high and holy to be approached by such beings as they are. And thus, to display their reverence, they become profane, and live like atheists from pure devotion! Both are cases of error without excuse; we may neither be light in prayer nor wrathful in debate.

If it be alledged that religion loses more than she gains by controversy, this, with an allowance for the mismanagement of unskillful advocates; is a direct censure of her champions, and a surrender of her cause. Are they who espouse such an opinion prepared for its consequences? Are they willing to say, that when the world was lying in ignorance, in wickedness, and in wo, the introduction of light from above produced more evil than good? That the gospel is a plague and not a blessing, because, through the malignity of its foes, it has often brought a sword instead of peace? That it had been better for men never to have "known the way of righteousness," than risk opposition in following it? That the reformation of religion was a senseless scheme; that the martyrs died

like fools; and that all the heroes who have been "valiant for the truth"—all the "ministers of grace" who have explained and established it—all the "apostles, and prophets, and wise men," whom the wisdom of God commissioned to reveal it—and that *wisdom* itself in the person of Jesus Christ—were disturbers of human tranquillity, and spent their time in no better labor than that of "turning the world upside down?" If you start at these things, what do you mean by asserting that "religion suffers from controversy?" For all, prophets, apostles, wise men, and the Redeemer himself, fought her battles, and yielded their latest breath in her defense!

You cannot stop even here. Religion, you say, suffers from controversy. Then it cannot endure investigation. It shrinks from the touch of reason, for controversy is reasoning; and, of course, it cannot be true, for truth never yet declined the test, nor sustained the slightest harm from the most fiery ordeal. On the assumption, therefore, that religion has truth on her side, you can hardly do her a greater injury than to forbid her entering into the lists with her antagonists. They will represent, and argue, and declaim. They will solicit, and soothe, and flatter, and sneer, till they pervert the judgment of many, and seduce the affections of more; and

religion, betrayed and insulted, her banner thrown down, her weapons shivered, her lips sealed, her limbs bound "in affliction and iron," is to be laid at their feet and left to their mercy, in testimony of the respect and attachment of her friends! It was not in this way that they formerly treated her, nor is it to this treatment that we owe our privileges. Her enemies, potent, subtle, and persevering, were encountered by her sons, and defeated as often as they ventured into the field. Those masterly defenses of revelation, those profound researches into its sense, that flood of light which has been poured upon its peculiar doctrines and its benign institutions, are the recompense of the war which Christian zeal and talent have waged in its cause. Had apathy like ours enthralled the spirit of our fathers, we should hardly have been able, at this day, to distinguish in religion between our right hand and our left.

The prejudice, therefore, against religious controversy, is irrational and hurtful. It is a prejudice against the progress and victories of truth. The misconduct of opponents to each other, is a personal concern. It disgraces themselves, but belongs not to the nature or merits of any controversy. This, in itself considered, is but the comparison of jarring opinions; with a reference, in matters of religion, to the scrip-

tural standard. There is no more necessity for falling into a rage when demonstrating a proposition in Christianity, than when demonstrating a proposition in mathematics: although the infinitely interesting quality of the one above the other, will involve a deeper feeling; will furnish an explanation of the warmth which is apt to accompany it; and will draw from candor an allowance for our common frailty.

Controversy then being unavoidable, as truth and falsehood often meet, and never agree, it must occasionally occupy every one who wishes to *have a good conscience.* But as great evils result from an *improper manner of conducting* it, the remarks in this paper are to be understood as contemplating it under the following restrictions:

I. There should be no personal asperity. The greater part of feuds arises from the rash use of names and epithets. If one is obliged to expose weakness or disingenousness, let not the exposure separate decorum from strength; nor forfeit respect in the act of forcing conviction.

2. There should be no impeachment of motives, where facts to justify such a censure are not too palpable to be set aside. The bosom is a sacred retreat: God alone can explore it without the aid of external evidence. And, therefore, a man must be his own betrayer, before his

fellow-man may presume to judge of what passes in his heart. Bad as the condition of the world is, it would be unutterably worse, if men always meant whatever their words convey, or even their actions indicate. Many persons have said and done, with the utmost integrity of motive, things which could not have been said or done by some others without an absolute sacrifice of principle—though it is not hence to be inferred that the things were right.

3. No consequence of an opinion should be attributed to those by whom it is disowned.

As the number of correct reasoners is comparatively few, positions are often advanced, of which their authors are far from perceiving the real tendency. This observation solves a difficulty that otherwise would be very embarrassing. Many a one whose piety it would be insolent to question, has held tenets which lead to the most impious conclusions. What then? must we say that these conclusions form a part of his creed, and arraign him when he denies them, as being at once both a blasphemer and a hypocrite? For example: because we are persuaded that opposition to the imputed righteousness of the Lord Jesus, and to the doctrine of the reformed churches concerning the divine decrees, will drive the opposers, if closely followed up, through the Socinian and deistical

camps, into atheism itself; are we, therefore, to brand them as Socinians, deists, or atheists? God forbid! It is our consolation to know that multitudes of them would, with horror, abjure their views on these points, could they see them to be connected with such results; and to believe that they renounce in words, things, which, without being aware of it, they love in their hearts. It is ignorance of this sort which, in some cases, reconciles with the existence of grace, a notion subversive of the gospel. Let me not, however, be supposed to favor in the slightest degree, that monster of modern philosophy—the innocence of error. Detect it; pursue it; hunt it down; urge it over the precipice: but permit those who started with it to disengage themselves in season, and save their lives. In plain words: charge home upon error its most tremendous consequences; but charge them not, when solemnly disavowed, upon the man whom it has misled. If you reason fairly, he must either quit his ground, or maintain it feebly; and while your triumph will be complete, neither mercy nor justice will forbid you to let him shelter himself from crime amid the thickets of contradiction.

The reader will doubtless apply the foregoing rules, without abatement, to the disquisitions in the present work. And his right to do so is unquestionable. That he shall never, in perusing

it, meet with an instance of transgression, it would savor of boasting to affirm. But that it shall not be often repeated, nor long continued, he may reasonably demand. Care shall certainly be employed that the Christian's Magazine be not unworthy of its name; but if, unhappily, any thing of a different mark should steal into its pages, let the Christian critic remember that he owes to its writers the same indulgence which they owe to him: and he will enter an occasional trespass into his account current with human imperfection.

ESSAYS ON EPISCOPACY.

PRINCETON
THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY.

REVIEW.

A Collection of Essays on the subject of Episcopacy, which originally appeared in the Albany Centinel, and which are principally ascribed to the Rev. Dr. Linn, the Rev. Mr. Beasley, and Thomas Y. How, Esq. With additional notes and remarks. 8vo. p. p. 210. New-York, T. & J. Swords, 1806.

Early in the summer of 1804, the Rev. John Henry Hobart, an assistant minister of Trinity Church, New-York, published a work, entitled, "*A Companion for the Altar: consisting of a short explanation of the Lord's Supper; and meditations and prayers, proper to be used before, and during the receiving of the Holy Communion, according to the form prescribed by the Protestant Episcopal Church, in the United States of America.*" This was followed, in the fall of the same year, by another compilation, from the pen of the same gentleman, entitled, "*A Companion for the Festivals and Fasts of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America.*"

These volumes, especially the former, appeared, at the time of their publication, not only to the non-episcopal reader, but, if we are correctly informed, to discreet Episcopalians themselves, to advance claims which it is extremely difficult to substantiate.

Of the nature of these claims, the following extract from the *Companion for the Altar*, will give a general idea.

" The Judge of the whole earth indeed will do right. The grace of God quickens and animates all the degenerate children of Adam. The mercy of the Saviour is co-extensive with the ruin into which sin has plunged mankind. And 'in every nation, he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted of him.' But where the Gospel is proclaimed, communion with the church by the participation of its ordinances, at the hands of the duly authorized priesthood, is the indispensable condition of salvation. Separation from the prescribed government and regular pristhood of the church, when it proceeds from *involuntary and unavoidable ignorance or error*, we have reason to trust, will not intercept from the humble, the penitent, and obedient, the blessings of God's favour. But when we humbly submit to that priesthood which Christ and his apostles constituted; when, in the lively exercise of penitence and faith, we partake of the ordinances administered by them, we maintain our communion with that church

which the Redeemer purifies by his blood, which he quickens by his Spirit, and whose faithful members he will finally crown with the most exalted glories of his heavenly kingdom. The important truth which the universal church has uniformly maintained, that, to experience the full and exalted efficacy of the sacraments, we must receive them from a valid authority, is not inconsistent with that charity which extends mercy to all who labour under *involuntary* error. But great is the guilt, and imminent the danger, of those who, possessing the means of arriving at the knowledge of the truth, *negligently* or *wilfully* continue in a state of separation from the authorized ministry of the church, and participate of ordinances administered by an irregular and invalid authority. Wilfully rending the peace and unity of the church, by separating from the ministrations of its authorized priesthood; obstinately contemning the means which God in his sovereign pleasure, hath prescribed for their salvation, they are guilty of rebellion against their Almighty Law-giver, and Judge; they expose themselves to the awful displeasure of that Almighty Jehovah, who will not permit his institutions to be condemned, or his authority violated, with impunity." This from the "Meditation" for "Saturday evening." p. 202—204.

As we have quoted the passage, rather in order to connect the circumstances which gave rise to

the "collection" immediately under review, than to subject it to rigid criticism; we forbear commenting on several assertions, in maintaining which the reverend writer, if a little pressed, might perhaps find that he has no ingenuity to spare. We now consider it in reference to the subject of the "Essays."

Extravagant as such pretensions must seem to those whose convictions are of a different sort, and offensive as they were to individuals whose predilections are certainly not anti-episcopal, no notice, so far as we know, was taken of Mr. Hobart's productions, nor any thing published on the other side, till the summer of 1805. Then a writer, generally supposed to be the Rev. Dr. Linn, introduced into "the Albany Centinel," under the head of "Miscellanies, No. ix." some free strictures on the Episcopal claims. He immediately met with an antagonist of no mean powers, under the signature of *a Layman of the Episcopal Church*, who is understood to be Thomas Y. How, *Esq.* To the aid of the latter came the Rev. Frederick Beasley, Rector of St. Peter's Church, Albany, with the venerable name of *Cyprian. Clemens*, or Dr. L. himself, shortly appeared in favour of the Miscellanist; as the battle waxed sore, the band of the hierarchy was joined by two right reverend prelates, the one from this state, as *Cornelius;* the other from Pennsylvania, as *an Episcopalian;* together with Mr. (now Dr.)

Hobart himself, in the twofold form of *Detector and Vindex;* while the *Miscellanist* re-appeared in the characters of *Umpire* and an *Inquirer.* By the forces thus marshalled, five against one, the warfare was protracted till the public grew weary, and the printer interposed to effect an armistice. However, that the record and the fruits of so memorable a campaign might not be lost, the Rev Mr. Hobart did not think it a misapplication of his time, nor a disservice to his church, to gather the pieces of both parties, and republish them in a separate volume with a preface, annotations, and comments of his own. We, accordingly, take up the "collection" as it came from his hands.

We have heard a suggestion of unfairness in this transaction. We do not see how the charge can be supported, unless the writers on the Episcopal side have been permitted to alter and amend their essays without extending the same privilege to their opponents. The modification of a single paragraph may cover with ridicule the most forcible argument which was directed against it *before* the modification, and would insult the reader by imposing upon him something which was not the subject of remark. Of so degrading an artifice no reputable man ought to be lightly suspected. As we have no such suspicion, and as this alone could justify a charge of unfairness, we do not see that Mr. H. is at all reprehensible for

republishing a set of essays which had been thrown upon the world without any pecuniary restriction, and accompanying them with such criticism as he deemed just.

Mr. H. observes in his preface, that "the friends of the church and of Episcopacy, however reluctant to discuss an important religious topic in a public paper, were compelled to resort to the same mode, for defence, which the author of Miscellanies had chosen for his attack." We lament, as sincerely as themselves, that a *Newspaper* was selected for such a discussion. We lamented it from the first. We never flattered ourselves that it would operate with a favourable influence either on the cause of truth, or on the social feeling of the community.

But when Mr. H. and the *Layman*, and *Cyprian*, all complain of being assaulted in the peaceful exercise of a common right, and thus endeavour to throw the odium of aggression upon the author of "Miscellanies," it is rather over-acting. To exclude all non-episcopalians from "the church which the Redeemer purifies by his blood, and quickens by his Spirit,"—to pronounce all their ministrations "irregular and invalid,"—to charge them with "great guilt" and threaten them with "imminent danger," for "negligently or wilfully continuing in a state of separation" from the episcopal church—to represent them as "wilfully rending the peace and unity of the church; as

obstinately contemning the means which God hath appointed for their salvation;" as "guilty of rebellion against their Almighty Law-giver, and Judge,"—to publish all this to the world; and then most gravely to tell these same non-episcopalians, that there is no attack upon them; but only a little wholesome admonition for the edification of devout episcopalians on the evening before the Holy Communion! and, moreover, to put on a lofty air, and break out into angry rebuke, toward those who are not satisfied with their explanation, is really an improvement in polemical finesse. But hold! let us look again at these pretty figures of rhetoric, by which thunderbolts, hurled at the heads of opponents, are converted into the gentle dews of instruction and consolation to friends—Schismatics, usurpers, renders of the church's unity, rebels against their Almighty Law-giver!—Verily, if this is no attack upon non-episcopalians, it is so like one, that we need a shrewd interpreter at our elbow, to prevent our mistaking it. "I never," said Jack, of Lord Peter's brown bread, "saw a piece of mutton in my life, so nearly resembling a slice from a twelve-penny loaf!!"

If Mr. H. had intended an attack upon the anti-episcopal denominations, in what manner *could* he have made it? Not by assailing them individually in the street: not by entering their houses and reading them a lecture on schism: not even

by preaching against them in his own place of worship: for this would be "instructing his own people;" and if any others should happen to stroll in, he could not help that, more than he could hinder their buying and reading his books;* which, according his own account, he neither desired nor expected. It is the dictate of common sense that if an author print and publish severe reflections upon any body of men, he not only attacks them, but does it in the most open manner possible. If one of our citizens should write and advertise in the Gazettes, a pamphlet, calling all the members of the community, but those of his own sect, traitors and rebels to the government, would Mr. H. or any body else, comprehended in the charge, be satisfied with such an apology as this: "You, have no right, sir, to be offended with any part of my pamphlet. It is true, I have called you a rebel and a traitor, but you should not construe these epithets into an attack upon you; for the least candour will enable you to perceive that I published my pamphlet for the exclusive use of my own connexions?" Would this, we ask, convince Mr. H. or any one else, and send him home perfectly satisfied to be denounced, as a rebel and a traitor, so often as a zealous partisan might judge it conducive to the edification of his own particular friends? We believe not. Neither will the non-episcopalians be satisfied with Mr. H's. apology for himself. They will probably

view it as a stratagem, and not a very deep one, to avoid the unpopularity of appearing as the aggressor. Some of them, too, may consider Mr. H's. books as the continuance of a system of attack which commenced several years ago, when a certain preacher declared to the faces of some of the most venerable ministers in this city, that all clergymen not episcopally ordained, are impostors; their commissions, forgeries; and their sacraments, blasphemy.*

These aspersions raised a great clamour at the time; and the repetition of them by Mr. H. and

* The preacher was Mr. WRIGHT; the place, St. Paul's church; the occasion, a deacon's ordination; and the text, of which, to use his own words, he "took leave," in order to give the poor non-episcopalians a *hit*, that injunction of our Lord, "*Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless as doves.*" That the orator was right in taking this "leave," will hardly be questioned, as he immediately broke through the second precept of his text; and the consequences proved that he had but little skill in the first. The effusion had more of every thing in the serpent, than his wisdom; and more of every thing in the dove, than her innocence.

A circumstance which rendered the attack an outrage, was the care of the episcopal clergy to circulate notice of the ordination, and their solicitude for the attendance of their non-episcopal brethren! One of the latter, who was present, remarked, at the close of the service, with the pith and point of indignant feeling, that "Mr. W. possessed a large stock of confidence, to tell his bishop to his face, that he was an unregenerated man, and no member of the Christian church!" It being well known that the Right Reverend Father in God, SAMUEL, bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the State of New-York, had been baptized by the Rev. Mr. DUBOIS, one of the ministers of the Reformed Dutch Church. Therefore,—&c. Alas! Alas!

others, though in more decent language, has been loudly censured, as a violation of all the rules of prudence and charity. Of their *prudence* we say nothing. And the offence against charity is not the point of difficulty with us. Nor do we think that the author of "Miscellanies," in declaiming against episcopal "bigotry and superstition," has taken the question by the proper handle. These are, at best, ungracious compliments, which, though they may vent the ire of the writer, contribute little to the emolument of the reader; and are generally repaid with good will, and with large interest. Truth, can admit of no compromise with error, nor does charity require it. They are the truly charitable who point out the way of life, and warn their fellow men of dangerous mistake. Therefore we shall neither dispute the right of an Episcopalian to publish his peculiar sentiments, nor when they happen to bear hard upon others, shall we cry out against their uncharitableness. Our concern is with their truth or falsehood. And as we are far from impeaching the sincerity of Mr. H. and his coadjutors, whatever we may think of their discretion; so our criticisms are intended to apply to them solely as *authors*. For their personal characters, we entertain unfeigned respect. Nor can we be justly charged with violating that respect, though we examine their claim with as little ceremony as they have brought it forward. If the errour be ours, let them overwhelm

our darkness with the effulgence of their light—if the error be theirs, God forbid that any human regards should prevail with us to pass it gently by. With the imperial Stoick, we "aim at *truth*, by which no man was ever injured."*

They tell us then, that their "priesthood" is the only "authorized ministry"—that the church in which it officiates, is the only one in covenant with God—that where the gospel is proclaimed, communion with this church, by the participation of its ordinances at the hands of the duly authorized priesthood, is the indispensable condition of salvation—that whatever mercy may be extended to those who labour under *involuntary* errour, such as *negligently* or *wilfully* continue in a state of separation from the authorized ministry of the church, and participate of ordinances administered by an irregular and invalid authority, are guilty not only of schism, but of contempt of God's institutions; of rebellion against his government, and of exposing themselves to his awful displeasure. In fewer words, their doctrine is, that non-episcopalians are no part of the Christian church; but are "children of wrath," and without a single hope founded on covenanted mercy. No "repentance toward God;" no "faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ;" no conformity to his image; no zeal for his glory, can be of any avail. The

* Ζητῶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὑφ' ἧς οὐδὲις πώποτε ἐβλεβη.—Mar. Anton. Lib. I. c. 21. p. 50. ed. Gatakeri.

simple fact of their separation from the "authorized," that is to say, from the episcopal "priesthood," mars their religion, and renders it stark naught!

This sweeping sentence of proscription is softened by representing it as "not inconsistent with that charity which extends mercy to all who labour under *involuntary* errour." But the relief is not worth accepting. For in the *first* place, so much is necessary to constitute "*involuntary*," or as it is elsewhere called, "*unavoidable*," errour, that the instances in which the plea should be substantiated would be rare indeed. Access to means of instruction precludes it effectually. And as there are few districts where this question can be agitated, without episcopalians, or their priests, or their writings, the errour must almost always be wilful; in which case the retreat is cut off—and *secondly*, we have no ground to expect even this very precarious mercy, but the *charity* of Mr. H. and his brethren! Warrant from the word of God they have produced none, and have none to produce. If communion with the authorized, or Episcopal priesthood, be to those among whom the Gospel is proclaimed, an indispensable condition of salvation, what possible escape can be left for those who reject it? The very idea of such an escape, however to be effected, is repugnant to that of an *indispensable* condition. No: if the condition be *indispensable*, they who reject it must

perish. And if they who reject it may still be saved, it is not *indispensable:* otherwise, the definition might run thus, *an indispensable condition is that which may be dispensed with!* The alternative then is, EPISCOPACY OR PERDITION!! Prove this, and there is but one way for us: rush into the arms of the Episcopal Church, and the sooner the better! Prove this, and for our part, little as we are inclined to such a transition at present, we will take refuge immediately in her communion! He is a fool who would put his soul in jeopardy for a single moment, by rejecting an "indispensable condition of salvation;" and risk the loss of Heaven upon the credit of the *charity* of Mr. H. and Bishop HORSLEY!! We are sure that the drift, and have little doubt that the design, of a number of Episcopal publications is to force plain people into such a conclusion.

But before the authors can be justified in uttering a syllable which only looks toward such a conclusion, they ought to be perfectly certain of their premises. To unchurch, with a dash of the pen, all the non-episcopal denominations under Heaven; and cast their members, indiscriminately, into a condition worse than that of the very Heathen, is, to say the least of it, a most dreadful excommunication; and if not clearly enjoined by the authority of God, as criminal as it is dreadful. That all those glorious churches which have flourished in Geneva, Holland, France, Scotland,

England, Ireland, &c. since the reformation; and all which have spread, and are spreading through this vast continent—that those heroes of the truth, who, though they bowed not to the mitre, rescued millions from the man of sin, lighted up the lamp of genuine religion, and left it, burning with a pure and steady flame to the generation following—that all those faithful ministers, and all those private christians, who, though not of the hierarchy, adorned the doctrine of God their Saviour, living in faith, dying in faith; scores, hundreds, thousands of them going away to their father's house under the strong consolations of the Holy Ghost, with anticipated heaven in their hearts, and its hallelujahs on their lips—that all, all were without the pale of the visible church; were destitute of covenanted grace; and left the world without any chance for eternal life, but that unpledged, unpromised mercy which their accusers *charitably* hope may be extended to such as labour under involuntary or unavoidable errour; and this merely because they renounced Episcopacy—are positions of such deep-toned horrour as may well make our hair stand up, "like quills upon the fretful porcupine;" and freeze the warm blood at its fountain. We say this sentance has been pronounced upon millions of the dead and of the living, merely because they were not, or are not, Episcopal. For Mr. H. and his friends have declared in substance, what their famous Dodwell has declared in form.

that, "*the alone want of communion with the bishop, makes persons aliens from God and Christ, and strangers from the covenants of promise, and the commonwealth of Israel!*"*

We shall hardly be accused of transgressing the bounds of moderation, when we demand for such assertions, proof which demolishes cavil, and shuts the mouth of reply. And if their authors cannot produce it; if they be not ready with demonstration, such as shall make "assurance double sure," they must abide the consequences of their temerity.

What the nature of their proof is, and how it will bear them out, we shall enable the reader to judge before we finish this review. We pause to make two observations.

1. The writers with whom we have to do, lay upon the form of church government a stress which is not laid upon it in the word of God. We are far from insinuating that the question is of small moment; we are persuaded, on the contrary, that it is of great moment; and that Christians are chargeable with much sin for the indifference which prevails among them concerning it. We can never grant that the appointments of our Lord Jesus Christ may be innocently neglected; nor

* That M. H. treads closely after Dodwell, see "*Companion for the Festivals and Fasts*," p. 59. And that the author of "memorial of the late Bishop Hobart," if a judgment may be drawn from his remerks upon these Essays, treads equally close. See "memorial."

that any one is excusable for not endeavouring to satisfy himself what these appointments are. But we are very sure that particular views of external church-order, are not the hinging point of salvation. Whether a man shall go to heaven or to hell, will be decided by another inquiry than whether he was an Episcopalian, a Presbyterian, or an Independent. The scriptures have fixed that inquiry to this point, whether he was a believer in the Lord Jesus Christ or not? *He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved: and he that believeth not, shall be damned.* Again. *Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved.* The reverse is, *he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten son of God.* According to these passages, faith in the Lord Jesus as he is exhibited in the Gospel, is "the indispensable condition of salvation."—According to Mr. H. and his compeers, participation of Christian ordinances at the hands of the Episcopal priesthood, is the indispensable condition of salvation. We are not ignorant that in other sections of his book, Mr. H. dwells with interest and force, on the necessity of a living and productive faith. We are glad to see so many things in a strain much more evangelical than pervades most of the ministrations in his church. But this inspires us with the deeper regret on account of the "dead flies" among the precious "ointment." Nor can we suppress our convic-

tion, that in representing an adherence to Episcopacy as "the indispensable condition of salvation," himself, and DAUBENY, and a legion more, have done much toward misleading men's minds as to the foundation of eternal hope. That which wounds the bosom of tender piety, and of which we utterly deny the correctness, is their placing the external order of the church upon a level with the merits of our Lord Jesus, in the article of acceptance before God. We are positively told that soundness in the former is "the indispensable condition of salvation;" and faith in the latter cannot possibly be any more. Nay, with respect to non-episcopalians, Episcopacy is of *primary*, and faith in the Redeemer of *secondary*, importance: for we are told again, that "whoever is in *communion* with the *bishop*, the supreme Governor of the church upon earth, is in *communion* with *Christ* the head of it; and whoever is not in communion with the bishop, is thereby cut off from communion with Christ:" and this is said to be a "general conclusion" "established" by "the *uniform* testimony of ALL the apostolic and primitive writers."* After perusing the paragraph, we were held in suspense between the gaze of astonishment and the swell of indignation. *Why*, he who is acquainted with facts well knows; these gen-

* *Companion for the Festivals and Fasts*, p. 59. from Daubeny. Quere. How many bow-shots are such writers off from the territory of "our sovereign Lord the Pope?"

tlemen *ought* to know; and, in due season, others whom it concerns *shall* know. The meaning is not obscure. There is no access to communion with Christ, but through communion with the bishop. Yet, Mr. H. himself being judge, true faith vitally unites its possessor to the Redeemer;* and in this "vital union" originates all communion with him. If, therefore, faith in Christ produces communion with him, and this communion is inaccessible but through the medium of the bishop, it follows that faith in Christ is impossible where there is no communion with the bishop: and that all non-episcopalians are, of necessity, infidels. And thus our position is proved, that Episcopacy is held up as of primary, and faith in Christ as of secondary, importance. For as both are "indispensable conditions of salvation," that one upon which the existence of the other depends, must be the more important of the two. And this is not an example of that sort of priority which obtains in the relation of *means* to *ends;* the use of the former preceding the attainment of the latter; so that the end, which is the greater, presupposes and follows the means, which are the less. The case before us, we say, is not of this sort: because we have access to the testimony of God, which must be believed in order to salvation, without going through the gate of Episco-

* *Companion for the Altar;* meditation for Thursday.

pacy. It may be urged, that faith in Christ includes the principle of obedience to his institutions; and therefore to resist them, is to show the want of that obedience which flows from faith. Doubtless the faith of Christ does include such a principle. But this no more proves particular views of church order, than it proves particular views of any thing else which is regulated by Christ's authority, to be the "indispensable condition of salvation." Habitual disobedience to any of his known commands will exclude from his kingdom. Yet there are sins both of ignorance and infirmity which consist with a gracious state. And why an errour about church-government is not to be classed among these, the Bible has assigned no reason. And if the high church-men will push their own doctrine, it will compel them to excommunicate each other in their turn. For it is no secret that there have been material differences among them on their favourite theme: and nothing can exceed their confusion and mutual contradiction, when they attempt to found their hierarchy on the scriptures.

At times, we acknowledge, they concede the possibility of "penitence" and a "true faith" out of their church, for it is upon this concession that they rest their *charity* for the non-episcopalian. But as their concession is in diametrical repugnance to their argument, it only lets us see that

they flinch from, the consequences of their own doctrine.

Upon the whole, we have the best evidence that they lay an unwarrantable stress upon the form of ecclesiastical order, by erecting communion with their priesthood into an "indispensable condition of salvation." The alarm which they have sounded on this subject, is *vox et præterea nihil*, mere noise; and need give no disquiet to the most timid conscience.

2. Our next observation is, that as Mr. H. and his fellows have denied all communion with Christ, to non-episcopalians they are bound to show, that there is at least, *more* of the truth and efficacy of the gospel in the Episcopal church than in all other connexions. This is not drawing invidious comparisons between Christian denominations, but on their own principles, a perfectly fair comparison between the church of Christ and a set of associations which do not belong to it. We shall account it no hard task to prove as much of the church of Christ according to our views; nor ought they. For assuredly, if there is not within his church much more of power and love, and of a sound mind;" much more of the fear of God; of "receiving Christ Jesus the Lord" and "walking in him;" of *reverential* attendance upon his worship; of domestic and personal godliness; in one word, much more of the spiritual life, and of that "holiness without

which no man shall see the Lord;" if much more of these things be not found *within* his church than *without* it, "what doth it profit?" Will Mr. H. meet the ordeal? Will he accompany us from temple to temple, from pulpit to pulpit, from house to house, from closet to closet, and agree, that in proportion as there is little or much of "pure and undefiled religion" in them, their grade in the scale of Christian churches shall be low or high? Is it, then, a fact, that in the church which boasts of the only valid ministrations, and the exclusive prerogative of being in covenant with God, there is more evangelical preaching; more of Christ crucified; more plain, close, decisive dealing with the consciences of men, upon the things which belong to their peace, than in many of the churches which she affects to despise? Is it a fact, that her "authorized priesthood" are more scrupulous about the preservation of pure communion; that they object more strongly to the admission of mere men of the world; and are more active in excluding from their fellowship the openly irreligious, than are others? Is it a fact, that they adopt more prompt and vigorous measures to expel from their pulpits doctrine which flies in the face of their avowed principles, and is acknowledged by themselves to be subversive of the Christian system? Is it a fact, that in this "primitive Apostolic" church, the sheep of Christ and his lambs are more plentifully fed with "the bread of

God which came down from heaven?" Or that she has less to attract the thoughtless gay, and more to allure those who become seriously concerned about their eternal salvation, than is to be found in hundreds of churches which she virtually "delivers unto Satan?" Are these facts? We appeal to them who have eyes to see, and ears to hear; especially to them who "have tasted that the Lord is gracious." The interrogatories and the appeal are extremely painful: but we are driven to them by the champions of the hierarchy, who appropriate communion with Christ to their own connexions. We, therefore, put them upon their trial before the bar of scripture, of conscience, and of public criticism. We demand the *evidence* of their exclusive fellowship with the Redeemer; we demand it for our own sakes; we insist upon their showing, according to his word, the superiority of their practical religion both in quantity and quality. If they cannot or will not answer, no rational man will be at a loss for the reason.

An Episcopal church we do know, in which there are hundreds of ministers, and thousands of their people, who are "valiant for the truth;" who exemplify in their own persons the loveliness of the Christian character, and who, with respect to themselves, will never shrink from the strictest investigation. Would to God, we could say as much for all non-episcopalians! But these members of that church who give, in "the fruits of

righteousness," unequivocal proof that the "Spirit of Christ is in them," are not the persons who advance or defend such claims as are set up by Messrs. Daubeny and Hobart. On the contrary, they most cordially welcome to their bosoms, as heirs with themselves of the grace of life, all those "who love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity:" and they are hated, reviled, persecuted, by those very same high churchmen, who, like Mr. H. and his friends are for confining the covenant of salvation to their own precincts.

We have reached only the threshold of the work which we proposed to enter and examine. But if we have detained the reader with preliminary matter, it is because we could not do justice to the subject without it. He is now in possession of facts and reasonings to show that the actual discussions relative to Episcopacy, are not to be classed with those wrangles of party which amuse ignorant zealots, and disgrace sober inquiry. Nothing less is agitated than the question whether as non-episcopalians, we are to walk in the "faith of the gospel," in "joy of the Holy Ghost," and with a "hope that maketh not ashamed;" or be shut up under condemnation, reprobated by God and man? As we did not begin the controversy; nor engage in it till after long forbearance under multiplied provocation; and not even then, till we felt ourselves called upon, by an imperious sense of duty, to vindicate

the perverted truth, and the absurd ordinances, of our master in Heaven; so, having begun, we shall not desist until we shall have exposed those arrogant pretensions, and fallacious reasonings, which are calculated to distress and deceive the hearts of the simple.

Mr. H. in his preface to this collection, assures the reader that,

> "The author of Miscellanies has, with great industry, collected together all the arguments against Episcopacy." p. iv.

We apprehend that Mr. H's zeal, in this paragraph, has outstripped his caution. A man professes to have a very extensive and accurate acquaintance with a subject, when he pledges himself to the public, that "*all* the arguments" on either side of a question relating to it, are contained in a work which he has written or edited. And if the work be defective, especially in material points, he subjects himself to comments most mortifying to his own feelings, most painful to his friends, and not desirable even to his opponents. We, therefore, think, and others may think with us before we shall have done, that Mr. H. ought not to have committed his reputation to the consequences of such an assertion. His reserve ought to have been the greater, as he has taken some pains to invite an examination of his scholarship. This *en passant.* To the book itself.

"The question of Episcopacy," says the Layman in his 9th number, "is a question of fact, to

be determined by a sound interpretation of the sacred volume." We join issue with him; and not only consent, but insist, that the question shall be decided by the scripture alone. We detract not from the respect due to the primitive fathers, nor decline to meet their testimony, as we shall show in proper season. But in fixing the sense of the scripture, their authority is of no more weight with us than the authority of other uninspired men; that is, we regard not their opinion any further than as it is supported by the strength of their reasonings. The written word is the perfect and exclusive rule of our faith. It would be so, had not a shred of Christian antiquity survived the ravages of time. And if all the fathers from *Barnabas* to *Bernard*, had agreed in reckoning among the institutions of Christ, any thing which is not to be found in the statute book of his own kingdom, it should be no article of our creed; and should have no more sway in our conscience than an assertion of the *Layman* himself, or of his clerical friends. This being understood, let us see how the lines of evidence run.

The author of "miscellanies" had, in No. X. argued the identity of presbyters and bishops from the indiscriminate use which the scripture makes of these official terms. His antagonists flout at this argument, with all imaginable contempt, through every part of the discussion. It is "literally," say they, "good for nothing:" "too

feeble to merit a serious reply." It is "wretched sophistry"—"the old and miserable sophistry of names." But wherein does the sophistry consist? Why Paul is called an "elder;" therefore the Presbyterian argument would prove that Paul was no more than a presbyter. Christ himself is called (διακονος) *diaconos*, which is translated a "minister," a "deacon;" therefore the Presbyterian argument would prove, that Christ was no higher than a deacon.

"Presbuteros" (πρεσβυτερος) "signifies an *elder man;* whence comes the term *Alderman*. By this new species of logic," (*which, by the way, is at least more than* 1400 *years* old,) "it might be proved," *saith the Layman*, "that the apostles were, to all intents and purposes, Aldermen, in the civil acceptation of the term; and that every Alderman is really and truly an Apostle." p. 52, 53.

If this argument is correct, the Presbyterians show very small, no doubt. And the Layman is not to blame for stigmatizing it as "wretched sophistry." "The miserable sophistry of names." Yet the reader may be induced to pause, when he is told that men of singular acuteness, learning, candour, penetration, and force of mind, have considered this self-same argument, when fairly stated, as altogether unanswerable. There may perhaps, be some policy in trying to run it down with hard words; for the Layman acknowledges, that the "Episcopalians would *give up their cause at once*, if reduced to the necessity of placing it on such a basis." p. 56. Here the secret is dis-

closed; if the argument from the scriptural use of official titles is valid, down goes the Hierarchy! *Hinc illæ lacrymæ!* No wonder that the attempts are so incessant to scowl, and scoff, and laugh it out of countenance. It will not, however, be parted with so easily; and in listening to a good word for it, the reader may begin to think it possible for a little sophistry to trill from *other* than Presbyterian pens.

In examining the records of the New Testament, we find that the conversion of a number of individuals to the Christian faith, was followed by their organization into a public society under their proper officers. These officers, *without a single exception*, are distributed into the two general classes of *presbyters* or *bishops*, and *deacons:* the former presiding over the spiritual, and the latter over the temporal, interests of their respective charges. This distinction is marked in the strongest manner, and is never confounded. Thus *to the saints in Christ Jesus, which are at Philippi with the* BISHOPS *and* DEACONS—*a* BISHOP *must be blameless—likewise must the* DEACONS *be grave, &c.*

And that the terms *bishop* and *presbyter* in their application to the first class of officers are perfectly convertible, the one pointing out the very same class of rulers with the other, is as evident as the sun "shining in his strength." Timothy was instructed by the apostle Paul in the qualities which were to be required in those who *desired the*

office of a BISHOP.* Paul and Barnabas *ordained* PRESBYTERS *in every church*† which they had founded. Titus is directed to *ordain in every city* PRESBYTERS who are to be *blameless, the husband of one wife.* And the reason of so strict a scrutiny into character is thus rendered, *for a* BISHOP *must be blameless.*‡ If this does not identify the *bishop* with the *presbyter*, in the name of common sense, what can do it? Suppose a law, pointing out the qualifications of a sheriff were to say, a *sheriff* must be a man of pure character, of great activity, and resolute spirit; for it is highly necessary that a *governour* be of unspotted reputation, &c. the bench and bar would be rather puzzled for a construction, and would be compelled to conclude, either that something had been left out in transcribing the law; or that governour and sheriff meant the same sort of officer; or that their honours of the legislature had taken leave of their wits. The case is not a whit stronger than the case of presbyter and bishop in the Epistle to Titus. Again: Paul, when on his last journey to Jerusalem, sends for the PRESBYTERS of Ephesus to meet him at Miletum; and there enjoins these PRESBYTERS *to feed the church of God over which the Holy Ghost had made them* BISHOPS.‖ It appears, then, that the *bishops* to whom Paul refers in his instructions to Timothy, were neither more nor less than plain

* 1 Tim. iii. 1. † Acts. xiv. 23. ‡ Tit. i. 5. ‖ Act. xx. 17. 28.

presbyters. To a man who has no turn to serve ; no interest in perverting the obvious meaning of words; one would think that a mathematical demonstration could not carry more satisfactory evidence. But conclusive as it would be in every other case, it is in this case, the advocate of the Hierarchy tells us, " good for nothing," because Paul is called an " elder," and Christ a " deacon" as well as a " bishop," and, therefore, if the argument proves any thing, it proves that neither the apostles nor their Lord, were any higher in authority than our elders and deacons.

May we ask whether " bishop," " presbyter," " deacon," signify *any thing at all* as terms of office, or not ? If they do not, then the scripture has used a parcel of words and names relative to church government, which are absolutely without meaning. This will not be said. Something, therefore, and something *official* too, they must mean. We ask again, whether or not they designate precisely any particular officers, as *mayor*, *alderman*, *recorder*, do in the commonwealth ? Or whether, like the term *magistrate*, they merely express authority in general ; so that no judgment can be formed from them as to the grade, or functions of the offices to which they are annexed ? If the former, the assailant of the Hierarchy, its own friends being judges, is invincible, and their citadel is laid in the dust. Of course, they prefer the latter; and insist that the official title occurring in the

New Testament, can afford no aid in ascertaining what offices Christ hath instituted in his church. If this is their hope, we much fear that it is a forlorn hope indeed.

If our question be not troublesome, we would ask, what is the use of *names?* Is it not to distinguish objects from each other? To prevent the confusion which must pervade conversation about *nameless* things? And to facilitate the intercourse of speech, by compressing into a single term, ideas which, without that expedient, would be protracted through descriptions of intolerable length? Now if there are not in the New Testament *appropriate* titles of office which distinguish the several officers from each other, there could have been no such titles in use at the time when that book was written? For it would surpass the credulity of infidels themselves, to imagine that the writers, by purposely omitting the *particular*, and employing only the *general*, terms of office, would throw both their history and their readers into utter confusion. There can be no possible reason for omitting terms characteristic of the several offices, but the fact that no such terms existed. A marvellous phenomenon this! That an immense society as the Christian church is, should be organized under its proper officers; should ramify itself through all the nations of the earth; should have every one of its branches regularly officered; and yet be destitute of names by which

the officers might be correctly known; so that when an official term was mentioned, no ingenuity could guess whether an officer inspired or uninspired, ordinary or extraordinary, highest or lowest in the church, was intended!!! Did any thing like this ever happen in the affairs of men, from father Adam, down to this present *A. D.* 1807? Is such a fact consistent with the nature and use of human language? Is it consistent with the operations or the being of any society whatever? If the state of the primitive church with respect to terms of office, were such as the Episcopal argument represents it, she would indeed, have been

Mostrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui LUMEN *ademptum;*

a perfectly unnatural and monstrous production; dark and confused as "Chaos and old Night."

This demonstration that the representation on the part of the Hierarchy cannot be true, accords precisely with scriptural facts. From these, therefore, we shall prove that it is not true. A controversy of moment was referred by the church at Antioch, to the apostles and elders of Jerusalem. Now, if *apostle* and *elder* are not specific terms of office, where is the propriety of the distinction? And to whom was the reference made? Would the description have answered as well if the assembly had been composed *entirely* of apostles; *entirely* of elders; or *entirely* of deacons? Paul and

Barnabas ordained elders (*presbyters*) in every city. Cannot an Episcopalian tell, even from the *name*, whether they ordained bishops, priests, or deacons? Titus was commissioned by Paul to ordain *elders* in every city: and Timothy received his instructions pointing out the qualifications of men who were to be made *bishops* and *deacons*. Pray, if the *officer* was not precisely designated by the *name*, what sense was there in giving particular instructions relative to each? How were Titus and Timothy to find out what sort of officers the apostle meant? Would any Episcopalian affirm, that under cover of the indefinite terms *elder*, *bishop*, and *deacon*, the good evangelists might have settled down a dozen *diocesans* in every city? or created a score of new *apostles?* Why not? if *apostle*, *bishop*, *presbyter*, *deacon*, are only *general* terms of office, but are not appropriated to any particular orders of officers. Nay, if the Episcopal assertion on this subject is correct, a broad line of absurdity runs through the apostolic writings, and through the whole transactions of the apostolic church.

The simple truth is, that all these terms, *apostle*, *bishop*, and *presbyter*, and *deacon*, were as distinctive, and were annexed to certain officers with as much regularity and exactness, as any official terms can be at this hour. The first was given by our Lord Jesus Christ, to officers commissioned immediately by himself, for the purpose of car-

rying his name and establishing his church among the nations. The last, viz. *deacon*, was given to officers ordained by the apostles to look after the poor. The other, viz. *elder*, or *presbyter*, had long been in use as a specific term of office. It signified a ruler; but a ruler whose power was well defined, and was perfectly familiar to the Jews. *Presbyters* were to be found in every synagogue; and every man in the nation was acquainted with their functions. If ever there was a term which conveyed precise ideas of a particular office, and was too notorious to be mistaken, *presbyter* was that term. By transferring it to rulers in the Christian church, the greatest caution was taken both to prevent misconception of their authority, and to facilitate the organization of Christian societies. As there were Jews every where, and converts every where gathered from among them, there were every where a number prepared to fall, without difficulty, into a regular church connexion, and to train the Gentile believers, to whom the whole system was perfectly new. But they would have talked of *elders* to the day of their death, without the most distant notion of such a ruler as a *diocesan bishop*. These Christian *presbyters* were also *bishops* (επισκοποι.) The former word denoting their authority; the latter, the functions growing out of it. They were, according to the form in which the master had distributed their duties, to execute the office of *presbyters*, by taking

the *episcopate* or *oversight* of the flock. So charges Paul the *presbyters* of Ephesus: *Feed the flock of God, over which the Holy Ghost hath made you* BISHOPS i. e. *overseers*, or *inspectors*. So charges Peter the *presbyters* of the dispersion: *Feed the flock of God—taking the* OVERSIGHT *thereof:* the word is επισκοπουντες, which signifies, "*exercising the Episcopal office.*"

If, then, the term *presbyter* or *elder*, had been so long settled; if it denoted an officer as unlike a modern bishop as can well be conceived: and if it was admitted universally into the Christian church, as thus understood, (for there is no intimation of its sense having been changed,) then the allegation of the Hierarchy, that it is an indefinite term, signifying merely a ruler, without reference to his station, is altogether false, and the objection founded upon this allegation is altogether frivolous. On the other hand, the argument founded upon it for the identity of the scriptural bishops and presbyters as rulers in the church, to the exclusion of prelates, is solid and strong; the flings of "good for nothing," and "miserable sophistry," to the contrary notwithstanding.

We have derived some amusement from remarking, that while our Episcopal friends pertinaciously deny that any official name in the New Testament is so appropriated to a particular office as to designate the *kind* of officer, they cannot render their own reasoning intelligible without the aid of the very principle which they reject.

"The apostles," *says the Layman*, "are called presbyters. This proves conclusively that no argument can be drawn, by the advocate of parity, from the promiscuous use of the terms presbyter, bishop, in the sacred writings. If it proves that there is now but one order in the ministry, it proves equally that Paul was upon a perfect level with the elders of Ephesus."* Again,

"Christ is called *diaconos*, which is translated deacon, or minister. Therefore Christ was on a level with the deacons of Jerusalem."

Does not every reader perceive, at the first glance, that the whole force of this objection, which is to put down the advocates of ministerial parity, depends upon the supposition, that presbyter and deacon *are* titles appropriated to particular grades of office? For if they are not, if they denote only office in general; what will the objection say? To try it fairly—substitute *officers*, in the room of *elders;* and the proposition will stand thus: the apostles are called *elders;* therefore, the apostles are on a level with *officers* in the church. This is not likely to fill the "advocates of parity," with any great alarm. Again,

"The apostle addresses Timothy and him alone, as the supreme governor of the church, [of Ephesus] calling upon him to see that his presbyters preach no strange doctrine."†

Here the Layman uses *presbyter* as a precise term, for a particular grade of officers; and so does the apostle in the epistle referred to, or else the Layman's argument, to quote his own words, "is literally good for nothing." Nay, he even con-

* No. 1. *Collec.* p. 8. † Layman, No. v. *Collec.* p. 55.

cedes that the term *presbuteros*, elder, is "ordinarily appropriated in the New Testament, to the second grade of ministers;" although, "it is capable of being applied to all the grades."* But how we are to discover when it is applied in one way, and when in the other; i. e. when it has a particular, and when a general signification, neither this gentleman nor his reverend associates have been pleased to tell us. If we are to judge from facts, which they recommend as an excellent way of judging, and if we collect facts from their own conduct in the debate, the rule is this, *Presbyter is always a* DEFINITE *term of office when it makes* FOR *the prelates, and always an* INDEFINITE *one, when it makes* AGAINST *them.* For example: When Timothy is to be proved a bishop, in the genuine prelatical sense of the word, presbyter infallibly signifies the second grade of ministers. This is sober, solid logic, which no man who can put a syllogism together must venture to dispute. On the other side, when Paul, addressing these same presbyters, seems to identify them with bishops; then presbyter is nothing more than a general term of office: and the argument drawn from its being convertible with *episcopos*, or bishop, is "literally good for nothing," "the old and miserable sophistry of names!"

All this, to be sure, is vastly ingenious, and infinitely removed from sophistry and quibble! But

* No. 1. *Collec.* p. 7.

as imagination is apt now and then to be unruly, we fancied that it is not unlike the Socinian method of defending the inspiration of the scriptures. Let those great luminaries of wisdom, Dr. Priestley and his compeers, patch up the "lame accounts" of Moses; refute the "inconclusive" reasonings of Paul; and otherwise alter and amend the Bible, as their philosophy shall dictate; and, then, the sacred writings will be *inspired* to some purpose! Let the abettors of prelacy interpret terms now one way, and then the contrary way, as it shall suit their convenience, and they will, no doubt, convert the New Testament into a forge for the Hierarchy, and swear in an apostle to superintend the manufacture.

But still, how are we to repel the consequence with which they press us? If presbyter and deacon are definite terms of office, and the apostles are called presbyters, and their Lord a deacon, (διακονος) we certainly, by our argument, confound all distinctions: and put the apostles, and their master too, on a level with the ordinary and even lowest officers in the church.

No such thing. The conclusion is vain, because the premises are false. The objection overlooks a distinction which its authors themselves are compelled to observe every hour of their lives; and that is, the distinction between the absolute and relative use of terms. By the *absolute* use of terms, we mean their being applied to certain

subjects in such a manner as to sink their general sense in a particular one. By their *relative* use, we mean their being coupled with other terms which permit them to be understood in their general sense only. To the former class belong all *names* which, however general in their primary ideas, have become appropriated to particular objects. To the latter belong the innumerable applications which may be made of the very same terms, when not thus appropriated. Examples will best illustrate the distinction. *Congress*, *judge*, *assembly*, are terms of great latitude, and their applications may be varied without end. When we say a *congress* of bodies, of waters, of people—a *judge* of music, of sculpture, of painting—an *assembly* of citizens, of clergy, of delegates; all the world perceives that these terms are used in their general sense, and can be used in no other. But when we speak of the United States, and say, *the congress*, *the judges;* or of the state of New-York, and say, *the judges*, *the assembly*, all the world perceives that the terms are used in a particular sense, and designate precisely certain public officers to whom, and to whom alone, every man, woman, and child, in the country will refer them. Now supposing that certain individuals should remit a litigated point to one of the *judges*, and we should insist that this may mean the *Lieut. Governour*, because the term judge *may* be applied to him, when he sits in the court of errours: and

suppose an opponent to urge that "judge" is an official term appropriated to known officers; and us to reply, your argument is "literally good for nothing," "the miserable sophistry of names;" judge is a generic term; and by this same mode of reasoning you might prove that every justice of the peace is on a level with the chief justice of the United States, or with God himself, because "judge" is a name given to them all!! Would not this pass for most sage ratiocination, and persuade the public, that whoever should not bow to it, must be either a "miserable" sophist, or an incorrigible dunce? And wherein it would yield the praise of acuteness, closeness, or strength, to the Episcopal objection to the argument drawn by the advocates of parity from the use of *official* terms in the New Testament, we are unable to discern. The mistake in both cases is the same, viz. the confounding the absolute and relative, or as we have explained it, the official and unofficial use of the same term. Make this plain distinction, and the reply of the Hierarchy is ruined. The Lord Jesus is emphatically the SENT of God; and therefore he is called, the *apostle* OF OUR PROFESSION.* He is also called *the minister* (*diaconos*) *of* THE CIRCUMCISION:† but never, absolutely, "an apostle," "a deacon." Paul and his fellow apostles are often called *diaconoi*, ministers; in such form as this, *ministers* OF GOD, *ministers of* THE NEW TESTA-

* Heb. iii. 1. † Rom. xv. 8.

MENT :* but never, absolutely, " deacons." They are also called *elders*, or *presbyters;* and for this very good reason, that possessing ordinary as well as extraordinary powers, they frequently participated in the councils, and exercised only the authority, of presbyters.†

Reverse the order : begin with the lowest and go up to the highest officer in the church, and you will not find an instance in which the official name of the superiour is applied to the inferiour. Deacons are no where called presbyters, nor presbyters, apostles. *Cyprian* does, indeed, assert, that " the apostolic authority was manifestly communicated to Epaphroditus." Where is the proof?

" St. Paul," says he, " in his epistle to the Philippians, ii. 25, calls him the apostle to the Philippians." " But I supposed it necessary to send to you Epaphroditus, my brother and companion in labour and fellow-soldier, but your apostle," (in our version, your *messenger*.) Accordingly St. Jerome observes, " by degrees, in process of time, others were ordained apostles by those whom our Lord had chosen"—as that passage to the Philippians shows. " I supposed it necessary to send unto you " Epaphroditus, your apostle." And Theodoret, upon this place, gives this reason why Epaphroditus is called the apostle to the Philippians. " He was intrusted with the Episcopal government, " as being their bishop." But these are parts of scripture on which the advocates of Episcopacy place the least reliance."‡

In this paragraph, as in many others, the asser-

* 2 Cor. vi. 4.

† This matter shall be more fully explained hereafter.

‡ CYPRIAN, No. iii. *Collec.* p. 72.

tions of Cyprian, applauded and adopted by Mr. H. display more haste than inquiry, and more ardour than discretion. To force a testimony in favour of Episcopacy, he has contrived, by a false translation of two words, to put into the mouth of the apostle Paul a speech which he never uttered. "St. Paul," says he, "calls Epaphroditus, *the* apostle to the Philippians." Paul does no such thing; he would not have spoken truth, if he had. No person, as shall be proved in its place, could be vested with apostolic authority, but by the immediate appointment of Christ himself. Such an appointment Epaphroditus had not; and, therefore, Paul did not, could not, call him "an apostle," in the official sense of that term; much less "the apostle to the Philippians;" because a permanent connexion with any particular church, like that which subsists between a presbyter and his congregation, or between a prelate and his diocese, was essentially incompatible with the apostolic character. We wonder that *Cyprian*, while his hand was in, did not fix down Paul himself as the diocesan of Corinth and its dependencies. For his own words to the Christians of that city are, *If I be not an apostle unto others, yet doubtless I am* TO YOU: *for the seal of mine apostleship are ye in the Lord.** Here occurs, in a fair and honest translation, the very phrase of "an apostle *to* a people," which *Cyprian* fabricated by a gross mis-

* 1 Cor. ix. 2.

rendering of a passage in the epistle to the Philippians. And considering the anxiety with which the New Testament has been searched for prelates, there can be no doubt that if stubborn, most stubborn facts did not stand in the way, Paul would have been made up into a diocesan long ago: and introduced to our acquaintance, with the mitre on his brow, as the bishop of Corinth. But if the declaration, "I am an apostle unto you," is no proof whatever, that Paul filled an Episcopal see among the Corinthians; how can the expression, "an apostle to you," even admitting it to be correct, prove that Epaphroditus was bishop of Philippi? But the words, mangled by *Cyprian* into an "apostle *to* you,"* signify just what our common version represents them to signify, "your messenger." The Philippians had sent him with a contribution to the relief of the apostle's wants; as he himself tells us in the fourth chapter. *I have all and abound: I am full; having received of Epaphroditus the things which were sent from you—v.* 18. This is the reason why he is called their messenger. The coupling of the term *apostolos* with "your," takes it out of the predicament of official names, and requires that it be understood in its general sense, which is, "a messenger." It has nothing to do with Episcopal relations, or clerical functions of any sort; say Theodoret what he pleases. It was hardly just to found the title of a

* ὑμῶν ἀπόστολος.

bishop in the murder of a text. But whatever sentence be pronounced on Theodoret, we entirely acquit *Cyprian* from the charge of sinning against knowledge.

Cyprian seems also to labour under the inconvenience of a bad memory. For after agreeing with his friend the *Layman* to reprobate all reasoning from words to things; he lays the whole stress of an argument for the prelatical dignity of Epaphroditus upon a single word. And so mighty is the force of this word in his eyes, that on the strength thereof, he says that the "Apostolic authority was *manifestly* communicated to Epaphroditus." When the fact turns out to be, that even the word which is to *manifest* this "communication," has nothing to do with the subject! And then, to finish neatly, he informs us in the close of the paragraph, that "these are parts of scripture on which the advocates of Episcopacy place the *least reliance*." They are wise to let the thistle alone after feeling its prickles—But it is rather incongruous to place only "the *least reliance*" upon "parts of scripture" which "*manifestly*" prove the very point they would be at. And no less so, to build their "manifest" proof upon an argument which they themselves have pronounced to be "miserable sophistry," and "literally good for nothing!"*

* These gentlemen are hardly civil to their favourite *Theodoret*, from whom, through Whitby and Potter, they borrowed this

Verum operi longo fas est obrepere somnum:

the right to be drowsy, in protracted toil, has become prescriptive. Homer occasionally nodded; and we shall not refuse to *Cyprian* and his colleagues the indulgence of a nap.

The sum is, that the terms *apostle*, *bishop*, *presbyter*, *deacon*, designate, with precision, officers known and established in the apostolic church—That no two of these terms are used interchangeably, excepting "presbyter" and "bishop." We mean that apostle and bishop; apostle and presbyter; apostle and deacon; bishop and deacon; presbyter and deacon, are never put promiscuously the one for the other: And the reason is, that they *do not signify the same thing*. But that "bishop" and "presbyter" *are* used interchangeably; so that you may put the one for the other at pleasure, without destroying or obscuring the sense of the sacred writers: and the reason is, and must be, that they *do signify the same thing;* that is, they mark one and the same grade of ecclesiastical rulers. This last proposition, *Theodoret*, fierce as he was for prelacy, has himself advanced. He probably did not observe how fatal it is to the hierarchy, as the discussions on that subject were not, in his day, very deep nor general. But so sensible was Dr. Hammond, the most learned,

"manifest" communication of the apostolic authority—to hold him up with one hand as a venerable defender of their cause; and with the other to lash him as a miserable sophist.

perhaps, of all the episcopal champions, that the argument drawn by presbyterians from the identity of the scriptural bishop and presbyter, is conclusive against prelacy, that he boldly denied the existence of such officers as are now called presbyters, till about or after the death of the apostles.* In supporting this paradoxical opinion, he

* "Although this title of Πρεσβυτέροι, *Elders*, have been extended to a second order in the church, and is now only in use for them, under the names of *Presbyters*, yet in the scripture-times it belonged principally, if not alone, to bishops, there being no evidence that any of that second order were then instituted, though soon after, before the writing of *Ignatius' epistles*, there were such instituted in all the churches."—Hammond, *on Act* xi. 30. p. 380.

How irreconcileably all this is at war with the assertions and reasonings of other learned advocates of the hierarchy, from whom the unlearned ones necessarily copy, we may amuse ourselves with showing in a more convenient place. One or two remarks we cannot suppress. Dr. Hammond does not tell us how these presbyters came into the church, but is pretty sure that they were introduced *after* "the scripture times," that is, after the canon of the scripture was completed, and "*before* the writing of *Ignatius' epistles*." The Dr. then confesses that the order of presbyters as inferiour to the bishop, is not of divine right; there being no evidence that any of that second order were instituted in scripture times: consequently, that as Christ had regulated his church, bishops or presbyters, and deacons, had no intermediate officer between them. This is exactly what the presbyterians maintain, and they are much his debtor. But as he saw that their argument would ruin him, as he was utterly unable to controvert its principle, viz. the identity of the bishop and presbyter; and as he was determined not to give up the hierarchy, he had recourse to the extravagant fiction of transforming all the presbyters into Diocesans. But as Diocesans with only deacons, would constitute rather a bald hierarchy, it was requisite, to give eclat to their dignity, to foist in

metamorphoses every presbyter of the apostolic church into a diocesan bishop! The meaning of language shall be inverted: the testimony of the scripture shall be dislocated: the presbyters of the city of Ephesus shall be an assemblage of diocesan bishops collected from all Asia! Truth, probability, and common sense, shall be set at naught—but the object is worth the price; the sacrifice is amply compensated, provided presbyters be banished from the New Testament, and no ruler be seen there unless in the shape of a diocesan bishop! Had only the *Layman* and *Cyprian*, and their friends, been troubled, there had been less cause of surprise. But that an argument "good for nothing;" a bit of "miserable sophistry," should put Dr. *Hammond*, the ὁ παυυ, the very Goliath of "the church," into such a fright as nearly to turn his brain, is strange indeed!

But should the episcopalian be worsted in the contest about the scriptural *titles*, what will be to

another order for which three is no scriptural warrant. And thus at one stroke he has levelled with the ground the whole fabric which the other episcopal workmen have been rearing. For if Timothy and Titus were not Diocesan bishops, as the latter affirm and the Dr. denies; and if they were not metropolitans, as the Dr. affirms, the others deny, and no man living can prove; then one of their famous three orders has vanished away. Of the Dr's supposition that the presbyters were instituted *before* the writings of Ignatius' epistles, the reason is, that they must be found *prior to that date*, or else poor Ignatius must be hung up for forgery.—A notable manœuvre this to save the credit of the principal witness for the Hierarchy.

us the advantage of victory, or to him the injury of defeat, if he shall, nevertheless, establish his claim by scriptural *facts?* So very little, that the choice between victory and defeat, on the first ground, would not be worth a straw to either. Abstractly considered, there is no inconsistency between our own doctrine of the identity of bishops and presbyters, and the episcopal doctrine of a superiour grade. For certainly it does not follow, from the nature of the thing, that because bishop and presbyter mean the same officer, therefore there is no other officer above him. But *as the facts stand*, the case is widely different; and the value of the argument from the scriptural titles lies here, that this superiour order must be found among the bishops and presbyters, or not at all; because, with the exception of deacons, these were the only ordinary officers in the apostolic church. If, then, "bishop" is the same with "presbyter," the superiour or prelatical order is absolutely unknown to the official language of the New Testament. Presbyters and deacons we meet with in abundance, but not the shadow of a prelate ever crosses our path. Now, that official titles should be conferred upon every grade of officers in the church except the highest; that this officer should have no place in the official catalogue; that he should wander up and down among the churches without so much as a name; that while his subalterns are mentioned particularly and repeatedly,

his own existence and dignity should be a matter of mere inference from his *acts*, so far surpasses all the powers of belief, that the proof of his existence is almost, if not altogether, impossible. This leads to a very short refutation of a plea on which no small "reliance" has been placed by episcopal writers, from *Theodoret* down to the *Layman;* viz. that names of office, like other words, change their signification; and become, in process of time, signs of ideas quite different from those which they originally expressed.

"In Roman history," *says the Layman*, "we find the term *Imperator* at one period applied to designate a general of an army; at another, a magistrate clothed with unlimited civil and military authority. Suppose we should be told that every general of an army was Emperor of Rome; and that the Emperor of Rome was merely general of an army; what would be the reply? That the term Imperator had changed its signification. And how would this be proved? By the Roman history, which shows us that the Emperors had generals under them, over whom they exercised authority. Apply this reasoning to the case under consideration. The terms bishop, presbyter, are used promiscuously in the New Testament. *Therefore*, say the advocates of parity, *they designated the same office in the ages subsequent to the apostles.* Is this a logical conclusion? Surely not. Names change their signification. Ecclesiastical history tells us, and the most learned advocates of parity have admitted the fact, that the order of bishops existed in the church as distinct from, and superiour to, the order of presbyters, within forty or fifty years after the last of the apostles. The bishops then had presbyters under them, over whom they exercised authority. The offices were distinct from the beginning, bishops being the successors,

not of those who are promiscuously called *bishops*, *presbyters*, *elders*, in the New Testament, but of the apostles themselves. Theodoret tells us expressly, "that in the process of time those who succeeded to the apostolic office, left the name of apostle to the apostles, strictly so called, and gave the name of bishop to those who succeeded to the apostolic office." No argument, then, can be founded on the promiscuous use of names."*

We hardly expected to find the Layman advancing and retracting a doctrine in the compass of a single page. Yet, assuredly, if bishops are not the successors of those who are promiscuously called bishops and presbyters, then these names do designate a precise order of officers, which was the very thing the Layman had denied in the preceding paragraph. That names change their signification is no new discovery. But can this either help the hierarchy, or hurt the advocates of parity? Things are before names; and the changes in things before changes in names. If, therefore, a change has passed upon the signification of official names in the church, since the days of the apostles, that alone proves to a demonstration, that a change has also passed upon the offices themselves; which consequently are not *as the apostles left them.* This is exactly what the presbyterians maintain; and so the episcopal plea returns with all its force upon its authors, and fastens upon their hierarchy the charge of having departed from, and corrupted, the order which Christ appointed for his church, and which the death of his apostles

* Layman, No. 1. *Collec.* p. 8. 9.

sealed up for permanency. We are not ignorant that the prelatical writers attribute this change of names to a very different cause. The celebrated Dr. Bentley, who, in critical learning, in spirit, and fire, surpasses the most of them, and falls short of none, thinks it was the *modesty* of the prelates* which induced them to relinquish the name of apostle, and to assume that of bishop. It is hard to estimate the degree of modesty which pervaded an immensely numerous body of prelates† at a period of which we have scarcely any records. The epistles of their tutelar saint, *Ignatius*, do not abound with that lovely virtue; and all the world is witness, that in matters relating to their titles and power, the order has been entirely innocent of such an imputation for fourteen centuries at least. The apostles themselves decorated the prelates, we are told, with their own name and ordinary dignity; they exercised the authority and wore the name, during the life, and in the presence of the apostles; and after their death retained the *dignity*, but renounced the *appellation* out of pure *modesty!* Dr. Hammond has more regard to consistency. He first creates, after the death of the apostles, an inferiour order of clergy; and as they could not well do without a name, he very ingeniously splits up the designation of the pre-ex-

* *Phileleutherus Lipsiensis*, p. 186.

† Dr. Hammond says there were *twenty-four*, besides the metropolitan, in Judea alone. *Annot.* on Rev. iv. 4.

isting order, giving one half to the prelates, and the other to his new race of officers!

We repeat, that change of *names* pre-supposes change of *things*. This is the natural and necessary course of language. The contrary would reverse the operations of the human mind. *When* the change was introduced, is perfectly immaterial to the argument. When the last of the apostles breathed out his spirit, the authority of the living God "bound up the testimony, and sealed the law among his disciples." No additions nor diminutions now. And whether the alteration in the government of the church, which produced a corresponding alteration in the names of her officers, took place "forty years," or forty score of years, or forty hours after the decease of the apostles, is not, with regard to the rule of conscience, worth the trouble of a question. The advocates of parity, do not, as the Layman affirms, infer from the promiscuous use of the terms bishop and presbyter in the New Testament, "that they designated the same office in the ages subsequent to the apostles." It is of no importance to them, what these terms signified in after ages. They prove that these terms signify in the New Testament, one and the same order of rulers; and therefore insist, that, as the rule of faith and the sense of the scripture are immutable, the same terms must mean, at this hour, the very same thing which they meant as they dropped from the

pen of an apostle. This is enough for them, as they entertain no fear of being unable to demonstrate that the scriptural presbyters are not diocesan bishops; and are the only ordinary rulers which the New Testament, the statute book of Christ's kingdom, recognizes as of his institution. The *subsequent* change of sense in the scriptural titles, as we have more than once observed, proves decisively a change in the original order of the church: for upon no other principle can the other change be explained. The Layman has been peculiarly unhappy, in forcing it upon the notice of his readers. He has only turned "king's evidence," against his party; and, in attempting to parry a Presbyterian thrust, has unwittingly smitten his own bishop under the fifth rib.

The advocates for the Hierarchy labour hard to show that any argument from official names to the offices designated in the New Testament, is inconclusive. They even pronounce it "good for nothing." Their hope is to render the scripture, thus far, neutral; that if it bear no testimony *for* them, it shall bear none *against* them. Whether they have succeeded in this attempt or not, we leave to the dispassionate judgment of the reader, who, with a desire of perceiving and embracing the truth, has deliberately considered what we have already written.

We now follow them to their argument from the

scriptural *facts*, upon which they avowedly rest the weight of their cause.

The *first* of these facts is the triple order of the priesthood among the Jews.

"We find," says the Layman, "three orders of officers in the Jewish church; and, in the Christian, there have always been three orders answering to these. What Aaron, his sons, and the Levites were in the temple, that bishops, priests, and deacons are in the Church. Such is the concurring testimony of the primitive fathers. Take that of St. Jerome, whom the advocates of parity are fond of quoting, and to whom, therefore, it is presumed, they will not object. "*That we may know the apostolical economy to be taken from the pattern of the Old Testament, the same that Aaron, and his sons, and the Levites, were in the temple, the bishops, presbyters, and deacons, are in the church of Christ.*" It is too absurd to attempt to turn this parallel into ridicule. By the very same mode of proceeding you may destroy the whole Christian dispensation. In all that he has said upon this point, the miscellaneous writer has contributed much more to the support of infidelity than of any other cause.

"How far, then, do we carry this argument?

"We say, simply, that the law being figurative of the gospel, in all its important parts, the Jewish priesthood was, of course, typical of the Christian. For this we have the express declaration of the apostle Paul, and the advocates of parity will not pretend to controvert the position. Well, then, the priest of the law serving as "*the example and shadow of heavenly things*," the circumstance of there being three orders in the Jewish ministry, furnishes a strong presumption against the doctrine of parity. *We do not rely upon this as proof. We merely state it as presumptive evidence, entitled to real attention.* It gives us, we contend, possession of the ground, and throws the burden of proof upon our opponents.

" Now, what says the miscellaneous writer in reply to all this? He talks to us of the dress of the Jewish high priests; asking, very sagaciously, where are the *golden ephod*, the *breast plate*, the *embroidered girdle*, in which Aaron and his successors were clad. I call upon him here to lay his hand upon his heart, and say, whether this is just reasoning. He knows it is not. What, the Jewish priesthood not figurative of the Christian, because of a variety in dress! Is it necessary, in order that one thing be typical of another, that there should be no points of difference between them? No more than it is necessary that we should be able to rise to the perfection of the character of Christ, because we are called upon to propose him as the model for imitation, and to become holy as he is holy.

" Is the miscellaneous writer aware of the conclusion to which his mode of reasoning conducts? If he has proved that the Jewish priesthood was not typical of the Christian, he has proved, equally, that the law was not a shadow of the gospel; thus destroying, effectually, all connexion between the Old and New Testament. Is there no difference between our Saviour and the Paschal Lamb by which he was prefigured? Abraham, Moses, Joshua, David, were all types of Christ; but were there no points of distinction between these men and the Saviour of the world? Give to the infidel the weapons of this writer, and how easily will he demolish, with them, the whole fabric of Christianity! If the points of difference which have been mentioned, between the priesthood of the law, and of the gospel, prove that the one was not typical of the other, they equally prove that our Saviour was never prefigured, and that that intimate connexion, between the Jewish and Christian dispensations, which has been so much relied upon by the defenders of the faith, never existed but in the imagination of men. But I feel as if I were insulting the understanding of the reader, in dwelling on this point. I dismiss it, therefore, especially as I have not been

able to bring myself to believe that the writer had any thing more in view, in it, than a flourish of rhetoric to attract the vulgar gaze.

"The Mosaic dispensation, then, was figurative of the Christian. The priesthood of the law was typical of the priesthood of the gospel. The former consisting of distinct and subordinate orders, a strong presumption thence arises in favour of that distinction and subordination of office which, until the days of Calvin, characterized, without a single exception, the Christian church. This we contend, as was said before, gives us possession of the ground, and throws the burden of proof upon the advocates of parity.

"So much then for the Jewish priesthood. It was a shadow of the Christian priesthood, according to the express declaration of the apostle Paul. While the miscellaneous writer does not venture openly to deny this, but rather seems to admit it, in representing the whole Jewish system as typical, he endeavours, nevertheless, in an indirect manner, to destroy all relationship between the priesthood of the law and of the gospel, by dwelling on the variety of dress, with some other subordinate points of distinction. Here he acts with his usual imprudence; tearing up, in his rage, against Episcopacy, the very foundation of the Christian faith."*

The same analogy is thus traced by Cyprian:

"Why should not the orders of the priesthood under the old economy be supposed to typify those orders that were to be established under the new? Besides, the fact is, that the Christian dispensation was not so much the abolition, as it was the fulfilment of the Jewish. Christ came, not to *destroy*, but to *fulfil* the law and the prophets.

"It is true, indeed, we possess not the Jewish form of church government. We possess one, however, which is the consummation of the Jewish—a government of which the

* No. VIII. *Collec.* p. 110, 111.

Jewish was an imperfect image. We possess a priesthood more glorious than the Levitical, inasmuch as it ministers under a more glorious dispensation—inasmuch as it performs purer and more exalted offices—inasmuch as, in its nature and offices, it is the glorious substance which was only faintly shadowed out under the law.

"We think, therefore, that we stand on substantial ground when we maintain that we derive *a strong argument in demonstration of the divine origin of our form of church government*, by showing that on this point the new dispensation is made to correspond with the old; is made the true substance of which the old was the shadow. What the high priests, the priests, and the Levites, were in the temple, such are the bishops, the presbyters, and deacons, in the church of Christ. This is the uniform language of the fathers. This is the conclusion to which the *data afforded us by the apostles inevitably lead.*

"Such was the model of church government instituted by God himself, and intended to be transmitted through all ages, with modifications that should vary, no doubt, according to the varying circumstances of mankind; provided these modifications affected not its great and cardinal principles. We say that the Jewish priesthood was the image of the Christian. We say that it is sound reasoning to deduce the probable form of the substance from the lineaments of it that may be traced in its image."*

It is somewhat curious to observe the rapid *growth* of this argument from the Jewish to the Episcopal priesthood. With the Layman it is not *proof;* it is merely "*presumptive evidence*, entitled to real attention." By the time it has travelled to Cyprian, it is a "*strong argument in demonstration*

* No. VIII. *Collec.* p. 119, 120.

of the divine origin of their form of church government;" and it places them, as well it may, "on substantial ground." But while we are looking through Cyprian's magnifier, at this Jewish image of the "Christian priesthood," he suddenly shifts his glass, and the giant, DEMONSTRATION, dwindles down again into the dwarf, PROBABILITY. "We say," adds he, in the next paragraph, "that it is sound reasoning to deduce the *probable* form of the substance from the lineaments of it that may be traced in its image." One hardly knows what to do with writers who drive their argument backwards and forwards between "proof" and "presumption;" between "probability" and "demonstration;" as if a rational debate were a game at shuttlecock! But they are not without excuse; for to one who can see the tendency of this argument of theirs, it is pretty clear that they did not know what to do with themselves. For if, as they assure us, the Jewish was a *type* of the Christian priesthood—if the former was "a shadow," and a "faint shadow," of which the latter is the true and "glorious substance," then there *must be* a coincidence between the essential parts of the type, and the essential parts of the thing typified. But according to the divine institution, the three orders of the high priest, the priests, and Levites, were essential to the legal priesthood; and if this was typical of the evangelical "*priesthood*," there must of necessity be three orders in that also. If

it were not so, the type would not tally with the antitype, the image would not represent its object, and the end of the typical system would be defeated. A body with a head would as soon cast a shadow without one, as a type of three orders represent a reality of two, five, or seven. This reasoning supposes, that the *number* of orders enters into the *nature* of the type; and on the same supposition rests the Episcopal argument. For if the number of orders in the Jewish priesthood constituted no part of the type, it is extreme weakness to mistake it for a "demonstration," or even a "presumption," that there ought to be three orders in the thing typified. It is producing your type to prove that the thing typified possesses a property which the type does not exhibit. The fallacy is too obvious to impose upon a child.

On the other hand, if the *number* of orders in the Jewish priesthood makes a part of the type, and the Christian ministry is the thing typified, the conclusion is inevitable, that there *must* be three orders in the Christian ministry. If *such* a typical relation really exists between the ministry of the old and of the new economy, we will lay down our pen. Our cause is desperate; the hierarchy has triumphed, but not a Protestant hierarchy. For according to all the laws of typical analogy, it is not more necessary that there be three orders in the "Christian priesthood," than that the highest order be confined to a single person. In this

point the Jewish and the Episcopal priesthood differ *essentially*. There is no likeness between the type and the antitype. Who, that intended to institute a set of *resemblances*, would ever dream of appointing a numerous body of Levites to represent a numerous body of deacons; a numerous body of priests to represent another numerous body of priests; and then finish by putting at the head of his system a *single high priest*, to represent an order of ten thousand bishops? Nay, if the Episcopal argument here is sound, it concludes much more forcibly in favour of the Papal than of the Protestant hierarchy. The former preserves, in her single pontiff, an essential feature of the type, which the latter, by her order of bishops, has perfectly obliterated. Thus, then, the case stands; if the typical character of the Jewish priesthood does not include its orders, the Episcopal inference from them in behalf of the bishops, priests, and deacons, is palpably false: If it does, while the Presbyterian perishes, the church of Rome gains much more than the church of England.

But this notion of the typical property of the grades of priesthood in the Jewish church, is an Episcopal fiction. It has no real existence. The decisive proof is, that the Levitical priesthood typified our Lord Jesus Christ, in whom there could be no place for different orders. Its several grades, as such, had nothing to do with its typical

character and functions. These lay in another direction altogether.

We, therefore, advance a step higher, and deny the whole doctrine of the hierarchy, in so far as it makes the Jewish priesthood a type of the Christian ministry. The Layman has asserted that "the law being figurative of the gospel, in all its important parts, *the Jewish priesthood was, of course, typical of the Christian.*"* To the same purpose Cyprian, "*We say that the Jewish priesthood was the image of the Christian.*"† These are the assertions; now for the proof. Cyprian tells us, that it "is the uniform language of the fathers—the conclusion to which the data afforded us by the *apostles inevitably* lead." The Layman, that "for this," viz. that the "Jewish priesthood was typical of the Christian, we have *the express declaration of the apostle Paul*," and that "the advocates of parity will not pretend to controvert the position." But they certainly do, sir; confident as you are of the negative. They not only venture to controvert, but engage to refute, your position. They maintain that the apostles have not afforded any data which can lead to such a conclusion. Cyprian has mentioned none: and the only passage which the other has quoted in his own justification, he has misunderstood and misapplied. The considerations which make against them, are numerous and weighty.

* No. VIII. *Collec.* p. 310. † No. IV. *Collec.* p. 320.

1. The scriptures no where draw a parallel or comparison between the rank and functions of the ministry of the Old Testament and that of the New. And if the former was designed to be the model of the latter, the omission is altogether unaccountable. They neither say nor insinuate that the priests under the law were a type and image of which the truth and substance are to be sought in the ministers of the new dispensation. The nature and use of the legal institutions are explained with minute accuracy by the Apostle Paul, in his epistle to the Hebrews. He treats them as types of "Jesus Christ, and all the effects of his mediation in grace and glory;" but of their typical relation to the Christian ministry, not a single syllable.

Here the Layman interrupts us with "the express declaration of the apostle Paul." Let us have it. "The priests of the law serving as '*the example and shadow of heavenly things*,' the circumstance of there being three orders in the Jewish ministry furnishes a strong presumption against the doctrine of parity."* The "express declaration" of the apostle, it seems is, that "*the priests of the law serve as the example and shadow of heavenly things;*"† representing his meaning to be, that the priests of the law are that example and shadow. We have a small objection to this assertion of the Layman; and that is, that, like Cyprian's story of

* No. viii. *Collec.* p. 110. † P. 111.

bishop Epaphroditus, it puts into the mouth of the apostle a speech which he never uttered. There is neither in the passage quoted, nor in any other passage of the epistle to the Hebrews, nor in the whole New Testament, such a declaration as the Layman ascribes to Paul. He has either quoted from memory, which we suspect to be the fact, and so has forgotten what the apostle said; or else is as unlucky in his criticism as his poor friend Cyprian. The apostle says, "*the priests who offer gifts according to the law, serve*," not AS, but "UNTO *the example and shadow of heavenly things.*" It was not the *priests*, but the *things to which they ministered*, that constituted the "example and shadow." This is obvious upon the first inspection of the text.* The apostle is discoursing of the tabernacle, its furniture and service. These were the "example and shadow." The substance, the "heavenly things," was Christ Jesus, his sacrifice and intercession, with all their blessed effects in the salvation of men. This is the apostle's own interpretation. For these same priests whom he here describes as "serving unto the example and shadow of heavenly things," he elsewhere describes as "serving the *tabernacle.*"† The tabernacle, therefore, not the priests, were the "example and shadow of the heavenly things." And that

* Οιτινες ὑποδειγματι και σκια λατρευουσι των επουρανιων. Heb. viii. 5.

† Οἱ τῃ σκηνῃ λατρευοντες. Heb. xiii. 10.

this is the apostle's meaning, is "yet far more evident." For in the 9th chapter, after detailing the construction, the furniture, and the service of the tabernacle,* he says that this tabernacle, thus framed, equipped, and attended, was *a figure for the time then present.*† "But Christ being come," proceeds the apostle, "an high priest of good things to come, by (*through*) a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building: neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us."

This "greater and more perfect tabernacle," is the human nature of the Son of God, in virtue of the once offering up of which as a sacrifice for sin, he entered into heaven itself for us. It is this blood of his, typified by the "blood of goats and calves," which "purges our conscience from dead works to serve the living God." These are the "good things to come;" these "the heavenly things," of which the first tabernacle was the "example and shadow." The "Christian priesthood," as it is improperly and offensively termed, does not even appear in the comparison. If the Layman has discovered it among the "heavenly things," his penetration is acute indeed. Instead, therefore, of producing an "express declaration" of the apostle to support his doctrine, he has only put a

* Heb. xiii. v. 2—7. † v. 9.

text to needless torture; for his witness, like Cyprian's in the affair of Epaphroditus, knows nothing of the matter.

It is further worthy of notice, that the New Testament *never* applies to the Christian ministry those terms which express the office of a priest, and which were invariably applied to the priesthood of the law. Jesus Christ is called a priest, an high priest, a great high priest; but not his ministers. On the principle that he is the true priest whom the priests of the law prefigured, this is perfectly natural. But is it not inconceivable, that the appropriate title of the priesthood should be given to the typical priests; to the form—to the shadow—and uniformly withheld from the priests who are the substance represented by them? Why this change of language? If the priestly character, office, and work, have been fulfilled in our Lord Jesus Christ, and if he, as the sole priest of the church, is now appearing in heaven for us, the reason of the change is as clear as noon day. There are no more official priests, there is no more "priesthood," in the church upon earth; and therefore the name is laid aside. But if there are such priests and priesthood, and if these are the very substance of which the old priests were but a shadow, it will baffle all the ingenuity of the hierarchy to the end of time, to assign even a tolerable reason why the spirit of wisdom has refused them their official designation,

and has altered the whole official style of the church! The ministry under the new dispensation is represented as the ascension gift of our glorified master.* Ordinary and extraordinary officers are enumerated, but not a word of the Jewish orders being a type of the Christian ministry. Not a word of priests or priesthood, of altars, of sacrifices, or any of the sacrificial language to which the hierarchy is so devoted. She has thought fit, and she shall answer for it, to bring back and affix to her clergy and their functions; to her sacramental table and its elements, a set of denominations which the Holy Ghost not only never annexed to the ministry and ordinances of his own creation; but which he had, with pointed care, excluded from the New Testament!

Our assertion, therefore, stands firm, that the apostolic writings furnish no data which can lead us to the "conclusion" of Cyprian, or the "position" of the Layman. Whence, we again ask, whence this silence? Why is so important a property of the typical priesthood overlooked? Is not the "glorious substance," of which it was only a "faint shadow," so much as worthy of notice? and that too in a set treatise of the legal shadows and their corresponding substances? It is indisputable, their own words evince it, that if the Layman and Cyprian, and their several coadjutors, had prepared such a treatise; whatever place they might

* Eph. iv. 11.

have allotted to the "apostle and high priest of our profession," the dignity of the episcopal priesthood would have filled up one of their most animated chapters. Having found so much of their own image where Paul found so little, it is but right to supply his deficiencies, and to administer a delicate rebuke for his negligent exposition!

2. A comparison of the Levitical with the Episcopal priesthood, will demonstrate that the former was not, and could not be, a type of the latter.

The grades are ranged thus:

Type, or *Shadow*,	*Antitype*, or *Substance.*
High-priest, - - - -	Bishop,
Priest, - - - -	Priest,
Levite, - - - -	Deacon.

Now in what do they resemble each other?

Did the high priest *ordain* the priests? No. Did he *confirm* the people? No. Had he the exclusive right of government? No. On the other hand; Do the bishops discharge any duty analogous to the offering up of the yearly sacrifice on the great day of expiation? No. Have they the peculiar privilege of entering into the immediate presence of God? No. Is the oracle of God attached to their persons? or have they any special right of declaring the divine will? No. He who has sagacity enough to detect in the appropriate functions of the high priest any thing that deserves to be called a type of the functions appropriated to a Christian bishop, can never be at a loss for type

and antitype, so long as any two objects remain within the bible or without it. Their prerogatives and offices are so absolutely dissimilar, that to make the one an image of the other, is to pour overwhelming ridicule upon the whole system of typical ordinances. The success will not be much better, if we go down to the second and third grades of the priesthood. If the reader has an hour which he cannot employ more profitably, he may throw it away in hunting for likenesses between the priests of the law and of the gospel; between the Levite and the Episcopal deacon. We have enough of it. Our argument is this, that as typical officers must have typical functions, if the functions of the legal priesthood did not typify those of the Christian, then was not the one priesthood a type of the other. To insist upon a typical meaning in the number of orders, and to discard as mere circumstances, the respective functions of those orders, is a distinction which reason laughs at, and a sound head will hardly adopt.

3. As typical officers and typical functions are correlate ideas, the former necessarily implying the latter, we remark, that if the Jewish priesthood prefigured the Christian ministry, as a type its antitype, then it follows, that we have in the functions of the priesthood now, the substance of that which in the functions of the Levitical priesthood was only a type. That is, the priests now

offer up the true sacrifice for sin, and are our mediators and intercessors with God, upon the footing of their sacrifice. It cannot be doubted that the *priestly* office of old was typical; and its sacrifices typical. Whoever, then, is the real priest, offers the real sacrifice. But he is the real priest of whom the priests of the law were a type. And the priests of the law were a type, says the hierarchy, of our priesthood: therefore the priesthood of the hierarchy offer up the true sacrifice for sin! There is no getting rid of the conclusion. The apostle Paul reasons in the same manner, from the typical relation of the old priests and their sacrifices to Jesus Christ and his sacrifice. He insists, that because they were shadows and Christ the substance, therefore Christ, the true priest, has put away sin by the offering up of himself as the true sacrifice. We see that the doctrine of the hierarchy is irreconcileable with that of the apostle. He teaches that the Levitical priesthood and their offerings were typical of Jesus Christ and his offerings. The hierarchy teaches that the Levitical priesthood typified the evangelical ministry. Both cannot be true. The same type cannot signify a single high priest who offered up a true and proper sacrifice for sin, and an order of priests who offer up no such sacrifice. If Christ is the substance of the legal priesthood, the Episcopal hierarchy is not. If that hierarchy is the substance, Jesus Christ is not. The reader

has his choice, whether he will side with the hierarchy at the expense of the apostle, or with the apostle at the expense of the hierarchy! Whether he will look for the substance of the Levitical priesthood in the Son of God and his mediatorial work, or in the administration of the Episcopal clergy! Whether—But we check ourselves. A stranger instance of infatuated zeal has rarely occurred. The genius of the Old Testament types shall be perverted; their beautiful correspondence with their objects shall be marred; the principle of a whole book of the New Testament, (the Epistle to the Hebrews,) shall be set aside; but an argument, though merely a presumptive one, for the hierarchy, shall not be given up!

The only escape from this dilemma appears to be through a distinction between the particular character of the Old Testament priests as such, and their general character as ministers of religion. It may be yielded, that in the former they were types of Christ; and maintained that in the latter they were types of the Christian ministry. The distinction is of no avail; and its best effect is to protract the death of the Episcopal plea for a minute longer. If both their particular character as priests, and their general character as ministers of religion were typical, they were nothing but types. The worship which they offered up was typical worship; their prayers were typical prayers; their instructions to the people, typical

instructions. The church in which they ministered was a typical church. All was type. There was no reality. But this is absurd. God had as real a church, and dispensed as real blessings, by real ministers before, as since, the evangelical dispensation. Whatever typical *ordinances* might be set up, the church itself never was a type. It is a *whole*, and one part of a whole cannot be a type of another part. And as there were real ministers in a real church under the law, if you will have them to be types in their general character, you make the ministry of the church at one period and in one form, the type of her ministry at another period under another form. This is a contradiction. For the same persons could not be, at the same time, and in the exercise of the same functions, under the same relations, both shadow and substance. It destroys also the nature of the church of God; giving us all type before the new dispensation, and all substance after it. So that in fact, according to the scheme we are considering, there was no such thing as a church at all under the law, but only the *shadow* of a church. We have one step further in this typical climax. The sinners under the law were only typical sinners; the saints only typical saints; the salvation of the soul only a typical salvation; and for aught we can see, the God of salvation only a typical God!

View it in any light you choose: The doctrine

of the Layman, Cyprian, &c. concerning the Old Testament types, is inconsistent with itself; with the doctrine of the apostle Paul, and with all the known relations of type and antitype. Yet while they are spreading this confusion; while they are displaying the most absolute want of acquaintance with both the Old Testament and the New, they have the assurance to tell us that if we "have proved that the Jewish priesthood was not typical of the Christian, we have proved equally that the law was not a shadow of the gospel: thus destroying effectually, all connexion between the Old Testament and the New."* It seems, then, that although we have Christ the true priest and true sacrifice; and the effects of his mediation in pardoning sin, in purging the conscience, and in presenting an efficacious intercession before God in the highest heavens—we have nothing to the purpose; we are "destroying the whole Christian dispensation;" we are doing "much more to the support of infidelity, than of any other cause;"† we are tearing up the very foundations of the Christian faith"—Why?—because we will not admit the episcopal clergy to be the substance of which the Levitical priesthood was only the shadow! It is amazing, it is humiliating, that men who have need that *one teach them which be the first prineiples of the oracles of God*, should talk so confidently. Nay, in the very act of sanctioning

* Layman, No. viii. p. 110. † P. 110.

all this misconception, misconstruction, and wresting of the scriptures, Mr. H. has permitted himself to ask Dr. Linn, whether he is "really *ignorant* of the nature of the types of scripture," or whether he is "guilty of wilful *misrepresentation*?"* Such questions as these ought not to have been put by Mr. *Hobart.*

So much for the first fact to which the disputants for the hierarchy have appealed.

Their *second* fact, is the triple order of the "priesthood" during our Lord's personal converse with men.

"Whilst our Saviour remained on earth," (says Cyprian,) "he, of course, held supreme authority in his church. The twelve were appointed by him as his subordinate officers. The seventy disciples constituted a still lower order. There existed, then, in the church of Christ, at this time, *three distinct grades* of ministers. When our Lord ascended into heaven, when he breathed upon the twelve, and said, "As my father hath sent me, so send I you," he transmitted to them the same authority which he himself had retained during his continuance amongst them: the twelve commissioned their presbyters and deacons to aid them in the administration of ecclesiastical government. Before their death they constituted an order of ministers to whom they conveyed that supreme authority in the church which was lodged in their hands during their lives."†

Thus, also, the Layman:

"Jesus Christ commissioned twelve, and the seventy; but he gave them no authority to commission others. The high power of ordination was exercised by himself alone. Here,

* Note to *Collec.* p. 37. † Cyprian, No. II. *Collec.* p. 62.

then, were three orders; our *Saviour*, the great head of the church; the twelve *apostles;* and the seventy *disciples.*"*

We should be much entertained, and possibly edified, by the history of the three orders and their succession, as compiled by the Layman and his learned colleague, were we not disturbed by some difficulties which we cannot well remove.

Our *first* difficulty, as to this second stage of the triple order, relates to John the Baptist. He was certainly the Redeemer's messenger, and exercised a contemporary ministry. Why is he left out of the list? His extraordinary functions cannot be the reason; for those of his master were more extraordinary than his own. But he was neither the Christ, nor one of the twelve, nor one of the seventy. If you take him into the catalogue, you have *four* orders; if you leave him out, you must leave out his master likewise; and then you will have but *two.* In either way the history of the hierarchy sticks.

Our *next* difficulty relates to the co-existence of the Jewish and Christian priesthoods. The church of God was either organized under the Christian form, during our Lord's continuance upon earth, or not. If not, there was no Christian priesthood, and consequently no orders of priesthood. If she was, then did she actually subsist under two forms at the same time. For it is certain that the legal form remained, till the offering up of the "word

* Layman, No. IX. *Collec.* p. 153.

made flesh," in sacrifice for sin. Moreover, our Lord Jesus Christ was indubitably the head of the church under her Jewish form. She was, with her whole system of worship, his property. *He came unto his own.** He was in the temple, the lord of the temple, and acted as such. Now if his personal presence as the head of the church made him an order in her evangelical ministry, that same presence in the Jewish church made him one of the orders of the Jewish priesthood. Admit this, and we are troubled with an additional order in that priesthood; deny it, and we have lost one of the Christian orders. The former compels us to take *four*, the latter allows us but *two*. Scylla and Charybdis over again for the history of the *three* orders!

Our *third* difficulty relates to the principle upon which, in the present case, the triple order is founded. The Layman and Cyprian, as a shoal of other writers had done before them, work up the apostles and seventy disciples into two orders of priesthood; and that their canonical number might not be wanting, they complete it by adding the Redeemer himself!

Now, we had always thought, with the apostle Paul, that Christ was *faithful as a son over his own house:* that the church itself is the house; and that all the ministers of the church are his *servants*. It was really a stroke worthy of "giants in theology,"

* Εις τα ΙΔΙΑ ηλθε. John i. 11.

to make the Lord himself one of the orders among his own servants! And seeing that his assent into heaven never stript him of any relation to his church, and that he actually exercises the priestly office at this moment before the throne of God, the consequence is, either that there are now *four* orders of the priesthood, or that there were but *two* in the days of his flesh. The same perplexity stares the hierarchy once more in the face; and if she will have three orders, neither more nor less, she must depose her master in order to make way for her bishops!

Our *fourth* difficulty relates to the *nature* of the succession.

Christ transmitted to the twelve, says Cyprian, "the *same authority* which he himself had retained during his continuance among them; and the twelve commissioned their presbyters and deacons to aid them in the administration of ecclesiastical government," and "before their death, constituted an order of ministers to whom they conveyed" their own "*supreme authority.*"

Some how or other, we have lost the seventy disciples in this arrangement. Probably they were promoted to bishopricks. However that be, the descent of "power" is very distinctly stated. Christ conveyed the *same authority* which he himself exercised to the apostles; and the apostles conveyed the *same* authority which they exercised to the order which they constituted before their

death; that is, the order of bishops. So, then, the order of bishops have now the *very same* authority which Christ himself had when he was upon earth! But Christ was the "lord and master" of the church; so are the Bishops; and for that reason are very properly styled, in some places, *Lords bishops!* Christ was the *proprietor* of the church—so are the bishops, no doubt! Christ had authority to appoint sacraments and to mould the government of his church according to his pleasure: so have the bishops, beyond controversy! It seems, then, that they are the successours not so much of the apostles, as of the Lord Jesus Christ himself: that he is gone away to heaven, and has deputed to them *in solidum*, by the lump, the whole authority which he himself possessed! A fair inheritance we own; and very goodly heirs! Having established this point, we wonder that they put themselves to any further trouble in making out their title to "the pre-eminence!" There is a short cut to the resolution of every difficulty about the affairs of the church, and every thing else. Go to the bishops! Christ had unlimited authority over the conscience, and they have succeeded him. Ecclesiastical history is not barren of instances wherein they have acted up to the spirit of their trust. England can witness, that, in one day, they threw upon the mercy of the persecutor, and the comforts of famine, *two thousand* of the best men and the most glorious ministers of the gospel, that ever

blessed a nation or adorned a church: and a great proportion of them for not submitting to impositions upon conscience for which the warrant of the divine word was not so much as pretended. But the Episcopal warrant was perfectly clear: and the Puritans were righteously deprived for not bowing to the successours of Jesus Christ! "Come set us the five mile act to music."* Let us compensate the fast of the 30th January for the martyrdom of Charles,† with the festival of St. Bartholomew's,‡ for the judgment of the Presbyterians!

* An act of 17th Charles II. by which non-conformist ministers were prohibited, unless in crossing the road, to come or be, on any pretence whatever, after March 24th, 1665, within *five miles* of any city, town corporate, or borough that sent burgesses to parliament; or within five miles of any parish, town, or place, wherein they had, since the act of oblivion, been parson, vicar, or lecturer, &c.; or where they had preached in any conventicle.

† Charles I. of tyrannical memory, was beheaded on the 30th January, 1649. He called himself, and was called by some others, *a martyr*. The anniversary of his martyrdom has afforded the High church clergy many fine opportunities for displaying their zeal for "the church," and mourning over her calamities.

‡ The famous "*Act for the uniformity of public prayers and administration of sacraments, and other rites and ceremonies, &c., in the church of England;*" which received the royal assent on the 19th May, 1662, and took effect on the 24th of August following, being *St. Bartholomew's day*. *Assent and consent* to its provisions were to be declared by that day, on pain of deprivation of their livings, if the offenders were in the ministry; and if schoolmasters or tutors, three months imprisonment and a fine of five pounds sterling. About *two thousand* ministers could not, with a good conscience, comply; and they were deprived accordingly.

They who can persuade themselves that the Episcopal prelates enjoy the same power, which was vested in our Lord Jesus Christ, are welcome to their consolation. *We* are, as yet, a great ways off from the line of converts.

Our *fifth* difficulty relates to the question, whether the twelve were really a superiour order to the seventy? We cannot perceive in the New Testament any characters of such superiority. On comparing the history of their appointment, we find their commission was the same both in form and in substance; that they had the same powers, the same instructions, the same cautions, the same support; in short, that their whole mission was the same. Let any man of common candour read the account of it in Matthew and Luke; and let him discover, if he can, any thing that bears the semblance of a superiour and inferiour order. To facilitate his inquiry we subjoin the passages alluded to—

The TWELVE:
Matthew ix. 37—x. 16.

"Then saith he unto his disciples, The harvest truly is plenteous, but the labourers are few. Pray ye therefore, the Lord of the harvest, that he will send forth labourers into his harvest. And when he had called unto him his twelve disciples, he gave them power

The SEVENTY:
Luke x. 1—16.

"After these things the Lord appointed other seventy also, and sent them two and two before his face into every city and place whither he himself would come. Therefore said he unto them, The harvest truly is great, but the labourers are few: pray ye therefore, the

The TWELVE.

against unclean spirits, to cast them out; and to heal all manner of sickness, and all manner of disease. Now the names of the twelve apostles are these; the first, Simon, who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother; James the son of Zebedee, and John his brother; Philip and Bartholomew; Thomas and Matthew the publican; James the son of Alpheus, and Lebbeus, whose surname was Thaddeus. Simon the Canaanite, and Judas Iscariot who also betrayed him. These twelve Jesus sent forth, and commanded them, saying, Go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not: but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. And, as ye go, preach, saying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand. Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils; freely ye have received, freely give. Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass, in your purses; nor scrip for your journey, neither two coats, neither shoes, nor yet staves; for the workman is worthy of his meat. And into whatsoever city or town ye shall enter, inquire who in it is worthy; and there

The SEVENTY.

Lord of the harvest, that he would send forth labourers into his harvest. Go your ways: behold, I send you forth as lambs among wolves. Carry neither purse, nor scrip, nor shoes: and salute no man by the way. And into whatsoever house ye enter, first say, Peace be to this house. And if the son of peace be there, your peace shall rest upon it: if not, it shall turn to you again. And in the same house remain, eating and drinking such things as they give: for the labourer is worthy of his hire. Go not from house to house. And into whatsoever city ye enter, and they receive you, eat such things as are set before you; and heal the sick that are therein; and say unto them, The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you. But into whatsoever city ye enter, and they receive you not, go your ways out into the streets of the same, and say, Even the very dust of your city, which cleaveth on us, we do wipe off against you: notwithstanding, be ye sure of this, that the kingdom of God is come nigh unto you. But I say unto you, That it shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodom than for that city. Wo unto thee, Chorazin! wo unto

The TWELVE.

abide till ye go thence. And when ye come into an house, salute it. And if the house be worthy, let your peace come upon it: but if it be not worthy, let your peace return to you. And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye depart out of that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet. Verily I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah, in the day of judgment, than for that city. Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves. He that receiveth you, receiveth me; and he that receiveth me, receiveth him that sent me."

The SEVENTY.

thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon, which have been done in you, they had a great while ago repented, sitting in sackcloth and ashes. But it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the judgment than for you. And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted to heaven, shalt be thrust down to hell. He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me; and he that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me."

If, after all, the twelve were an order superiour to the seventy, the evidence, whether in these or other parts of the evangelical narrative, is too subtle for our clumsy senses. The Layman, however, whose perceptions are not so dull, has been more fortunate. Let us betake ourselves to his aid.

"The twelve," says he, "were superiour to the seventy, both in *dignity* and *power*."

They were superiour in "*dignity*."

How is this proved? Thus—

1. "The apostles are every where spoken of,

as the constant attendants of our Lord." Therefore, they were of a higher rank than the seventy! The Layman is as active as he is sharp-sighted; but the ditch between his premises and his conclusion being rather too wide for us to leap, we cannot conveniently follow him.

But the Layman has forgotten that there were others, beside the apostles, who are mentioned as the constant attendants of our Lord,* and who received from that circumstance no pre-eminence of authority whatever. The Layman's first argument, then, is "good for nothing."

2. "The commission of the apostles was much more general" than that of the seventy. The latter "were sent before our Lord into the cities *whither he himself would come.*" The former were directed "to preach the gospel to all the Jews." A minister, therefore, who should be instructed to make a preaching tour through the United States, would be of a higher grade than one whose labours should be confined to the state of New York. If this argument of the Layman is not very satisfactory, it is at least ingenious. There is something vastly pleasant in regulating the grandeur of the priesthood by the length of a journey; and determining its grades with a pair of geographical compasses!

3. "The inauguration of the twelve was much

* Acts i. 21.

more solemn than that of the seventy." Therefore, they must be of a superiour order. Because all the world knows that it is impossible to appoint, though on different occasions, officers of the same rank without the very same degree of solemnity. This is demonstration! Is it not, good reader? But in what was the inauguration of the twelve more solemn than that of the seventy?

"In relation to the first," replies the Layman, "we find our Saviour directing his disciples to pray to God to send labourers into the harvest. We find him continuing himself a whole night in prayer. In the inauguration of the seventy there was nothing of all this solemnity." P. 154.

Nothing! if we read our bible correctly, there is the same direction about prayer to the Lord of the harvest, for labourers in his harvest, coupled with the mission of the seventy, and of the twelve. With respect to his continuing in prayer the whole night previous to the choice of his apostles, is the Layman sure that their appointment was the special cause of our Lord's being thus employed? That he never prayed in this manner upon any other occasion? And particularly, before the election of the seventy? And supposing him to be sure of all this; how does it affect relative dignity? Christ prayed all night before appointing the twelve, and not before appointing the seventy, *therefore*, the twelve were a superiour order of ministers! It seems, then, that it was not preaching the gospel, nor performing mighty works in

his name, which lay so near the Saviour's heart when he was about to send forth his messengers, as to engage him all night in prayer; but it was the desire to set off a superiour order of them with suitable eclat!—When the *twelve* are to be commissioned, he prays all night. When the *seventy* are to be commissioned, he is not at the same trouble; and this merely to show that they are not of such high dignity as the others! Poor disciples! To have the same duties and the same trials with your twelve superiours, and much less interest in your master's affections and prayers! It was no small matter, we see, to be a bishop or something like one, in the days of his flesh: And if the Layman will undertake to prove that the successour-bishops have still the same enviable privilege, we shall not refuse him the praise of courage! However, if they act up to the *principle* of his argument, there is one inference which we think may be drawn from it with rather clearer evidence than his own for the pre-eminence of the apostles above the seventy; and that is, that when the hierarchy is about ordaining bishops, she prays most fervently; and when presbyters are to be ordained, she does not think it worth while to pray at all!

The Layman proceeds:

"The apostles were, likewise, superiour," viz. to the seventy, "in *power*." p. 154

How is this proved? Thus:

"They alone received the commission to offer the eucharistic sacrifice of bread and wine."

We stay not to comment on the popish style of this passage. "Eucharistic *sacrifice!*" The scripture knows neither the name nor the thing, in reference to the *commemoration* of our Lord's death in the sacrament of the supper. The Layman's argument for the superiority of the twelve is, that they alone were authorized to administer this sacrament. Indeed! How, then, came it to be administered by the Episcopal priests who are not the successours of the apostles? Either this power does not prove superiority of rank, or else the hierarchy has transferred to an inferiour order, one of the peculiar functions of the superiour; and thus corrupted the institutions of Christ. The Layman has his option. It will not be possible to evade the alternative; because the Lord's supper is an ordinance of perpetual obligation, and could not be administered by the apostles till after his death; nor is there a shadow of proof that it was ever administered by them till after his ascension, and the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. Prove what it will, it cannot prove the superiority of the twelve above the seventy during his abode upon earth. And what is more, there is nothing in the institution of the supper to express the conveyance of authority to administer it. There is nothing but the appointment of it for the observation of the church. *This do in re-*

membrance of me; for as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye do shew the Lord's death till he come. But all communicants "do this in remembrance of him," they all "show forth his death," in the holy supper, as much as did the apostles. The commission to administer the sacraments, and govern the church, was not given till the very moment of his departure from earth.

In the next place:

"To the twelve," says the Layman, "were twelve thrones appointed, whereon they should sit, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." P. 154.

As this language is altogether symbolical, he should have fixed his meaning before he quoted it as a proof. This he has not done, and it is not our business to do it for him. But Cyprian has conceded that Christ held, in his own hands, the supreme authority while he was on earth; the Layman himself has told us, that the twelve during this period, had not the power of ordination; and men who had power, neither to govern nor to ordain, are not very fitly depicted by the symbols of men "sitting upon thrones, and judging the twelve tribes of Israel." The Layman has again mistaken and misrepresented the passage, *part* of which he has cited. It stands thus, in Math. xix. 28. "Jesus said unto them, Verily I say unto you, that ye which have followed me in the regeneration, *when the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of his glory*, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones,

judging the twelve tribes of Israel." It appears from Luke, ch. xxii. that this promise was addressed to the twelve just before our Lord's passion. Whatever then is meant by the "twelve thrones," and the "judgment of the twelve tribes of Israel," it was not, and could not be possessed by the apostles, till after their master's *exaltation:* till he should sit in the *throne of his glory.* He was to bestow it upon them after he should have "ascended up far above all heavens," and not before. This is the text on which the Layman relies for proof of the pre-eminence of the twelve during our Lord's *humiliation*, when *he* did *not* sit in the throne of *his* glory, and consequently *they* did *not* sit on *their* thrones.

But "on them," *viz.* the twelve, "was to rest the fabric of the church. *The wall of the city having twelve foundations, and in them the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb.*" Rev. xxi. 14.

Another blunder, as usual. A symbolical representation of a state of the church which has not yet happened, is to prove that the twelve were superiour to the seventy in the days of their master's flesh, and before they had received any commission whatever to *govern!*

There is one argument more.

"Upon the happening of a vacancy, by the apostacy of Judas, Matthias was raised to his bishoprick, being numbered with the eleven apostles, and taking a part of their ministry. Acts i. Matthias had been one of the seventy. For this we have the testimony of Eusebius, of Jerome, of Epiphanius.

Mark, Luke, Sosthenes, with other evangelists, as also the seven deacons, were of the seventy, if the primitive fathers of the church be at all to be relied upon as witnesses of facts. And these persons, even after their promotion, were still inferiour to the twelve, being under their government." P. 154.

The elevation of Matthias to the apostleship took place *after* the eleven had received their commission from the risen Saviour, and after he had ascended to heaven: and this is to prove that they were superiour to the seventy *before* his passion. Truly the Layman has a right to make himself merry with the logic of his opponents! But did the seventy retain, after Christ's resurrection, the commission which they had before his death, or did they not? If they did not, the Layman's argument goes to the wall at once. If they did, then it is strange that their official character is never so much as mentioned, after the resurrection, in any part of the New Testament. And it is no less strange that the Layman should represent any of them as being *promoted* to the office of *deacons*. Lower they could not be, to be in the "priesthood" at all. And if they were *next* the apostles, as they were put in a preceding part of the discussion, their being made *deacons*, was a promotion *downwards*. They must have been, as belonging to the priesthood, either of the order of deacons, or of a superiour order: if deacons, their ordination to that office by the apostles was a farce; if of a superiour order, it degraded them. The Layman has again his choice. But whether

they were *then* degraded, or promoted, or neither, what has this to do with their own office or that of the apostles, during our Lord's abode upon earth?

So much for the Layman's proofs that the twelve were superiour to the seventy. He has not proved, nor can he, with the whole phalanx of the hierarchy to help him, prove, either from their commission, or from their acts, that the twelve exercised or possessed an atom of power over the seventy.

But our difficulties are not yet ended. We encounter a formidable one in the fact, that the Christian church *was not organized at all during our Lord's residence on earth.* The ministry of the baptist, his own ministry, and that of the apostles and the seventy, were all *preparative.* The church could not be organized under the new dispensation, till the Jewish form ceased; and that could not cease till the Messiah had "finished transgression, made an end of sin, and made reconciliation for iniquity," by the sacrifice of himself. Accordingly, he gave his apostles their high commission after his resurrection; and they did not so much as attempt to act upon it, till, as he had promised, they were "endued with power from on high," by the descent of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost. *Then* they were able to speak in the name of a master who was "set on the right hand of the throne of the majesty in the heavens." Then, and not till then, did the church put on her New Testament

form. It is, therefore, perfectly idle to infer what this form should be, from her appearance in her unformed state.

Once more. Had the Episcopal writers even made good their assertions concerning the state of the church in the period we have been reviewing, it would avail them nothing. Because our Lord has settled the platform of his church, the leading principles of her order, by positive statute; and this precludes, to the whole extent of the statute, all reasoning from analogy. We have nothing to do but to ascertain what he has enacted.

Thus have the proofs drawn in favour of the hierarchy, from the Jewish priesthood, and from the state of the church during our Lord's personal ministry, vanished, successively, at the touch.—Grosser abuse of the divine word than we have had occasion to expose, cannot easily be found. The Layman hardly approaches a text without disfiguring it. He is young, very young, in the study of his bible. This is *some* excuse; and, in his being a *layman*, he has an apology which cannot be extended to Cyprian, Vindex, or Cornelius. If reading the scriptures, like correct interpreters, were to be the test, we much fear that, in the issue of the present trial, neither himself, nor his reverend associates, would be entitled to plead *the benefit of clergy.*

Facts to justify the Episcopal claim, have been sought, without effect, in the constitution of the Jewish priesthood, and in that peculiar state of the church which existed during our Lord's personal ministry. These refuges have failed. The hierarchy has been dislodged from all her intrenchments in succession, and left without a resting place for the sole of her foot, in any part of the religious territory which was occupied by the church from the days of Abraham, till the day of Pentecost. We acknowledge, however, that she will suffer little detriment from her defeat, if she can establish herself firmly upon New Testament ground. The strength of her positions here, is next to be tried. If, as she glories, the *facts* of the New Testament are on her side, we own ourselves vanquished, and have nothing to do but to hand her our swords. But we shall not take her word for it. Let the facts be produced. According to the writers whom we are reviewing, they are found in the pre-eminence of James at Jerusalem; of Timothy at Ephesus; of Titus in Crete; and of the seven angels in the Asiatic churches. Epaphroditus, too, has been occasionally added to the number. The ability and *learning* of *Cyprian*, had done him up into a bishop, and had dispatched him from Philippi, in Episcopal majesty, on a visit to Paul at Rome. Unfortunately the good man lost his mitre by the way, so that when he arrived, the apostle could not distinguish him from a sim-

ple messenger, who came on an errand from his Philippian friends, and sent him back again *in statu quo*, without a single mark of prelatical dignity. So we leave him to go in quest of the others. Before investigating the validity of their individual titles, we ask the reader's attention to some *general presumptions* against the existence of prelates in the apostolic church. Presumptions, in our view, so strong, as almost to supersede the necessity of further examination.

The first is this, that *no such order is mentioned, nor even alluded to, either in the salutations of Paul's epistles to the churches, or in his directions for the performance of relative duties.* Had prelacy been of apostolic origin; had Paul himself been distinguished for his zeal in establishing it, would there not have been *something* in his epistles to the churches, appropriated to their chief officer? He gives very exact instructions to every other class of Christians; points out, minutely, their duties to each other; carefully distinguishes between presbyters and deacons; draws their respective characters, and assigns their functions; salutes individual ministers and private Christians, both men and women, by name; but no where says one syllable to the superiour grade of ministers! How is this fact to be explained? That Paul, who observed the most scrupulous propriety in all his addresses—who left no part of religious society any excuse for neglect of duty—

who overlooked nothing which might tend to counsel, conciliate, or console—who carefully avoided every thing contemptuous or irritating—who was even solicitious, as we are told, to assert the dignity of prelates above that of presbyters—that this very Paul should take no manner of notice of them in his letters to their dioceses, should enjoin respect and obedience to their subalterns before their faces; and not so much as *hint* at the obedience which these subalterns owed to them, is past all belief! It would bespeak not a man of discretion; much less a wise man; less still, a great man; least of all an inspired apostle —but a downright idiot. He could not have fallen upon a more effectual method to disgrace them with their people; to encourage insubordination among their presbyters; and, by wantonly sporting with their feelings, to convert them into personal enemies. How then, we ask again, shall this omission be accounted for? It will not do to reply, that as the names of *bishop* and *presbyter* were promiscuously used, he joins them in common directions, salutation, and honour. This answer relieves not the difficulty: for it cannot extend to the deacons, whom he expressly distinguishes from the presbyters. Well, then, he singles out the *lowest* order of clergy, pays them marked attention, and, by this very act, *insults* the prelates whom his silence had sufficiently mortified. Further, if one set of particular instructions suits dif-

ferent sets of officers, how can their *functions* be different? If the prerogative of the prelate consist in the power of ordination and government, how can his duties be comprised in a draught of instructions for officers who have no such power? It would be as rational to insist that the very same instructions would suit the governour of a province and the constable of a town. And did not every rule of decorum require, on the part of the apostle, a primary attention to that order which was emphatically to succeed him? that order, without which, we are taught the Christian church can have neither form nor government, nor ministry, nor sacraments, nor lawful assemblies; no, nor even existence? That *this* order should first be instituted by the apostle, and then passed over in absolute neglect when he is writing to their churches; or be lumped with their inferiours, while the grades of these inferiours are addressed in a manner which it is impossible to mistake, puts all credulity at defiance. The question, therefore, returns, How shall we solve this enigma in the conduct of Paul? The simple solution is, he takes no separate notice of *bishops* as superiour to *presbyters*, because no such bishops existed. Other solution there is none. For it is very certain that *after* their introduction they figured gloriously. Whoever was left in the back ground, the bishop came conspicuously forward—whoever was thrown into the shade, the bishop was irradiated—who-

ever was treated with neglect, due homage to the bishop was never forgotten. Not such was the fact in the days of St. Paul; therefore, not such was the order which he had instituted.

2. Another presumption, if, indeed, it deserve not a higher name, against the episcopal construction of the New Testament facts, is, that one at least, of the two powers said to be vested exclusively in prelates, is clearly attributed to presbyters. We mean the power of *government.*

There are three terms employed in the New Testament to express the authority which is to be exercised in the Christian church, and they are *all* applied to presbyters. These terms are,

1. ἡγεομαι—To take the lead.

2. προϊστημι—To stand before—to preside.

3. ποιμαινω—To act the part, to fulfill the duties of a shepherd.

Every power which Christ hath deputed to his officers, is conveyed by one or other of these terms.

For the greater precision we shall show, *first*, that they do express the power of government; and *then*, that each of them is applied to presbyters.

1. ΗΓΕΟΜΑΙ. To take the lead—-signifies to "rule." *Math.* ii. 6. *Thou, Bethlehem, in the land of Juda, art not the least among the* PRINCES (ἡγεμοσιν) *of Juda; for out of thee shall come a* GOVERNOUR (ἡγουμενος) *that shall* RULE *my people Israel.* The force

of the term, then, cannot be questioned. It is applied to presbyters.

Heb. xii. 7. *Remember them which* HAVE THE RULE OVER you. (τως ἡγουμενων ὑμων your rulers.) The apostle is speaking of their deceased pastors; for he immediately adds, *who have spoken unto you the word of God; whose faith follow, considering the* END, the issue or termination, *of their conversation.* Again,

V. 17. *Obey them that have the rule over you,* (τοις ἡγουμενοις ὑμων) *for they watch for your souls as they that must give account.*

That these "rulers" were presbyters, is evident from a single consideration; the apostle attributes the power of "ruling," to those deceased pastors who had preached the gospel to the Hebrew converts; and those living ones who "watched for their souls;" which are undeniably the functions of presbyters; therefore Paul recognizes in presbyters, all the power of government expressed by the first term—rulers.

2. ΠΡΟΙΣΤΗΜΙ, or ΠΡΟΙΣΤΑΜΑΙ. To stand or place before—to preside—to *rule.* 1 Tim. iii. 4. *A Bishop must be one that* RULETH WELL (καλως προισταμενον) *his own house.* The same in v. 5. 12.*

The power expressed by this term also, is applied to *Presbyters.*

1 *Thess.* v. 12. *We beseech you, brethren, to know*

* For other references see *Raphelii Annot. Phil. in N. T.* ad locum, & *Schleusneri Novum Lexicon in N. T.*

them which labour among you, and ARE OVER YOU (προϊσταμενους) *in the Lord.*

It is a description of ordinary faithful pastors; not of *prelates*, for there were *several* at Thessalonica; and diocesan Episcopacy admits of but *one* in a city. The whole description taken together, supposes the exercise of functions, and an intimacy of intercourse, among the people, which a prelate cannot possibly observe in his diocese; but which is exactly characteristic of the *Presbyter*. However, to put the matter out of all doubt, Paul charges Timothy, 1 Eph. v. 17. *Let the elders that* RULE WELL, (οἱ καλως προεστωτες) *be accounted worthy of double honour*, &c.

Presbyters they are, Episcopacy herself being judge: for this is one of the passages which she quotes to prove their inferiority in the church of Ephesus, to bishop Timothy. The apostle, then, here formally attributes to presbyters the power of "ruling," which we humbly conceive to be much the same with the power of "government."

3. ΠΟΙΜΑΙΝΩ. To exercise the office of a shepherd; hence, to provide for the safety and comfort of any one—to direct, to controul, to govern.

This term being more comprehensive than either of the former two, we crave the reader's indulgence to a minuter proof of the last mentioned acceptation, viz. to "govern."

As early as the days of *Homer*, this word and

its relatives were in familiar use, to designate not only authority, but the *highest* authority in the commonwealth. Thence that frequent Homeric phrase "the shepherd of the people," for their "king." No one who is in the least conversant with that pre-eminent poet will ask for examples; but lest we should be contradicted by such as are not, and yet wish to pass for "Greek scholars," we subjoin a few; though at the hazard of being again reproved by Mr. *Hobart* for our "ostentation."

———Δρυαντα τε ΠΟΙΜΕΝΑ λαων.
Il. A. 263.

"Dryas the SHEPHERD of the people"—which the scholiast interprets by Βασιλεα οχλων; "the KING of multitudes."

———πειθοντο τε ΠΟΙΜΕΝΙ λαων
Σκηπτουχοι βασιληες. Il. B. 85.

"The sceptred kings yielded to the SHEPHERD of the people."—Where the scholiast again explains "shepherd" by "king." Βασιλει.

In the same poet, "shepherd" is used interchangeably with other terms descriptive of the military chiefs of Greece.

Αιαν διογενες, Τελαμωνιε, ΚΟΙΡΑΝΕ λαων. Il. I. 640.
Οἱτινες ΗΓΕΜΟΝΕΣ Δαναων και ΚΟΙΡΑΝΟΙ ησαν. Il. B. 487.

Those who are elsewhere called "shepherds," are here named "leaders" and "princes:" the former being interpreted "kings" by the scholiast, as he had already interpreted "shepherds."

In the same way does he translate the latter, in his annotation upon v. 204, of the book last cited. So that by the great master of Grecian language and literature, the three terms, Ποιμην, Ηγεμων, Κοιρανος, i. e. "shepherd," "leader," "prince," are interchangeably used of the same rank, and are all explained by the Greek commentator, Βασιλευς, i. e. "king." Instances might easily be multiplied, but we forbear. We have the rather appealed to Homer, because he depicts that same state of society in which a great portion of the scriptures was written; and alludes to those same objects from which they have borrowed much of their imagery, and many of their terms.

Proceed we now to the septuagint version of the Old Testament, which was completed between two and three centuries before Christ. 2 *Kings*, v. 2. in our version, 2 Sam. v. 2. *The Lord said unto thee*, viz. David, *thou shalt* FEED (ποιμανεις, shalt act as a shepherd to) *my people Israel, and thou shalt be a* CAPTAIN (ἡγουμενον) *over Israel.*

Precisely the same sort of example is to be found in Ch. vii. 7, 1 Chron. ii. 2. xvii. 6; also Ps. xlviii. 14. *Death shall* FEED *upon* (ποιμανει, shall have the *rule* over) *them.*

The New Testament is equally decisive. Math. ii. 6. *Thou, Bethlehem, in the land of Juda, art not the least among the princes of Juda; for out of thee shall come a* GOVERNOUR (ἡγουμενος) *that shall* RULE

(ποιμανει, feed, superintend as a shepherd,) *my people Israel.* The prophet speaks of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the "good shepherd," and the "chief shepherd;" and who had, and has, "the government upon his shoulder." Is. ix. 6.

This term, likewise, is applied to Presbyters.

Acts xx. 17, 28. *From Miletus, Paul sent to Ephesus, and called the* PRESBYTERS *of the church and said unto them—Take heed unto yourselves, and to all the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made you* BISHOPS *to* FEED (ποιμαινειν, like good shepherds, to provide for, watch over, and govern,) *the church of God*, &c.

1 Pet. v. 2, 3. *The* PRESBYTERS *who are among you, I exhort, who am also a* PRESBYTER. FEED (ποιμανατε) *the flock of God which is among you*, taking the OVERSIGHT (επισκοπουντες, discharging the duty of BISHOPS) *thereof, not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind: Neither as being* LORDS *over God's heritage, but being ensamples to the flock.*

It is obvious, upon the very face of the texts, that these *presbyters* of Ephesus, and of the dispersion, are considered as vested with the pastoral care in all its extent; and they are commanded to be faithful to the trust reposed in them, by providing for the protection, nurture, and comfort of the flock of God. This "feeding" the flock, this discharge of the pastoral duty, is directly opposed by Peter, to being "lords over God's heri-

tage," i. e. to rigorous and oppressive government; or, as we commonly say, to "lording it" over them. The contrast could have had no place, had not these presbyters been church governours; for it is idle to warn men against abusing a power which they do not possess. By instructing them *how* they were to govern the church, the Apostle has decided that the power of government was committed to them. No higher authority than he has recognized in them, can belong to the order of prelates. For the very same term by which he marks the power of the presbyters, is employed in scripture, to mark the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ himself.*

The reader cannot for a moment, suppose that we put any power left in the church, on a level with that of her divine master. Far from us be the thought of such blasphemy. But we contend for these two things.

1st. That the term which both Paul and Peter apply to the office of presbyters, undoubtedly expresses the power of *government;* seeing it is the term which expresses the office of Christ, as the *governour* of his people Israel.

2d. That as this term, applied to the office of Christ, expresses the highest power of government in him as the chief shepherd; so, when applied to the office of the under shepherds, it expresses the highest power of government which he has dele-

* Math. ii. 6—ἡγουμενος οστις ΠΟΙΜΑΝΕΙ τον λαον μου, &c.

gated to be exercised in his name for the welfare of his church. But this power is vested, Paul and Peter being judges, in *presbyters;* therefore, presbyters, by the appointment of Jesus Christ, are invested with the highest power of government known in his church.

We go further: The authority conveyed by the charge to "*feed* the flock of God," comprehends the ordering of *all things* necessary to her well being; and, therefore, the power of *ordination* likewise. An essential part of the Redeemer's *pastoral* office, was, and is, to provide under-pastors for his sheep. This, at first, he did in person, by immediate vocation. But having "ascended up far above all heavens, that he might fill all things," he performs the same office through the medium of the pastors whom he has left in the church. The question is to *what* pastors has he committed the trust of ordaining *other* pastors, and thus preserving the pastoral succession? We answer, to *presbyters:* for he has affixed to their office, that very term which designates his own right and care to furnish his church with pastors, or lawful ministers. Let our Episcopal brethren show as much for their prelates, if they can.

To sum up what has been said on this article: No expression more clear and decisive than those we have considered, are used in the scripture to denote either the communication, or the possession, or the exercise, of the ordinary powers given

by Christ for the well ordering of his church. And we have shown, that the New Testament has, in the most direct and ample manner, confided them *all* to presbyters.

Unless, therefore, we adopt the insane paradox of Hammond, viz. that the presbyters of the New Testament were all diocesan bishops, the passages quoted must bear one of two senses. Either they point out, under the denomination of presbyters, those officers who are strictly so called, in con tradistinction from prelates and deacons; or they use the name with sufficient latitude to include the prelates too. If the former, our position is established. If the latter, then prelates and presbyters are *joined together* in the power of government, which the hierarchy maintains is confined to prelates alone. In either way, the argument is conclusive against her.

3d. At a very early period of the Christian church, presbyters did *actually exercise* the power of government: exercised it in conjunction with the apostles themselves; and that upon the principle of parity.

The important question concerning the obligation upon Christians to be circumcised and keep the law of Moses, in order to salvation, was referred by the church at Antioch, to the apostles and elders at Jerusalem. The historian does not mean apostles and elders who had a fixed and permanent charge at Jerusalem, which was essentially

incompatible with their apostolic vocation. But as that city had been the cradle of the Christian church, and was the centre of religious communication from all parts of the world, the apostles returned thither from their excursions in preaching the gospel, accompanied with Elders or Presbyters from the churches which they had planted, and met together in ecclesiastical council to consult about their common interest. Herein they have set us the example, and left us the warrant, of a *delegated body*, as the ultimate resort in all ecclesiastical affairs: for, such a body, to all intents and purposes, was the assemblage of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem. Of this most venerable primitive Synod, we treat no further at present than to ascertain what share the *presbyters* had in its proceedings. The following things appear indisputable.

1st. The apostles and presbyters met in common; that is, they formed but *one* assembly. Of a "house of bishops," and a "house of clerical and lay delegates," they had no idea. This improvement in church-government was reserved for discovery by those who have been trained in the school of the "judicious"* *Hooker.*

* This appellation was bestowed upon Hooker by James VI. who was delighted, beyond measure, with his famous work on *ecclesiastical polity*. And delighted with it for the same reason which, no doubt, ravished the heart of Cardinal *Allen*, and Pope

2d. The *right* of the presbyters to sit in judgment with the apostles upon all ecclesiastical concerns, which were not to be decided by special revelation, was well understood in the churches.

The proof of this proposition lies in the *very terms* of the reference from Antioch. For it is inconceivable, how the church there should think of submitting a question, so weighty in itself, and so extensive in its consequences, to the "elders," conjointly with the "apostles," if they had not been taught that presbyters were the ordinary church governours, and were to continue such after the decease of the others. This explains why they went up with the apostles to Jerusalem. It was not only to give them opportunities of information; but also, if not chiefly, to learn the proper mode of dispatching the public business. Before this council or synod, composed of apostles and elders, was the interesting reference from Antioch laid; by them was it discussed, and by them decided.

3d. The apostles, on this occasion, acted simply as members of the synod; they did nothing in vir-

Clement the VIII.* viz. that the *principle* of *Hooker's* book, and the scope of his argument, are to prove the right of the church to model her government as she shall judge for edification. We shall touch this subject again. Does not the reader suppose that this must be a truly *Protestant* work, which excited the admiration and rapture of the pope and his cardinals!

* *Hooker's* life, p. 78, 79. Works, vol. I. 8vo.

tue of their extraordinary, which was their apostolical, character, nor introduced into the deliberations of the assembly, any influence but that of *facts;* of the *written scripture;* and of *reasoning* founded on the comparison of both. All this is evident from the narrative in the fifteenth chapter of the Acts; and resulted from the nature of the case. Had the question been to be determined by *special revelation* or *apostolic* authority, *one* inspired man, or *one* apostle, would have answered as well as a dozen. The dispute might have been settled on the spot, and by Paul himself. Had there arisen any doubt of his power, or distrust of his integrity, a hundred miracles, if necessary, would instantly have removed the obstacle. In every view, the embassy to Jerusalem would have been an useless parade.

The truth is, that the apostles acted in a *double* capacity. They had that authority which was designed to be ordinary and perpetual, such as preaching the word, administering the sacraments, and governing the church. But superadded to this, they had also the authority of special messengers for extraordinary and temporary purposes. If a new church was to be founded among the nations—if any part of the rule of faith was to be revealed—if a particular emergency required a particular interposition; in these and similar cases, their extraordinary character found its proper objects: they "spake as they were moved

by the Holy Ghost:" their judgment was infallible, and their authority paramount. But for the *ordinary* government of the church, or any part of it, they do not appear to have enjoyed these extraordinary communications of the divine spirit; nor to have exerted their extraordinary powers; nor to have claimed a particle of authority above the presbyters. Without such a distinction as we have now stated, their history is a tissue of inconsistencies, and their conduct in the synod of Jerusalem must be given up as a riddle that baffles solution.

Seeing, therefore, that in the apostolic epistles and salutations to the churches, there is no mention of prelates, although there is frequent mention of presbyters and deacons—that presbyters are formally addressed as possessing the power of government—and that they actually did exercise it in matters of the highest moment, the advocate for diocesan episcopacy must adduce *scriptural facts* to support him under the depressing weight of all these considerations. As he maintains that prelates are at least of apostolic origin; and that they *alone* succeeded the apostles in the powers of ordination and government, his *facts* must not only be *plausible* when detached from their place and bearings in the Christian history, and when decorated with appendages of his own imagination; but they must accord with the *language* of the New Testament, and with its *narrative;* they

must be so *decisive* as to annihilate the foregoing difficulties; and must not admit of a fair and rational explanation upon Presbyterian principles. With such facts, he tells us, he is ready to confront us. Our curiosity is awake: let us look at them without further delay.

He refers us for one fact, to that same synod of Jerusalem which we have just left. We must go back again.

"If from Crete," says Cyprian, "we pass to Jerusalem, we shall there discover equally striking evidence* that St. James, the brother of our Lord, possessed in that place the pre-eminence of a bishop in the church. In the first council that was held there, in order to determine the controversy which had arisen in regard to the circumcision of Gentile converts, we find him pronouncing an authoritative sentence. His sentence, we remark also, determined the controversy. "Wherefore my sentence is, says he, that we trouble not those who from among the Gentiles are turned unto God." In Acts xxi. 17 and 18, we are told, "that when St. Paul and his company were come to Jerusalem, the brethren received him gladly; and that the next day following, Paul went in with them unto James, and all the Elders or Presbyters were present." Acts xii. 17, it is said, that "Peter, after he had declared to the Christians to whom he went, his miraculous deliverance, bade them go and

* What this "striking evidence" is, remains to be seen hereafter. We shall reduce the out-works of the hierarchy before we close in upon her citadel. This is the Episcopal character of Timothy and Titus, as her chieftains confess, as their anxiety to defend it sufficiently indicates, even without their confession. In the mean time, we believe Cyprian to be pretty correct in making the evidence for the episcopate of James at Jerusalem, to be "*equally* striking" with that of Titus's at Crete. For we hope to prove that in both cases it amounts to just nothing at all!

show these things to James and to the brethren." In Galatians ii. 12, St. Paul says, "that certain came from James," that is, from the church of Jerusalem to the church of Antioch. Surely these passages strongly indicate that James held the highest dignity in the church of Jerusalem. The brethren carry Paul and his company to him as to a supreme officer. He has presbyters and deacons in subordination to him. When messengers are sent from Jerusalem to other churches, it is not done in the name of the presbyters and deacons, or of the church of this place; it is done in the name of James. Do not these considerations prove James was the supreme ruler of that church?"

The first argument of Cyprian for the episcopal pre-eminence of James, is, that he pronounced in the synod of Jerusalem, "an *authoritative sentence*;" and that "*his* sentence determined the controversy." The proof is, that expression in his speech to the council, "Wherefore, *my sentence* is, that we trouble not those who from among the Gentiles are turned unto God." *Acts* xv. 19.

We are under the necessity of objecting, for the *third* time, to these writers, that they put into the mouth of the person whom they quote, declarations which he never uttered. They will make James deliver an authoritative sentence as the bishop of Jerusalem. They, perhaps, could not help themselves, as they have only followed their file leaders. *Potter* had said the same thing; and they took it as they found it. But the editor of *Lycophron*, and author of the "Antiquities of Greece," was "a scholar, and a ripe and good one." He knew that he was standing on slippery

ground; and so to save his own reputation, he slily fathers his construction of James's words upold *Hesychius.**

But in opposition to Cyprian, and the Layman, and archbishop Potter, and Hesychius too, we shall show,

1. That there is nothing in the language of James, from which it can be inferred that he, as the superiour officer, pronounced an *authoritative sentence*, and,

2. That it was *impossible* for him to pronounce such a sentence.

The *first* point is to be settled by a critical examination of his phraseology. His words are, *Διο εγω ΚΡΙΝΩ*, which our translators have rendered "*Wherefore* MY SENTENCE *is.*"

The primitive meaning of the word is to *discriminate*, to *separate*, to *select*, to *arrange*. Thus Homer,

—Δημητης
ΚΡΙΝΕΙ, σπειγομενων ανεμων ΚΑΡΠΟΝ τε και ΑΧΝΑΣ.
Il. E. 501.

"*Separates*, by the winds, the *chaff* from the *wheat.*"

* *Discourse on Church Government*, p. 91. In a note, the learned prelate cites Hesychius as thus distinguishing—"Peter addresses the council; but James enacts the law." Πετρος δημηγορει, αλλ' Ιακωβος νομοθετει. Potter's precaution passed unobserved. The reason probably is, that it was locked up in the quotation from Hesychius, "*Græcum est; et non potest legi!*" said the *Trojans* of Oxford, whenever a line of Greek came in their way.

——————ΚΡΙΝΑΣ τ'ανα δημον αριζους.
Od. Δ. 666.

"*Selecting* the most valiant throughout the people."

ΚΡΙΝ' ανδρας κατα φυλα. Il. B. 362.

"*Arrange* the men according to their nations."

From this primitive notion, the word, by a very natural transition, came to signify the formation of an opinion, or judgment, and the expression of it when formed, because no opinion or judgment can exist without a previous process by which the mind *discriminates* between its own perceptions. And thus the word is familiarly used by writers both profane and sacred.

——μισει δε πλεον η δικη ΚΡΙΝΑΝΤΕΣ.

"*Forming their opinion* rather from hatred than justice," says Thucydides of the Platæans, with respect to their *judgment* of the Thebans.*

—την διακοσμησιν και ταξιν ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ ου τυχης—ειναι κασκευασματα.

"To *think* that the beautiful order of the universe is not the production of fortune."†

——τω τουτο ΚΡΙΝΕΙΣ.

"Why dost thou *think* so? upon what ground art thou of *this opinion?*"‡

In the speech of Hermocrates to the Syracusans,

* *Thucyd.* III. 67. p. 209. *ed Dukeri.*

† *Diod. Sic.* Lib. xii. 84. Tom. I. p. 491. *ed Wessel.*

‡ *Aristoph.* Plut v. 48. p. 9. *ed Kusteri.*

as recorded by Thucydides, there is a perfect parallel to the expression of James.

"We shall consult," says he, "if we be in our right minds, not only our own immediate interests; but whether we shall be able still to preserve all Sicily, against which, *in my judgment*, the Athenians are plotting."*

The same use of the word is so common in the New Testament, that examples are almost superfluous. We shall, however, subjoin a few, because they will bring our criticism more directly within the reach of the unlearned reader.

Luke vii. 43. *Simon said—I suppose that he to whom he forgave most.* And he said unto him, Thou hast *rightly judged* (ορθως *EKPINAΣ.*) Simon's judgment was surely not an *official* one. It was simply his *opinion*, or *conclusion*, from the case proposed to him.

John vii. 24. JUDGE *not* (*Μη KPINETE*) *according to the appearance, but* JUDGE *righteous* JUDGMENT (*KPIΣIN KPINATE.*) No "authoritative sentence" is contemplated here.

Acts xii. 46. *Seeing—ye* JUDGE *yourselves* (*KPINETE*) *unworthy, &c.*

2 *Cor.* v. 14, 15. *The love of Christ constraineth us, because we thus* JUDGE (*KPINANTAΣ τουτο,*) &c. "Concerning the love of Christ," saith Paul,

* —ου περι των ιδιων μονον, ει σωφρονωμεν, ἡ συνοδος εσται· αλλ' ει επιβουλευομενην την πασαν Σικελιαν, ΩΣ ΕΓΩ ΚΡΙΝΩ, ὑπ' Αθηναιων, δυνησομεθα ετι διασωσαι. *Thucyd.* iv. 60. p. 272. *ed Dukeri.*

" this is our *sentiment*, our *mode of reasoning*, that if one died for all," &c.

In every one of the preceding quotations, the very same word is used which occurs in the speech of James, and, in the very same sense. It is the plainest Greek imaginable to express the *result of one's reflections.* This is all that the words of James imply. He spoke among the last; he availed himself of the discussion which had already taken place: And when his opinion was matured, he submitted it to the council in the form of a temperate and conciliatory proposition. We ask any man of plain sense, to look over the chapter, and say whether this is not a natural and satisfactory account of the whole affair. Little did the guileless disciple suspect that his familiar and innocent expression, would be converted, in these latter days, into a certificate of his being a diocesan bishop! And had not the " proofs" of the hierarchy been, like lords' wits, rather " thinly sown," she would never have attempted to cull one from a form of speech which might have been adopted by the obscurest member of the council, with as much propriety as by James himself.

We have neither interest nor disposition to conceal what is well known to even smatterers in Greek, that the term which we have shown to be familiarly used to signify the expression of *opinion generally*, is also used, and with equal familiarity, in a more *restricted* sense, of a *judicial* opinion; or,

if you prefer it, an "authoritative sentence." But then it always *presupposes the judicial or authoritative character* of the person to whom it is applied. Thus the senses of the word rank.

1. To discriminate—to select—to arrange.—Thence,

2. To form a judgment—to express an opinion,—and thence,

3. To pronounce an official judgment; or "an authoritative sentence."

But who does not see that you must first know under *what circumstances* a person is represented as speaking or acting, before you can determine whether the writer intends, by the word we are considering, a mere *selection* of one thing from a number of others? or an *opinion* as expressed in conversation or debate? or a *solemn judicial sentence?* Had the prelatic dignity of James been *first established;* and had the synod at Jerusalem been *a convocation of his clergy*, there would have been a propriety in attributing to him an "authoritative" decision, and interpreting his words accordingly. But to argue from his "my sentence is," that he *was* a prelate, is completely begging the question. The argument *assumes* that he was the bishop of Jerusalem; for this is indispensable to that "authority" which Cyprian ascribes to his words; and it is exactly taking for granted, the thing to be proved.

Another unfortunate circumstance for the Epis-

copal construction of James's speech is, that it contradicts the sacred historian. In the very next chapter he tells us, that Paul and Silas delivered to the cities through which they passed, "the decrees for to keep, that were *ordained* (*KEKPIMENA*) of the *apostles and elders.*" Ch. xvi. 4. *Cyprian* says that *James* pronounced the "authoritative sentence." The inspired historian says, that it was pronounced by the *apostles and elders.* Both cannot be true; and we are inclined to think that the rector of the episcopal church in Albany, cannot stand in the judgment, even with Potter and Hesychius to back him. The affront put upon the narrative of Luke is the more conspicuous, as the term which, in the mouth of James, is tortured into an "authoritative sentence," *here* occurs in that sense most unequivocally: because the reference from Antioch was brought before the *tribunal* of the apostles and elders. They were recognized as *Judges having cognizance of the question;* and theirs was, of course, an authoritative sentence. James was, indeed, *one* of the judges; he acted in his judicial character, but that character was common to him with every other member of the council; and like theirs, his only influence was that of his wisdom and his vote. The scripture, then, being judge, it is incontestible, that he did NOT pronounce an "authoritative sentence."

Our *second* position is, that it was *impossible* for

James to exercise such a power as the advocates of Episcopacy attribute to him. Our proofs are these :

1. The cause was not referred to him ; and accordingly it was not tried in the court of " St. James ;" but in the court of the " apostles and elders," as the representatives of the Christian church.

2. It could not be referred to him ; nor could he, as bishop of Jerusalem, have any cognizance of it ; Antioch being entirely without his jurisdiction.

3. The decision of the council was received and obeyed with alacrity through the churches of Asia. But had it been pronounced by an authority so limited and local as that of the bishop of Jerusalem, the effect must have been very different. Unless we should suppose, that all the Asiatic cities through which Paul and Silas passed, were subject to the see of Jerusalem ; and, then, we shall not only spoil the Episcopal argument from the seven angels of Asia ; but shall overturn the whole system of the hierarchy, as it is pretended to have been established by apostolic ordination : because we shall admit, that, instead of fixing bishops at proper distances for governing the church within convenient dioceses, the apostles put the immense regions of Asia under a spiritual head in the land of Judea. Indeed, we have always thought it hard, upon the Episcopal

plan, that, considering the importance and the wealth of Antioch, not a bishop could be mustered for that distinguished city; but she must go for direction all the way to the prelate of Jerusalem!

4. The assembly in which James delivered his speech was not composed of clergy belonging to his diocese; and, therefore, he could not, even upon episcopal principles, pronounce an "authoritative sentence." The reason is obvious: he could not exercise authority over those who were not under his controul. There were present at the council, not only "presbyters," but "apostles." Peter was there, Paul was there, and how many others, we do not know. Had James then pronounced an "authoritative sentence," he had been above not only all the presbyters of his own diocese, but above all the deputies from Antioch; above all the members of the council from whatever part of the world; above the apostles themselves! Look, then, at this *fact* of the hierarchy. It turns the very apostles into mere make-weights of bishop James! It sets up an authority much like that of a visible head of the church catholic, than the papists have ever been able to produce for their "St. Peter!" If this is *not* a "bold stroke" for a bishop, pray, gentlemen, what *is?* And if any of our readers can digest such a dish of absurdity, we wish him much comfort of his meal!

We shall not trespass long upon the patience of

either our friends or our foes, in disposing of the "remains" of Cyprian's proofs. "When St. Paul and his company were come to Jerusalem, the brethren received him gladly, and the next day following, Paul went in with them unto James, and all the elders or presbyters were present." It was rather rustic in Paul not to pay his court to the bishop *first*. We have learnt, at the expense of some mortification, that in New-York any communication with the clergy, on ecclesiastical matters, except through the medium of the bishop, is an invasion of episcopal order. But Paul must be pardoned for committing an oversight, especially as Cyprian, to be even with him, has done so too. He has stopped at that part of the narrative, which, in his eyes, holds James forth in something of bishop-like majesty, and forgot to tell the rest of the story. The reader, no doubt, would expect to hear of a very pointed conference between James and the apostle, all the presbyters listening with due humility to their superiours; but if he turn to the history, (Acts xxi.) he will find these same presbyters most uncivilly advising the apostle; and what is still worse, telling him that *they* had decided the reference from Antioch. Cyprian asserts that *James* made the decision. They, on the contrary, have the assurance to tell the apostle Paul, in the pre-

sence of James himself, that the *presbyters* had decided it. And all this while not a word of bishop James! In the following ages the presbyters were taught better manners.

But then, it seems, that after Peter's "miraculous deliverance, he bade the Christians go and show these things to James, and to the brethren"—Also, that "certain came from *James*, that is, from the church of Jerusalem to the church of Antioch." *Therefore*, James was bishop of Jerusalem! Very sagely and conclusively reasoned! As if such things did not happen every day in places where there are ministers of the gospel distinguished by their talent or standing. The writer of this review stepped the other evening into the house of that venerable Christian veteran, the Reverend Dr. Rodgers, and found there "certain brethren" who had just come from one of their judicatories. It is quite common for people to talk of Dr. Rodgers' sending ministers to preach; and even to designate his denomination as Dr. Rodgers' church! Therefore Dr. Rodgers is bishop of New-York; and primate of the Presbyterian church in North-America!!

"Thus endeth the first lesson," which is concerning Cyprian's "striking evidence" that James was bishop of Jerusalem.

Having disposed of the see of Jerusalem, which had been gratuitously conferred on James, we proceed to the argument in favour of Diocesan Episcopacy, from the epistles addressed, in the book of the Revelation, to the seven churches of Asia. We give it in the words of Cyprian. And as it may possibly amuse the reader, while it convinces him that we were correct in saying that Archbishop Potter is one of the *real* authors under the signatures of *Cyprian*, &c. we shall put his Grace of Canterbury side by side with our Albany friend.

POTTER.

" St. John, in the three first chapters of his Revelation, has given us a lively description of seven *bishops* who presided in the seven principal cities of the pro-consular Asia. Our Lord is there introduced, sending seven epistles to the seven churches of these cities, directed to the *seven angels* of the churches, whom he calls *the seven stars in his right hand.* Now if it appears that the *seven angels*

CYPRIAN.

" In the three first chapters of the Revelations of St. John, we find absolute demonstration of the existence of the Episcopal dignity and authority, at the time in which this work was written. In these chapters, St. John gives us a description of the seven Bishops, who superintended the interests of the church in the seven principal cities in the Pro-Consular Asia. Our Lord is represented as sending seven Epistles to the seven churches of these cities, directed to the seven angels of the churches, whom he calls the " seven stars in his right hand." From all the circum-

POTTER.

were so many single persons invested with supreme authority in the seven churches, there can be no reason to doubt, whether they were the *bishops* of these churches ; a *bishop* being nothing else but *one* who has chief authority in the church.

" Let us examine in the *first* place, whether the *seven angels* were so many single persons ? And first of all, it is manifest they were not the whole church or collective body of Christians in their several cities ; because the churches are represented by *seven candlesticks*, which are all along distinguished from the *seven stars*, which are emblems of the *angels*. Neither were they any select number or body of men : For they are constantly mentioned as single persons ; *the angel of the church of* Ephesus, *the angel of the church of* Smyrna, and so the rest."

" Accordingly, both he and all the rest are constantly addressed to in the singular number ; *I know thy works*, *I have a few things against* thee, *remember how* thou *hast*

CYPRIAN.

stances that are mentioned, it undeniably appears that these seven angels were so *many single persons*, invested with supreme authority in the churches ; that is to say, they were the bishops of those churches.

" I say it manifestly appears, that these seven angels of the churches, whom the Lord calls the " seven stars" in his right hand, were single persons. They were not the whole church or collective body of Christians. This is proved incontestably from these considerations. The whole Churches, or collective body of Christians, are represented by " seven candlesticks," which are distinguished from the " seven stars," that are emblems of the Angels, the Bishops. They are constantly mentioned in the *singular number*. " The Angel of the Church of Ephesus"—" the Angel of the Church of Smyrna," and so of the rest.

And in the epistle to Thyatira it is said, " I know thy works." " I have a few things against thee." " Remember how thou hast heard." " Thou hast kept the word of my pa-

POTTER.

heard, thou *hast kept the word of my patience*, and so in the rest, where our Lord speaks to them in particular: But when what he writes equally concerns the people, he changes his style, and speaks in the plural: *The devil shall cast some of* you *into prison.* Thou *hast not denied my faith when* Antipas *my faithful martyr was slain among* you. *I will reward every one of* you *according to* your *works. That which ye have, hold fast till I come.* Which variation of the number, is a plain argument that some parts of these Epistles relate to the whole churches, and others only to the persons of the *angels.*"

"But there is one thing yet behind, which will put this matter beyond dispute: namely, that the titles of *angels* and *stars* are constantly applied in this book of Revelation to single men: Our Lord is called the *Morning Star*, and the *Sun*, and the apostles are called *twelve stars*, and *twelve angels;* but there is not one example where these titles are given to any *society* or *number* of men. So that if we will allow the divine author of this *book* to speak in this place, as he does in all others, the *angels*

CYPRIAN.

tience." This is the style which is used when the Angel or Bishop of the Church is addressed.——

But when what is said relates to the *people*, the style is altered, the *plural number* is then used. "The devil shall cast some of you into prison."

"I will reward every one of *you* according to your works. That which *ye* have, hold fast till I come." And this variation in the number, proves that *some parts of these Epistles relate to the whole Church, and others only to the Angels.*

But what places this subject beyond all reasonable doubt is this circumstance: The titles of Angels and stars are *constantly applied* in the book of Revelation to single men, and *never* to a society or number of men. Our Lord is called the "morning star and the sun," and the twelve Apostles are called "twelve stars," and "twelve Angels."

It is evident, therefore, that the seven stars or Angels in the book of Revelation, are single persons.

Potter.	Cyprian.
of the seven churches can be none but single persons.	
"The *next* thing to be made out is, that these single persons were men of chief authority in their several churches. And we might safely conclude they were so, though we had no other proof of it, because our Lord has directed to them the Epistles, which he designed for the use of their churches. But there are several other arguments, which prove that the *angels* were men of eminent station and authority: For whereas the churches are only called *candlesticks*, the *angels* are resembled to *stars*, which give light to the *candlesticks*."	That these persons possessed supreme authority in the Churches, is also demonstrated from these considerations.
	These Epistles are addressed to them alone.
	The Churches are called candlesticks, and they the stars which give *light* to the candlesticks.
"They are praised for all the good, and blamed for all the evil which happened in their churches. The *angel* of Ephesus is commended, because he *could not bear them that were evil*, and had *tried those who called themselves Apostles, and were not* so; which seems to imply, that he had judicially convicted them to be impostors. And the *angel* of Pergamos is reproved *for having them who hold the doctrine of* Balaam; that is, the Nicolaitans, who allowed themselves to	The seven angels are praised for all the good which they had done, and blamed for all the evil which happened in the Churches. The Angel of Ephesus is commended because "he could not bear them that were evil, and had tried those who called themselves Apostles, and were not so," which seems to imply that he had convicted them of imposture. The Angel of Pergamos is reproved for having them "who hold the doctrine of Balaam, and he is severely

POTTER.

commit fornication, and to *eat things sacrificed to idols;* and he is severely threatened, unless he *repented:* which shows he had authority to correct these disorders, otherwise he could not justly have been punished for them. The same may be said of the *angel* of Thyatira, who is blamed for *suffering* Jezebel, *who called herself a prophetess, to teach and seduce* the people. And the *angel* of Sardis is commanded to be *watchful*, and to *strengthen* those who *are ready to die;* otherwise our Lord threatens to *come on* him, *as a thief*, at an *hour* which he should *not know*."

CYPRIAN.

threatened unless he repented." This shows that he possessed authority to correct these disorders, or he could not justly be menaced with punishment for permitting them. The Angel of Thyatira also is blamed for suffering "Jezebel," who called herself a prophetess, to teach and seduce the people. And the Angel of Sardis is commanded "to be watchful, and to strengthen those who are ready to die," otherwise our Lord threatens to come on him "as a thief; at an hour which he should not know."

The writers under review, having a great contempt for all reasoning from *names*, promised to intrench themselves within scriptural *facts*. One of their facts they find in the history of the "stars" or "angels" of the seven churches. Yet if the reader shall attentively inspect their argument, which we have placed before him in its full strength, he will perceive that it rests entirely upon their interpretation of two *names*. These are "angel" and "star:" which, in the symbolical language of the scripture, are as really names of office, as bishop, presbyter, deacon, are in its alphabetical or common language. The aspect of

the fact changes with the construction of these two symbols. You must fix their sense before you can tell what the fact is. Unless you can prove that "star" and "angel" necessarily denote individuals, and such individuals as diocesan bishops, the fact, instead of being *for* the hierarchy, will be *against* her. And thus her advocates, under the pretext of "absolute demonstration," put us off with what they themselves have again and again declared to be "miserable sophistry"—"the old and wretched sophistry of names."

Let us, however, examine this, their "absolute demonstration" of diocesan Episcopacy. It turns, as we just now said, upon the interpretation of the symbolical titles, "angel" and "star." These, our prelatical friends maintain, "are *constantly applied* in the book of Revelation to *single men*, and *never* to a society or *number of men*." Such is the assertion—now for the proof.

"The whole churches, or collective bodies of Christians, are represented by "seven candlesticks," which are distinguished from the "seven stars," that are emblems of the angels, the bishops."

The distinction is admitted: but it is equally marked upon the Presbyterian plan. For the collective body of the ministry is quite as distinguishable from their churches, as the bishops alone can be. Nothing is gained here. We go on.

"They," the angels, "are constantly mentioned in the *singular* number."

What then? Does this prove that the singular term "angel" has never a *collective* sense?

What next? Nothing at all. Let out readers examine, again, the whole of what Cyprian has said upon this point, and if they can detect, in the multitude of his words, and his show of illustration, any thing more than his mere assertion, we shall be disappointed.

The stars and angels, says he, are distinguished from the churches. True—but they may be so without being diocesan bishops——

"They are constantly mentioned in the singular number"—which is not true. And if it were, the question still is, whether the symbolical term in the singular number must necessarily signify only a single person—O yes, says Cyprian, most undoubtedly. "What places this subject beyond all reasonable doubt, is this circumstance. The titles of angels and stars are constantly applied in the book of Revelation, to single men, and never to a society or number of men!" Now this is exactly the thing to be proved.

Amphora cœpit
Institui: currente rota cur urceus exit?

Cyprian sets out with a threat of "absolute demonstration," and leaves off with begging the question.*

* Potter, in his zeal to make out the prelatic character of these angels, presses into his service a *various reading*. "If," says he,

That the assertions which Cyprian has borrowed from Potter, are not accompanied with *quite* an "absolute demonstration," may be gathered from the light in which they are considered by Episcopal writers no way inferiour to Potter himself.

"Methinks," says Dr. *Henry More*, "it is extremely harsh to conceit that these seven stars are merely the seven bishops of any particular churches of *Asia*, as if the rest were not supported nor guided by the hand of Christ; or as if there were but seven in his *right hand*, but all the rest in his *left*. Such high representations

"in the epistle to *Thyatira*, instead of (*την γυναικα* Ιεζεβηλ,) the *woman* Jezebel, we read (*την γυναικα σου* Ιεζεβηλ,) *thy wife* Jezebel, as it is in St. *Cyprian*, the *Syriac* version, the *Alexandrian*, and several other manuscript copies, then the *Angel* of *Thyatira* was a married man, and consequently but *one* person."*

Learning, when not well directed, falls into absurdities which plain sense avoids. It is hard for a man to suspect himself of blundering when he is displaying his erudition. But on this occasion, the eyes of Potter seem to have been blinded by the dust of his manuscripts. If we adopt his reading, and make "Jezebel" a literal woman, by making her the wife of the prelate of *Thyatira*, the symbolical or figurative sense of the text is gone. And in order to be consistent, the crimes charged upon her must also be literal. Thus we shall not only have my lady of *Thyatira* an open adulteress; but the diocese a huge brothel under her inspection; where by example and by precept, she initiates her husband's flock in the mysteries of lewdness and idolatry. A goodly occupation for the spouse of a diocesan! Bad times, one would think, for an angel-bishop; and not the most flattering compliment to episcopal discipline.

* *Discourse of Church government*, p. 145, 3d edit.

cannot be appropriated to ANY SEVEN PARTICULAR CHURCHES WHATSOEVER." Again, "By *angels*, according to the *apocalyptick* style, all the agents under their presidency are represented or insinuated—and it is so frequent and obvious in the *Apocalypse*, that none that is versed therein can any ways doubt of it."*

The great, and justly celebrated *Joseph Mede*, observes, that "Angels, by a mode of speaking not uncommon in this book, are put for the *nations* over which they were thought to preside. Which appears hence, that they who, by the injunction of the oracle, are *loosed*, are *armies of cavalry* sent forth to slaughter men."†

Just after he adds, "the *four angels*, (Rev. ix. 14,) "signify so many *Sultanies* or kingdoms."‡

Dr. *Fulk*, in his answer to the Rhemish Testament, remarks, that "St. John, by the angels of the churches, meaneth not *all that should wear on their heads mitres*, and hold crosier-staves in their hands, like dead idols, but them that are faithful messengers of God's word, and utter and declare the same. They are called the

* *Exposition of the seven churches*, *Works*, *p.* 724.

† Angeli ponuntur pro gentibus quibus præesse credebantur, non inusitatâ in hoc libro metonymiâ. Id ex eo apparet, quòd qui continuò ex oraculi præscripto solvuntur, *Exercitus Equestres* sunt, hominibus occidendis emissi. *In Apocap. B. III. Tub. VI. Works*, *p.* 471.

‡ *Angeli quatuor* totidem Sultanias seu regna significant. *Ibid.*

Angels of the churches because they are *God's messengers.*"*

The famous *Stillingfleet*, in his *Irenicum*, asks, concerning these angels, "If, in the prophetick style, any unity may be set down by way of representation of a multitude; what evidence can be brought from the *name*, that by it some one particular person must be understood?"—And a little further he says, "If many things in the Epistles be direct to the angels, but yet so as to concern the whole body, then of necessity, the angel must be taken as a *representative* of the whole body, and then, why may not the word *angel* be taken by way of representation of the body itself; either of the whole church, or, which is far more probable, of the *Consessus*, or order of Presbyters in that church? We see what miserable, unaccountable arguments those are, which are brought for any kind of government, from metaphorical or ambiguous expressions or names promiscuously used."†

* This and the following quotation, are from the Appendix to Ayton's Original Constitution of the Christian Church.

† It is the fashion with the *Jure divino* prelatists to decry this work of Stillingfleet as the production of his juvenile days; and as being recanted by him in maturer life. The true reason of their dislike to it is, that it has sorely gravelled them from the date of its publication till the present hour, and is likely to gravel them in all time hereafter. We cannot, however, see what the *age* or the *recantation* of the author, (if he *did* recant,) has to do with the question, any further than as it may be influenced by his

We quote these passages, not to make them our own, but to show that Episcopal writers of the highest reputation, entertain opinions very different from those of Potter and Cyprian, as to the evidence which the apocalyptic angels give in favour of their hierarchy :

" It is absolute demonstration," says Cyprian. " It is a harsh conceit," says Dr. *H. More.*

" The titles of angels and stars are *never* applied," says Cyprian after Potter, " to a society or number of men." They signify " them that

private opinion. " Old men are not always wise ;" nor do green years detract from the force of argument. Facts and reasonings having no dependence upon a writer's *name*, stand or fall in their own strength. It is one thing to *recant*, and quite another to *refute*. The learned, but unhappy Whitby, who, in his commentary on the New Testament, had zealously defended the divinity and atonement of our Lord and Saviour, left a work behind him entitled Ὑστεραι φροντιδες, or *After Thoughts*, in which he denied both. Yet his proofs of his previous belief remain unanswered by himself, and unanswerable by any other man. We see that it is very possible for great and learned men to change for the *worse*. Therefore, although Stillingfleet, whether of his own accord, or by yielding to the teazings and menaces of others, did retract the doctrines of his *Irenicum*, it does not follow that all his facts and reasonings are false, or that he himself drew nearer to the truth. He renounced the *Irenicum*, the prelatists cry—Good. Did he *answer* it ? we ask. Howbeit, since Dr. Hobart has represented himself and his brother-writers, as young men, and even " striplings ;" who knows, but, upon their arriving at maturity, when they shall have sown their intellectual " wild oats," their opinion may change in a direction contrary to that of the bishop of Worcester, and that they may yet ripen into excellent Presbyterians ?

are the faithful messengers of God's word ;" answers Dr. *Fulk*—They " are put for the *nations* over which they were thought to preside," adds the venerable *Mede*—*More* follows again, with a declaration, " That no man versed in the apocalyptical style, can any wise doubt that by " angels" *all* the agents under their presidency are represented." And *Stillingfleet*, their own *Stillingfleet*, calls the argument of the hierarchists from these symbolical titles, a " miserable" one ; thus avenging the Presbyterian upon them, by dealing out to them in their own way, " measure for measure."—

To which side the scale inclines, it is not difficult to discern.

That the epistles in question are addressed to the persons designated by " stars" and " angels," in such a manner as to imply that these persons were invested with authority over the churches, is freely conceded. It is also conceded that " angel" and " star" are titles of office which belong exclusively to the ministry. Unless we greatly mistake, " stars," in the symbolical language, signify, throughout the whole Bible, " ministers of religion."

But we contend that they signify ministers of religion with regard to their *general office*, and not with regard to their *relative dignity*. Jesus Christ is a " star," the twelve apostles are " stars"—and so are the apostate clergy, figured by the " third

part of the stars," which the dragon cast down with his tail to the earth. Who does not see, that the only point in which the symbol agrees to the subject in all these cases, is the common character of the *religious ministry*; distinction of rank being utterly disregarded? On this principle, the "stars" must mean the ministers of the churches without discrimination; every one being a "star." It is, therefore, impossible to discover under this emblem, any order of ministers to the exclusion of any other.

In this general reasoning, the hierarchy might, perhaps, concur without much prejudice to her cause. She might insist, that a symbol, common, in its own nature, to all ministers of religion, is restricted, by the conditions of the text, to a single individual, who, from the functions ascribed to him, must be a superiour officer, and not one of a college, concessus, or presbytery, having equal authority.

There is internal evidence in the passage itself, that this construction, though ingenious and acute, cannot be true. For as the "candlesticks" are emblematical of the churches, and as there is but *one* star to give light to each candlestick, it would follow that there was but a single minister in each of the churches; and thus the Episcopalian would overthrow himself: for without inferiour, there can be no superiour, clergy. Surely he will not say, that the bishop *alone* did *all* the preaching, gave

all the instruction, and set *all* the example: i. e. emitted *all* the light on account of which ministers are called "stars." The other clergy had *some* share in these useful functions. They too "preached the word;" they too, taught "from house to house;" they too, "let their light shine before others." Now, one "star" being appropriated to one "church," as one candle is to one "candlestick;" it follows, from the nature of the comparison, that as one candle is the *full complement* of light for one candlestick; so one star is the full complement of light for one church. But the light which shone in these churches did not emanate from any individual; it emanated from a number of individuals; from the *collective body* of the ministers of religion. Therefore, the "star" which expresses the whole light in one of these churches, is a symbol, not of a *single* minister, but of her ministry *collectively*. It would be a darksome diocese, indeed, which should enjoy no rays of light but those which proceed from the bishop.

Let us now advert to the other symbol, viz. "Angel." This too, the hierarchists, whom we oppose, say, is "*constantly* applied in the book of Revelation to a *single* man, and *never* to a society or number of men."

It looks somewhat uncivil to contradict so positive an assertion; but we must contradict it; for it is not true. And if, in proving it to be false, we

prove its authors either to be ignorant of the scriptures, or wilfully to misrepresent them, we cannot help it. One passage from the book of Revelation itself, overturns the very foundation upon which *Cyprian* and his associates have reared their "absolute demonstration."

I saw, says the prophet, *another* ANGEL *fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to preach unto them that dwell on the earth, and to* EVERY NATION, *and* KINDRED, *and* TONGUE, *and* PEOPLE. (Rev. xiv. 6.)

"Heaven," in this book, is the ascertained symbol of the Christian church, from which issue forth the "ministers of grace" to the nations. As the gospel is preached only by *men*, this "angel" who has it to preach to "every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people," must be the symbol of a human ministry. And as it is perfectly evident that no single man can thus preach it, but that there must be a *great company* of preachers to carry it to "every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people," the angel mentioned in the text is, and of necessity must be, the symbol of that *great company*. We might produce other examples; but this is decisive. It shows the proposition of Potter, Cyprian, &c. to be one of the most rash and unfounded assertions into which the ardour of party ever betrayed a disputant.

Assuming it now as proved, that the term "angel" is applied in this book to a *collective body*, or

a number of men joined in a common commission, we demand the reason of its being restricted to an individual in the epistles to the churches of Asia. Signifying "a messenger," it is in itself as applicable to *any* preacher of the gospel as to a diocesan bishop. If he was of old, what most of the diocesans are now, he was, of all the clergy in his diocese, the one who had the *least* claim to the title. To "preach the word," to "declare the whole counsel of God," to instruct the people, we are told plainly enough, are not the peculiar attributes of the bishop. By what rule of propriety should *he* be characterised by symbols which are foreign from his appropriate functions? by symbols which describe exactly the functions of those ministers whom, we are taught, they do *not* represent.*

The advocates of the hierarchy must have summoned up the most desperate resolution, when they ventured upon the declaration which we have

* "Angel of the church," is a phrase borrowed from the synagogue. "It answers to the Hebrew שלי"ח צבור, the *Legate*, or *delegate of the church*. A name which was given in the synagogue to experienced and learned men, especially the *Doctors* (or teachers,) who were usually *delegated* to pray for the public assembly, whether in ordinary or extraordinary cases. So that by *Angels of the churches* must be here understood those *rulers of the Christian church*, whose office it was to offer up public prayers in the church, to manage sacred concerns, and discourse to the people." *Vitringæ anacrisis apocalypseos*, p. 25. To the same purpose speaks the profoundly learned *Lightfoot*. *Works*, Vol. I. p. 341. Fol.

exposed. To do them justice, they seem not to have been forsaken of those "compunctious visitings," which occasionally trouble such as suspect the righteousness of their cause. We infer this from their growing dogmatical and rather unruly in their asseverations, nearly in proportion as they find themselves beset with difficulty. Not unlike men who are accustomed to tell "a tough story," and when they perceive the credulity of their audience to be too hard pressed, back their veracity with a file of oaths. Any plain reader will observe, on a slight inspection of these epistles, that they address the angel of a particular church in the singular or plural number indifferently. Thus to the angel of the church in *Smyrna*, the Redeemer says, *I know* THY *works, and tribulation and poverty, but* THOU *art rich—Fear none of those things which* THOU *shalt* SUFFER. *Behold the devil shall cast* SOME *of* YOU *into prison, that* YE *may be tried; and* YE *shall have tribulation ten days: be* THOU *faithful unto the death; and I will give* THEE *a crown of life.**

We ask any dispassionate man whether all this is not addressed to the *angel* in Smyrna? *Thou*, says the text; "Thou," the angel, "shalt suffer." How? What? "Thus," saith the text, "the devil shall cast into prison *some of you*"—you who are signified by the angel. However, "be *thou* faithful unto the death;" i. e. although thou

* Rev. ii. 8—10.

shouldest die for being faithful; "and I will give *thee*," whom? certainly the persecuted, "I will give thee a crown of life." This is so obvious, that, in order to evade its force, the Episcopal writers represent the epistles as addressed partly to the bishop and partly to the people.

"When what is said relates to the *people*, the style is altered; the plural number is then used." See Cyprian and Potter as above.

This gloss is contrary,

1. To the plain and natural construction of the prophet's words; which, using sometimes the singular, and sometimes the plural, number, when speaking of the *angel*, leads us to a simple and easy solution, by supposing that he employs that term in a *collective* sense, of the *whole ministry* of the church.

2. To their own principles which the Episcopal writers have laid down as containing an "absolute demonstration" of the prelatic dignity of these angels, viz. "That the titles of angels and stars are *constantly* applied in the book of Revelation to *single* men, and *never* to a *society* or *number* of men." The epistle is written to the *angel* in Smyrna. "Angel," say they, *always* signifies a *single* person, and *never* a number of men; and yet they say, that of this very epistle to the angel, part is addressed directly to the *people*, who *are* "a society or number of men."

3. To their own distinction between the emblems which point out the ministry and the churches respectively.

" The stars and angels," say they, " were not the whole church or collective body of Christians. This is proved incontestably from these considerations. The whole churches or collective body of Christians, are represented by " seven candlesticks," which are distinguished from the " seven stars" that are emblems of the angels, the bishops," &c. See above.

The distinction is just; but it is completely overthrown in their subsequent interpretations. For, in the first place, they tell us very truly, that the collective body of Christians is signified by the symbol of a " candlestick:" and in the next, that they are directly addressed in the letter sent to the angel, who is, say they, a single person: i. e. they are *explicitly and formally addressed*, under an appellation which is *never applied to them.*

4. To the known use of those scriptural emblems, " star" and " angel." These titles in the context are perfectly synonymous; whatever is meant by " star," is acknowledged to be meant by " angel." Now both these symbols depict *official* character; and consequently, when applied to the Christian church, cannot mean the people as distinguished from their ministers. Therefore, under the term " angel," the ministry and the people cannot be distinctly addressed.

5. To the tenour of the exhortations and promise in the text. If the " angel" is the collective body of the ministry upon whom the persecution was to fall, then the exhortations, *Fear none of those things which thou shalt suffer—Be thou faithful unto the death;* and the promise, *I will give thee a crown*

of life, are in harmony with the pre-monition that the *Devil should cast some of them into prison.* The anticipation of evil is softened by the assurance of support. But according to the Episcopal construction, the sorrow goes one way and the consolation the other: the bishop is exhorted not to fear: to be faithful unto the death. But it seems that the people only are to bear the calamity. The bishop has a glorious promise of a crown of life; but not a word to cheer his oppressed flock. Cold comfort this to the poor prisoners cooped up by the devil in a dungeon! One would think that the "cup of salvation" might have been put to the lips which were drinking deeply of the cup of sorrow. But the matter is more dexterously managed: the bishop suffers, and the people are consoled,—by proxy. A mode of suffering, we presume, to which the bishops of the present day, and many others beside them, would submit with great magnanimity. How they would relish the consolation thus administered, is another affair.

Lastly, to the authority delegated by Christ to Presbyters: We have formerly proved that every ordinary power left in the church is, in the most direct and unequivocal manner, devolved on Presbyters.* And as one part of scripture cannot be repugnant to another, it is impossible that any term or expression here, in this book of the Revelation, can be rightly interpreted, which is said

* See page p.

to lodge the whole power of government and discipline in a bishop, to the exclusion of presbyters.

We do not feel conscious of any arrogance in supposing, that after the reader, who is solicitous to know the truth, shall carefully have examined and compared the reasonings now submitted to him; and allowed them their due force on his mind, he will coincide with us in opinion, that the "angels" and "stars" in the context before us, do NOT *signify single persons*, but *a number of men;* that is, are emblems of a *collective ministry*, and not of *diocesan bishops.*

"Thus endeth the second lesson," which is concerning Cyprian's "absolute demonstration" that the angels of the seven churches of Asia were Episcopal prelates.

We now come to the *third* and great fact of the Hierarchy, the prelatical character of Timothy and Titus. The inquiry consists of two parts; the first, concerning their *ordination*, and the second, their *powers.*

Although the Episcopal writers argue less confidently from the first of these topics than from the second; yet it is not unimportant to their cause. For if they can prove that ordination to the ministry in the days of the Apostles was Episcopal, in their sense of the term; that is, that an officer whom they call the bishop, had the *sole power* of ordination, presbyters being permitted merely to express their *consent*—if they can prove

this, it will be hard to escape from the conclusion, that the whole government of the church was prelatical. If they decline much reliance upon it, as Dr. Hobart and the Layman say they do,* their shyness must be imputed to some other cause than its insignificance ; for they are not in the habit of declining very humble aid ; and our former remarks will show that, though well supplied with *assertions*, they have no *evidence* to spare.

The following texts have been quoted under the present head.

For TIMOTHY.

Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, WITH THE LAYING ON OF THE HANDS OF THE PRESBYTERY. 1 *Tim.* iv. 14.

Wherefore I put thee in remembrance that thou stir up the gift of God which is in thee, BY THE PUTTING ON OF MY HANDS. 2 *Tim.* i. 6.

For TITUS.

For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest set in order the things that are wanting ; and ordain elders in every city, AS I HAD APPOINTED THEE. *Titus* i. 5.

From these texts one thing is clear, viz. that both Paul and the Presbytery imposed hands on Timothy. But several questions have been started

* *Collec.* p. 59, *note.* LAYMAN, No. V. p. 51.

about the rest. Who constituted the Presbytery? Why were hands imposed on Timothy? Was this his consecration to the evangelical ministry? If so, what share had the apostle in the transaction, and what the presbytery? The high church construction is, that "*St. Paul ordained* Timothy with the *concurrence* of the *Presbytery.* By the Presbytery may be understood a number of Apostles who laid their hands on Timothy, since the Apostles, though certainly superiour to Presbyters, style themselves "Elders," or Presbyters. The Greek expositors understood the passage in this sense as well as the Greek church, both ancient and modern—since in the ordinations of this church, the Presbyters do not lay on their hands with the Bishop. Nor was it the custom in the Western church until the fourth century. But allowing that by the Presbytery is meant a number of Presbyters, it is evident, from a comparison of the two texts, that the Presbyters imposed hands, not to *convey authority*, but merely to *express approbation.* "*By* the putting on of *my* hands," "*with* the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery." In the church of England, the Presbyters lay on their hands with the Bishops in ordination, to denote their *consent.*"*

As our business, at present, is not with ecclesi-

* Hobart's *Festivals and Fasts.* p. 25. The Greek expositors to whom he refers in the margin, are *Chrysostom* and *Theophylact.* Theophylact has copied Chrysostom, whose words are, *ου περι πρεσβυτερων φησιν ενταυθα· αλλα περι επισκοπων, ου γαρ ἐη πρεσβυτεροι τον*

astical history, but with the interpretation of scripture, we pass over the allusion to the Greek and Western churches. " The evidence" that " the Presbyters imposed hands not to *convey authority*, but merely to *express approbation*," is extorted from the two prepositions " *by*" and " *with*." " *By* my hands," says Paul: therefore he alone *ordained* Timothy. " *With* the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery," says he again: therefore, the Presbytery merely " expressed their *approbation*."

In support of this " evident" difference between the agency of Paul and that of the Presbytery in the ordination, the Layman has entertained us with some rare criticism which we shall not be so unjust as to withhold from our readers.

" It is known to every Greek scholar, that *dia* signifies, emphatically, the cause of a thing; while *meta* denotes emphatically, nearness of situation, relation, connexion,

επισκοπον εχειροτονουν. *Chrys. ad loc.* " *He*, the apostle, *is not speaking here of* Presbyters, *but of* Bishops: *for Presbyters did not ordain a Bishop*." The eloquent Patriarch flounders sadly. He takes for granted, that Timothy was a bishop: to allow that a bishop could be ordained by Presbyters, would demolish the whole fabrick of the hierarchy. Paul had used an ugly word for their spiritual mightinesses; and so, to make short work with him, the golden-mouthed preacher flatly contradicts him. It was a " presbytery," said the apostle. It was a council of bishops, replies Chrysostom. Yet, after all, neither he nor Theophylact, have interpreted the term of *Apostles*. When a writer quotes authorities without consulting them, he should be wary, and be extremely cautious in mentioning names. Dr. H. was probably in haste. Had he stuck closer to Potter, he would have been less inaccurate.

agreement. It need not be observed that words are used sometimes more loosely, and sometimes more strictly. A term is often introduced in a sense different from its original and primary meaning. The two words *dia* and *meta* are opposed in the Epistles of Timothy. Well, then, the two words being opposed, and the first, as every Greek scholar knows, denoting, emphatically, the cause of a thing ; the latter conveying, particularly, the idea of relation, connexion, agreement, it follows, obviously, that they are to be taken in these their appropriate senses. Our author will not venture to say that the Greek word *meta* is as appropriate an one as *dia* to express the cause of a thing. He will not so far hazard his reputation as a scholar. I assert, then, that *dia* signifies, particularly, the cause of a thing, and that *meta* is the preposition of concurrence. Nor is this invalidated by the circumstance of *meta* being sometimes used as *dia* with the genitive case. The emphatical distinction between the two words lies in the first denoting a *cause*, the other *concurrence.* Why does St. Paul carefully use the word *dia* in the one case, and *meta* in the other ? Why does he not use *meta* in both cases ? It is to be recollected too, that the passages are, in his Epistles to Timothy, relating to the same subject ; and of course, the terms must be regarded as contrasted with one another. Surely the words *dia* and *meta*, as opposed, signify, the first, the cause of a thing ; the last, nearness, concurrence, agreement. This is familiar to every Greek scholar, and I assert it on the authority of the best lexicons of the language. The circumstance, then, of the Apostle using a word in relation to himself, which denotes the instrumental cause, and with respect to the Presbytery, a word which, particularly as distinguished from *dia*, expresses agreement, shows, clearly, that the authoritative power was vested in him, and that the act, on the part of the Presbytery, was an act of mere concurrence."*

* *Layman*, No. V. *Coll.* p. 53, 54.

That Presbytery may be left without a shadow of support, these two unhappy prepositions, (*δια & μετα,*) (*dia* and *meta*) *by* and *with*, are doomed to the same rack on which Cyprian had formerly tortured a noun, and the Layman himself both a noun and a verb, into witnesses for the hierarchy.* It being presumed that the imposition of hands relates to Timothy's ordination, the "presbytery," whose act it was, whether composed of mere Presbyters, or of Prelates, or of Apostles, had nothing to do in the affair, but barely to express their *consent;* and if this appear dubious, it shall be substantiated by the deposition of *dia* and *meta.*

"It is known," says the Layman, "to every Greek scholar, that *dia*" (*by*) "signifies, emphatically, the cause of a thing; while *meta*" (*with*) "denotes, emphatically, nearness of situation, relation, connexion, agreement."

We do not wish to be uncharitable, but, if we must judge from the instances of words, which, in this collection have been unfortunate enough to undergo his critical process, it is very hard for the Layman to tell what a *Greek scholar* knows. Scholars, like other classes of men, have their appropriate habits of speaking and acting: And when one who has had only a dining-room acquaintance with them, affects to be of their number, his awkward imitation betrays him in the same manner as the dialect of a foreigner distinguishes him from a native, as a prime minister would loose the reputa-

* See p.

tion of a statesman by relying on annual registers, on reviews, or the gazettes, for his great political facts. No scholar would have made the Layman's indefinite appeal to "the best lexicons in the language," for settling the meaning of a disputed word. He would have produced *examples* from the only legitimate authorities, the *original writers.*

How the Layman would fare in such hands, we shall not conjecture: but we are sure that a very little acquaintance with Greek is sufficient to pluck away the feathers with which poor *dia* and *meta* have been made to adorn his plume.

"*Dia* signifies, emphatically, the cause of a thing."

For example:

It is easier for a camel to go THROUGH (dia) *the eye of a needle, than, &c.* Math. xix. 24.

Jesus went—THROUGH (dia) *the cornfields.* Mark ii. 23.

And again he entered into Capernaum, AFTER (dia) *some days.* Mark ii. 1.

Now what "cause" does the preposition *dia* express here. Does it "emphatically," as the Layman speaks, "signify the *cause*" of the needle's eye? of the cornfields? or of the days? or the "*cause*" of the camel's going through the first? of our Lord's going through the second? or of his spending the third before he went into Capernaum? When the Layman shall have found his emphatical signification of *dia* in these instances, he may call upon us for a hundred more

The fact is, that this preposition *never* signifies the cause of a thing: whatever the "Lexicons" say. It expresses the idea of *transition* or *transmission*, and has no English word to correspond with it so well as the preposition "*through.*" Whether it is accompanied with the notion of a *cause* or not, must be determined by the phrase where it occurs.

But in spoiling the Layman's criticism, we acknowledge that we have not overthrown his argument. For *if* the imposition of Paul's hands was the medium *through* which, to the exclusion of the Presbytery, he *alone* conveyed the ministerial commission to Timothy; and *if* this act of his formed a precedent for all subsequent ordinations, the Layman has won, and we own Timothy to have been episcopally ordained: Whether a *bishop* or not, would still remain a question. These *ifs*, however, seem to be rather anti-episcopal.

From the words of Paul, we should conclude, that whoever or whatever else might have been concerned in this august transaction, a material part of it belonged to the Presbytery. *Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy*, WITH THE LAYING ON OF THE HANDS OF THE PRESBYTERY. A plain reader would certainly say, that Timothy was *Presbyterially* ordained: as he could not well imagine that a Presbyterian himself would have chosen to word the account differently. But this would be the errour of one who

had never heard what marvels can be effected by a little critical legerdemain operating upon Greek prepositions. O no! This is the very text which proves that his ordination was *not* presbyterial! Astonishing! I see Timothy bowing before the Presbytery. I see them imposing hands upon his head: I am told by the Apostle Paul, that the gift which was in him was given him with the laying on of their hands: and yet they did not *ordain* him! "No!" Had no *share* in his ordination! "No!" Gave him no *gift* at all! "No!" Verily this Layman is unceremonious in his behaviour to *words;* for he will either allow them no meaning at all; or else, as it may suit him, they shall mean in the mouth of an apostle, the contrary to what they ever have meant or ever shall mean, in the mouth of any other man! *No* ordination! *No* communication by the Presbytery! Why, that old Jesuit, who has foisted the Virgin Mary into every chapter of the book of Proverbs,* could not himself be more fantastical! How, in the name of common sense, is the Presbytery disposed of? Softly, zealous friend, softly. Thou shalt see. Here comes the magician: his wand shall touch the little four-lettered vocabule, "WITH," and lo, the whole Presbytery will evanish, and leave only a single ordaining hand!

"The circumstance of the apostle using a word in relation to himself, which denotes the instrumental cause," viz. *dia;*

* *Vid.* F. Q. DE SALAZAR, *expositio in Proverbia.*

"and with respect to the Presbytery, a word which, particularly as distinguished from *dia*, expresses agreement," viz. *meta;* "*shows, clearly*, that the *authoritative* power was vested *in him;* and that the act, on the part of the Presbytery, was an act of mere *concurrence*."

So they wrap it up! Let us try to unwrap it a little, and see whether the bundle will bear examination. So far as we can perceive, there is nothing here but a play upon words; and the argument consists in the jingle. The interpretation of the word used by the apostle, is bent and twisted in such a manner as to induce the unlettered reader to suppose that it expresses the *assent* of one person to the act of another. We do not object to the Layman's translating *meta* by "concurrence;" for according to our great English Lexicographer, "concurrence" signifies "union, association, conjunction:" "Agreement; act of joining in any design or measure"—"combination of many agents or circumstances," &c.; but popular and colloquial usage often employs it when nothing more is intended than an *approbation* of an opinion or a measure. It is in this sense that the Layman uses it; and it is here that his criticism puts a fraud upon his reader. We do not say that the fraud is intentional; before we can prove this, we must prove that he understands Greek; which we humbly beg leave to decline. But we shall freely give him the "eight or ten years" which his friend has craved,* in order to

* Hobart's *Apology*, p. 250.

support his construction of *meta* by the proper authorities; and he shall have "the best lexicons of the language" into the bargain.

But as we do not ask for credence to our bare assertion, we shall subject the Layman's distinction between *dia* and *meta* to the test of fact.

"It is to be recollected," says he, "that the passages are in his" (Paul's) "epistles to Timothy, relating to the same subject; and *of course*, the terms," (viz. *dia* and *meta*,) "must be regarded as contrasted with one another."

Be it so. I open my New Testament and read, that "*many signs and wonders were done* BY (dia) *the apostles.*"* Proceeding in the narrative, I read afterwards that Paul and Barnabas *rehearsed all things that God had done* WITH (meta) *them.*† Now, the Layman being judge, as "the passages relate to the same subject," viz. the miraculous works which God enabled his servants to perform, and the success with which he crowned their ministry, "the terms" *dia* and *meta* "must be regarded as contrasted with one another. The circumstance, then, of the historian using a word in relation to the apostles in general, which denotes the instrumental cause; and with respect to Paul and Barnabas, a word which, particularly as distinguished from *dia*, expresses agreement, shows clearly, that the authoritative power was vested in the former, and that the act, on the part of the latter, was an

* Act ii. 43. πολλα τε τερατα και σημεια ΔΙΑ των αποστολων εγενετο.

† ὁσα ὁ θεος εποιησε MET' αυτων——Act. xv. 4.

act of mere concurrence." In fewer words, when Peter, James, &c. wrought miracles, they did it in virtue of an authoritative power; and when Paul and Barnabas wrought miracles, they had no authoritative or instrumental agency, but merely expressed their *approbation* of what God did *without* them; although the historian has positively asserted that he did it *with* them. All this from the difference between *dia* and *meta!*

Should the Layman by any means escape from this difficulty, it will be to fall into another still greater. Before he ventured upon the criticism now under review, he ought to have read, in the original, the verse which he has undertaken to criticise. There he would have found his *dia* and *meta* in the same proposition, and separated only by a single word. *The gift*, says Paul to Timothy, *which was given thee* BY (dia) *prophecy*, WITH (meta) *the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery.** That the terms relate to the same subject, is indisputable; and of course, says the Layman, they are "contrasted with one another. The circumstance, then," proceeds he, "of the apostle using a word in relation to prophecy, which denotes the instrumental cause; and, with respect to the Presbytery, a word which, particularly as distinguished from *dia*, expresses agreement, shows, clearly, that the authoritative power was vested in the

* 1 Tim. iv. 14.

prophecy; and that the act, on the part of the Presbytery, was an act of mere concurrence."

The result of the Layman's criticism is, that Timothy had *two* ordinations, by *two* authoritative powers, viz. the prophecy, and the apostle Paul; and *two* concurrences of the Presbytery, viz. one with prophecy, and one with the apostle. We cannot deny that he was *well* ordained!

From words let us go to things, and see what the Episcopal argument will gain by the exchange. The imposition of hands on the part of the Presbytery, was an act, it is said, of "mere concurrence;" designed to express approbation, and not at all to convey the ministerial office.*

This assertion is not only without proof, but is directly in the face of all the proof which the nature of the case admits.

1. By what rule of reasoning is the *very same act*, viz. imposition of hands, performed at the *same time*, in relation to the *same subject*, considered as expressing the communication of *authority* by *one* of the persons engaged, and only as expressing *approbation* by all the *rest?* When certain distinctions have taken place, it is easy to invent other distinctions to justify them. But is it credible? does it belong to the nature of significant rites, that a rite signifying the conferring of power should be employed by a number of persons in a *concur-*

* Hobart and the Layman, as above.

rent act, and yet, with regard to all but *one* of them, not signify the conferring power at all?

2. The advocates of prelacy are challenged to produce from the scriptures, or other authentic records of the apostolic and preceding ages, proof that imposition of hands was used to signify mere assent or approbation. To say that it *might* so signify, is nothing to the purpose. The point to be determined is, not what it *might*, but what it *did*, signify. If, in every other case, imposition of hands expressed authoritative communication, it must have done so in the ordination of Timothy; and to maintain that it did not, is to beg the question. The Episcopal construction violates the plainest meaning both of words and of actions. The Presbyterian construction is in perfect coincidence with both. Paul says that the gift in Timothy was given to him *by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery.* It is agreed that prophecy, or prophecies which went before on Timothy, designated him as a fit person for the ministry: but did not invest him with office—did not give him the gift. Had there been nothing else but the prophecy, he would have had no commission. It was necessary that the imposition of the hands of the Presbytery should *concur* with the prophetical designation, or Timothy had remained a layman. The Presbytery did thus concur; they did lay their hands on Timothy, and he received his office. Now as the prophecy made no part of

his ordination; it follows, that he was ordained by the Presbytery. If the gift which was in him by the imposition of Paul's hands, was his ministerial commission, that apostle had no share in it which was not common to every member of the Presbytery; or else his declaration, that Timothy was ordained by prophecy with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery, would not be true. Nor is there any thing in his expression which might not be used by every one of his colleagues, and with peculiar propriety by himself, if, as it is not improbable, he presided at Timothy's ordination.

To exhibit this subject in another light, we propose a few questions which some of the advocates for prelacy would do no disservice to their cause by answering in such a manner as to remove the scruples they must naturally occasion.

1. Did Paul *alone* ordain Timothy? or was his ordination the joint act of the Presbytery? If the latter, we have a complete scriptural example of Presbyterial ordination. If the former, so that the Presbytery, by the imposition of their hands, merely testified their *assent*, then,

2. Were the persons who thus imposed hands on Timothy simple Presbyters, or were they apostles or prelates? If the latter, then,

3. How came Paul to appropriate to himself a power which belonged to every one of them in as full right as it could possibly belong to him? How came they to surrender this their power into the

hands of an individual? And how could the imposition of Paul's hands bestow the ministerial gift, while others, possessing the same *authority*, did, by the very same *act*, at the very same *time*, merely declare their *assent?*

If the former, i. e. if those who concurred with Paul in the imposition of hands were simple Presbyters, then,

4. What ordination did Timothy receive? Was he ordained a *Presbyter* or a *Prelate?* If the former, his Episcopal character, in so far as it depends upon his ordination, is swept away; and we have not a single instance of the consecration of a prelate in all the New Testament. If the latter, then,

5. How came simple Presbyters to impose hands upon the head of a Bishop at his consecration? Or supposing these Presbyters to have been Prelates, where was Timothy's commission? By the terms of the argument, he was ordained by Paul alone; but according to the Episcopal order, which we are assured is the apostolical order, *two or three bishops* are necessary to ordain a bishop.*

* Επισκοπος ὑπο επισκοπων χειροτονεισθω ΔΥΟ η ΤΡΙΩΝ. *Can. Apos.* I. *Apud PP. App. Tom.* I. *p.* 442. *Ed. Clerici.* On this canon, Bishop Beveridge thus comments. "This right, therefore, used by the apostles themselves, and prescribed, by apostolical men, our church," meaning the church of England, "most religiously observes; and, as far as possible, it ought, beyond all doubt, to be observed every where. But when necessity, that most unrelenting mistress, shall require it, the rigour of the canon may be so far relaxed, as that a bishop may be ordained by *two*." *Ibid* p. 457.

And so poor Timothy was not ordained a bishop at all. If, in order to give him his mitre, we make the Presbytery to consist of Apostles, or men of apostolic rank, we not only prostrate the Layman's famous criticism about *dia* and *meta*, but are left without the vestige of an ordination by a prelate alone, in so far as that point is to be made out by the ordination of Timothy.* There remains nothing but an example of ordination by a Presbytery, which is all that the Presbyterians desire.

We cannot dismiss this point without remarking how our prelatical friends shift their ground.

Two things are to be proved: that Timothy was a Bishop; and, that a Bishop alone ordains. For the *first*, according to our Episcopal brethren, the Presbytery, who joined with Paul in laying hands on Timothy, were bona fide prelates, who, jointly with the apostle, imparted the Episcopal dignity; and so Timothy is a bishop without any more ado. But for the *second*, the Presbytery were *not* prelates; or if they were, they did *not* ordain jointly with the apostle; they merely expressed their approbation.

"The legs of the lame are not equal." If we adopt the first, we lose the proof of ordination by a Bishop alone. If the second, we lose the ordination of bishop Timothy. The *latter* makes *dia*

* Ordination performed by Titus shall hereafter be considered.

show "clearly, that the authoritative power was vested in Paul," and *meta*, that "the act on the part of the Presbytery, was an act of mere concurrence." The *former* shows, with equal clearness, that the authoritative power was *not* vested in Paul alone; that the act on the part of the Presbytery, was *not* an act of mere concurrence; and that there is nothing in *dia* and *meta* to establish the contrary. When a circle and a square coincide, then shall these two arguments for prelacy be consistent with each other.

So much for *Timothy's* ordination. Now for that of *Titus.* Him, too, the Layman has ordained Episcopally.

"To Titus the apostle says, *For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldst set in order the things that are wanting, and ordain elders in every city as I had appointed thee.* Here let it be observed, in passing along, that Titus is spoken of as having been ordained by the apostle: *As I had appointed thee.* Nothing is said of the Presbytery in this case. Paul appointed Titus to his office. And this is a conclusive circumstance for believing that the case was the same in relation to Timothy, as it is not reasonable to suppose that they were commissioned in different ways."*

We agree that the office of Timothy and Titus was the same, and that they were commissioned in the same manner. But the Layman has overshot his mark. For, as we have already stated, the advocates for the divine right of Episcopacy maintain that the ordination of a bishop by *two or*

* Layman, No. V. *Collec.* p. 56.

three others, is an apostolical institution: and that even in cases of the *hardest necessity*, *two* bishops are essential to the ordination of a *third.* One of two consequences is inevitable; either that Paul exercised, on this occasion, his extraordinary power, and so has set no precedent; or, if he set a precedent for ordination by a single prelate, Titus was no more than a presbyter, and could not by himself, ordain other presbyters. All this rests upon the assumption that the expression, *as I had appointed thee*, refers to the ordination of Titus. Another blunder. There is not a syllable about his ordination in the text. It pre-supposes his authority, and relates solely to the *directions* which the apostle had given him for the application of it. The word rendered, "*appointed*," frequently occurs in the New Testament, but always, with the construction before us, in the sense of prescribing, enjoining, commanding: and never in the sense of setting apart to an office—Thus,

He COMMANDED (διεταξατο) *a centurion to keep Paul.* Acts xxiv. 23. Surely Felix did not then give the centurion his military commission.

As God hath distributed to every man; as the Lord hath called every one, so let him walk: and so ORDAIN I, (διατασσομαι) direct, enjoin I, *in all churches.* 1 Cor. vii. 17.

In the very same manner does Paul speak to Titus.

As I had APPOINTED (διεταξαμην) instructed, enjoined, *thee.*

The word which expresses investiture with office is quite different, as this very verse shows; and the author of Miscellanies* had remarked: but this circumstance, Dr. Hobart, though not sparing of his notes, passes over in profound silence.

We come, at length, to the decisive argument for diocesan Episcopacy—the *powers* exercised by Timothy and Titus. This is to silence the last battery of the Presbyterians, and reduce them to the humiliating necessity of surrendering at discretion! Really one would imagine, that the powers of Timothy and Titus are a new discovery: and that the epistles written to them by Paul, had been in the custody of the prelates alone as containing the precious charter of their rights. But the world may believe us, upon our word of verity, that we have actually read those epistles long ago; and that the demonstration, said to be therein contained, of the apostolical institution of the "sacred regiment of Bishops," has been questioned, yea and, in our judgment, confuted some handful of years before our grandfathers were born. However, *Ecce iterum Crispinus!* Here it is again. We shall give unto thee, reader, as Cyprian and the Layman have given it unto us. But we entreat thy patience to some preliminary matter.

We think that when the Episcopal writers ap-

* Clemens, No. I. *Collec.* p.

peal, with so much confidence, to the powers exercised by Timothy, they ought also to have agreed as to the *office* and *rank* of that eminent man. Yet it is a disputed point among them, at this hour, whether he was simply Bishop of Ephesus, having jurisdiction over his presbyters; or an archbishop, having bishops under him; or the lord primate of Asia, above them all. If you ask the advocates of these several opinions, what was precisely his authority? some cry one thing, and some another: for the assembly is confused; and their voices unite only in this, Great is Timothy of the Ephesians! We cannot refrain from transcribing a few remarks of the powerful and eloquent Jean Daille.

"Here," we translate his own words, "Here the hierarchs, having their imagination full of their grand prelatures, of their bishoprics, their archbishoprics, and their primacies, do not fail to dream of one in these words of the Apostle. That *he besought Timothy to abide still at Ephesus*, signifies, if you believe them, that he made Timothy bishop of the church of Ephesus; and not only that, but even Metropolitan, or archbishop of the province; and even primate of all Asia. You see how ingenious is the passion for the crosier and the mitre; being able, in so few and simple words, to detect such great mysteries! For where is the man, who, in the use of his natural understanding without being heated by a previous attach-

ment, could ever have found so many *mitres*—that of a Bishop, that of an Arch-bishop, and that of a Primate, in these two words, *Paul besought Timothy to abide still at Ephesus?* Who, without the help of some extraordinary passion, could ever have made so charming and so rare a discovery?* and imagine that to beseech a man to stay in a city, means, to establish him bishop of that city, Archbishop of the province, and primate of all the country? In very deed, the cause of these gentlemen of the hierarchy must be reduced to an evil plight,† since they are constrained to resort to such pitiful proofs."‡

Our readers will hardly blame *Daillé* for applying the epithet "pitiful," to the argument of the hierarchy for Timothy's Episcopate, when they see that her ablest and most resolute champions are at irreconcileable variance with each other on this very point: some maintaining it as perfectly con-

* Deviner une chose si belle & si rare?—

† A de mauvais termes.

‡ Daille' *Exposition de la premiere epitre de l'Apotre Saint Paul à Timothée; en* 48 *sermons prononcés à* Charenton. *Serm.* I. p. 22, 23. a *Geneve* 1661. 12mo.

This is that identical Monsieur Daille' whom Mr. Bingham and, from him, Dr. Hobart have represented as friendly to Episcopacy.* This is that Jean Daille'! The prelatical commentators have played tricks with the French preacher; which, if we feel in a humour for it, we may one of these days expose.

* Hobart's *Apology*, p. 94, compared with p. 99. Bingham's *Christian Antiquities*. Vol. II. p. 799.

clusive; others rejecting it as weak and frivolous. The mere fact of this variance is a strong presumption against the former, and in favour of the latter. For although vigorous, cultivated, and candid minds may be so far warped by their wishes as to lay more stress upon an argument *for* them than it deserves; yet it is hardly to be supposed that such minds will attribute to an argument which, if sound, secures them the victory, much *less* importance than it possesses. If, then, there are to be found among the advocates of Episcopacy, men second to none of them in learning, force, and sagacity, who fairly give up the plea from Timothy and Titus, the conclusion is, that their concession is extorted against their prejudices and interest.

As a specimen of the collision which takes place, on this subject, between the most zealous supporters of prelacy, we transcribe a part of the *seventh* section of the Appendix to Ayton's *Original Constitution of the Christian Church.* It has not been in our power to compare all his quotations with the authors, but we have examined a number and they are correct.

"The chief plea and argument of the Episcopalians is taken from Timothy and Titus. But however much this is boasted of by some, as a conclusive proof for a diocesan form of church government, and superior power of Bishops to that of Presbyters; yet there is nothing adduced by them that is more violently opposed by others of them, and in which they are more egregiously divided. For some of them pretend, that the

Apostle, in his Epistles to Timothy and Titus, uses the terms Bishop and Presbyter promiscuously, only to express such officers as are now called Presbyters. Of this opinion I take Bishop Hoadley to be, Dr. Whitby, Mr. Dodwell, and many others might be named.

" But how contradictory to this is the judgment of Bishop Pearson, *Vindicia. Lib.* 2. *Cap.* 13. Bishop Taylor, *Episc. assert.* P. 85. Bishop Burnet, in his *History of the Right of Princes*, *Prefac.* p. 15. and p. 4, 5. of the Book: and Dr. Hammond, in a variety of places. I say, how contradictory are these sentiments of those prelates to this above named? seeing they hold, that all those whom they were to ordain were proper bishops, nay, Dr. Hammond's opinion is, that Timothy and Titus were Archbishops, and had their suffragans under them; and with him bishop Bull seems to agree, when he calls Timothy Archbishop, *Serm.* on 2 *Tim.* iv. 13. And to these I could add others of the same mind. But, then as Dr. Hammond reckoned, that the Apostles ordained no mere Presbyters at the first, but only Bishops, *Annot.* on *Acts* xi. 6, 14. so Dodwell, *Parœnes*, p. 54. p. 13. and p. 102. p. 33. must certainly contradict him in this, when he maintains, that the Apostles at the first ordained no *Bishops*, but simple *Presbyters* only; and that there is no mention of Episcopal government in the New Testament, and that it was not established till *Anno* 106. But then, according to both these Doctors, there is one office in the church without scripture warrant—*Presbyters*, according to Dr. Hammond; and *Bishops*, according to Mr. Dodwell. But how will they answer to what is advanced by Bishop Burnet, which equally contradicts them both, *Vindic. of the Church of Scotland*, p. 355. *That without Scripture warrants no new office may be instituted?* Besides Dr. Hammond's conceit against Presbyters not being instituted in the New Testament, is opposed with all freedom by Mr. Maurice, *Defens.* p. 27. and by Bishop Hoadley, *Brief Defence*, p. 113. Is it possible to behold such wrangling,

without being affected with a mixture both of indignation and compassion? Is it not matter of indignation, that men of judgment and learning should have such a fondness to maintain a cause that is so precarious, as to drive them into so many schemes to defend it, and every one of them contradictory to one another? And can it miss to beget compassion in the breast of every sincere Christian, that men of abilities should bestow so much time to perplex themselves and others, when their labours, rightly employed, might prove much more beneficial to the Protestant world?

"But that we may give the world a view, how inconclusive all these schemes and models are, which are taken from Timothy and Titus, I shall give some account of the minds of the Episcopalians at some length, who, when adduced, will leave no room for the Presbyterians to be in any perplexity in the defence of their establishment. The first I shall bring on the stage is the famous Willet, *Synops. Papism.* p. 236. 'It is most like Timothy had the place and calling of an evangelist: and the calling of evangelists and bishops, which were pastors, was divers.' To him let us join the learned Stillingfleet, who says, *Irenic.* p. 340. 'Such were the evangelists, who were sent sometimes into this country to put the church in order there, sometimes into another; but wherever they were, they acted as evangelists, and not as fixed officers. And such were Timothy and Titus, notwithstanding all the opposition made against it, as will appear to any who will take an impartial survey of the arguments on both sides,' &c. Nay, the jesuit Salmeron, is ashamed of this argument, for he says, *Disput.* 1. on 1 *Tim.* 'It is doubtful if Timothy was Bishop of Ephesus: for though he preached and ordained some to the ministry there, it follows not that he was the Bishop of that place; for Paul preached also there above two years, and absolved the penitents, and yet was not Bishop. Add that now and then the apostle called him away unto himself, and sent him from Rome to the Hebrews with his epistle; and in the second

epistle, he commands him to come to him shortly. Timothy was also an evangelist of that order, *Eph.* 4.—So that Dorotheus says in his *Synopsis*, That Timothy preached through all Greece ; but he stayed at Ephesus not to be Bishop, but that, in the constitute church of Ephesus, he might oppose the false Apostles.—It appears therefore that he was more than a Bishop, although for a time he preached in that city as a pastor, and ordained some to the ministry. Hence it is, some calls him Bishop in Ephesus.'

" Having elsewhere given the judgment of the learned Dr. Whitby at some length, all that I shall transcribe from him at this time, is a few lines of what he says in his preface to the Epistle to Titus: 'First, I assert, that if by saying Timothy and Titus were Bishops, the one of Ephesus, the other of Crete, we understand they look upon these churches or dioceses as their fixed and peculiar charge, in which they were to preside for term of life, I believe, that Timothy and Titus were not thus Bishops.' See Chap. 1 and 4.

" To fortify those who have given their assault, let me bring in Mr. Le Clerc, in his *Supplement to Dr. Hammond's Annotations on the Epistle to Titus*, p. 530. who says, ' The testimonies of the ancients about this matter, who judge rashly of the times of the apostles by their own, and speak of them in the language of their own age, are of little moment. And so do no more prove that Titus was the Bishop of the island of Crete, than what Dr. Hammond says, proves him to have been distinguished with the title of Archbishop.' To the same purpose the forecited Dr. Whitby says, ' The great controversy concerning this and the epistle to Timothy is, whether Timothy and Titus were indeed made Bishops ; the one in Ephesus, and the Pro-consular Asia, the other of Crete, and having authority to make, and jurisdiction over so many Bishops as were in those precincts ? Now, of this matter, I confess I can find nothing in any writer of the first three centuries, and not any intimation, that they bore that name.'

" The judgment of the learned Whittaker is supporting on this occasion, as well as in the most of the former, who says, *Controv.* 4. Q. 4. C. 2. p. 374. ' In the apostle's times there were many things extraordinary. There was another form of government in the church in the days of the apostles, and another now, is acknowledged by Stapleton : For it was then governed by the apostles, evangelists, and prophets, but now only by pastors and doctors ; the rest are all removed.' From this it may justly be inferred, that Timothy and Titus were not ordinary officers, but they being both evangelists, are not succeeded to by Bishops. And here I cannot but subjoin the judgment of Chrysostom, whom our adversaries, I hope, will not reject as an adversary. His words, as translated by Smectymnuus, are these, *Paul would not commit the whole island to one man, but would have every man appointed to his charge and cure. For so he knew his labour would be the lighter, and the people that were under him would be governed with the greater diligence. For the teacher should not be troubled with the government of many churches, but only intend one, and study for to adorn that.* The remark of Smectymnuus is just, *Therefore this was* Titus *his work, not to be Bishop of Crete himself, but to ordain Elders in every city, which was an office above that of a Bishop.*

" But this fortification is not able to stand ; for the remarkable Mr. Dodwell, *Parænes.* Sect. 10. p. 404. attacks it most handsomely, when he says, ' But truly, that the office of [Timothy] was not fixed, but itinerary, many arguments do evince. It was required of him to abide at Ephesus, is testified by the Apostle, 1 *Tim.* i. 3. He was therefore, when thus demanded, an itinerary. The work of an Evangelist, 2 *Tim.* vi. 5. so many journeyings with St. Paul, and his name being joined in common with the Apostle, in the inscription of the epistles to the Thessalonians, are all of them arguments for this. Moreover, the apostle commands Titus only to ordain, in Crete, Presbyters in every city, *Titus* i. 5. He says, he was left there, that

he might set in order things that were wanting. And he was a companion of the apostle when he was left. And truly, other places make it appear, that he was a companion of St. Paul, and therefore was no more restricted to any particular place than the apostle himself.' Thus the famous Dodwell. And from what has been said from so many learned Episcopalian Doctors, one may consider, how far Bishop Hall had lost his senses, when he saith with such a masterly air, *Episcop. Divine Right*, Sect. 4. P. 2. *That if Episcopal power of ordination, and power of ruling and censuring Presbyters, be not clear in the apostle's charge to these two Bishops, the one of Crete, and the other of Ephesus, I shall yield the cause, and confess to want my senses.*"

" But now, to dismiss this conceit of Timothy's being Bishop of Ephesus, &c. I shall give the judgment of the learned Willet, *Synops. Papism. Contr.* 5. *Q.* 3. ' Neither can it be granted by the words of the Apostle, *Lay hands suddenly on no man*, &c. that Timothy had this sole power in himself; for, the apostle would not give that to him, which he did not take to himself, who associated to him the rest of the Presbyters in ordaining of Timothy. ——— It is questioned, says he, if the apostle had then constituted Timothy bishop there [Ephesus:] For, he saith, *That thou mightest charge some that they teach no other doctrine*,' &c. I conclude with the judgment of the accurate Dr. Barrow, *Pope's Suprem.* p. 82. whose words must certainly contradict this notion concerning Timothy's Episcopate; for he says, ' Episcopacy is an ordinary standing charge, affixed to one standing place, and requiring a special attendance there; Bishops being Pastors, who, as St. Chrysostom says, do sit, and are employed in one place. Now, he that hath such a general charge, can hardly discharge such a particular office, and he is fixed to a particular attendance, can hardly look after so general a charge.' Though this is spoken with respect to the Apostles; yet it will equally hold

with respect to Timothy and Titus. I think, by this time, this strong bulwark has almost lost its beautiful shapes, and formidable figures, and is not capable of doing much execution. The itinerary life of the apostles, according to Barrow, is inconsistent with that of a Bishop, and must be so likewise with that of Timothy and Titus, seeing they were not fixed residenters in any particular place, as is well observed by Mr. Dodwell: and it must conclude against them with equal force, if Dr. Brett's notion be true, that they were both of the Apostolic order."

No equitable judge would censure us for leaving these sons of the hierarchy to dash their heads against each other, and declining to give ourselves any further trouble. We are not obliged to inquire into the claim which they set up for Timothy or Titus, until they shall themselves ascertain what the claim is; nor to answer their plea, until they shall cease to quarrel about its correctness. But, instead of taking so mortifying an advantage, we shall meet the question as it is stated by Cyprian and the Layman; referring to our readers for an opinion whether or not we are afraid to have the cause tried either at Ephesus or in Crete; and under any form which our Episcopal friends shall prefer.

"In Titus i. 5." says Cyprian, "it is said by the Apostle Paul, 'For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest ordain Elders in every city." Let us contemplate the circumstances that attended this transaction, and see what inferences we can draw from it. St. Paul had planted the gospel in the island of Crete. He had made proselytes in every city who stood in need of the ministrations of Presbyters. He

speaks not to Titus as if he had left him in Crete to convert the cities to the faith. He speaks as if this work was already accomplished, as if the way was paved for the establishment of the Church. These being the circumstances of the case, it appears to me that this transaction carries on its face a proof of superiority on the part of Titus to the Presbyters or elders. Will it be imagined by any reasonable man, that St. Paul had converted so many cities on this island without having ordained any elders amongst them ? What ! When it was his uniform and invariable practice to ordain Elders in every country in which he made proselytes ? What ! Could he have neglected to ordain those amongst them who were absolutely necessary to transact the affairs of the Church during his absence ? Would he have left the work he had begun only half performed ?

" These considerations are sufficient to convince every unprejudiced mind that there were Elders or Presbyters in the Church of Crete at the time St. Paul left Titus on that island. And if there were Presbyters, and those Presbyters had the power of ordination, why was it necessary to leave Titus amongst them in order to perform a task that might as well have been accomplished without him ? If the Presbyters possessed an authority equal to that of Titus, would not St. Paul, by leaving him amongst them, have taken the surest way to interrupt the peace of the Church, to engender jealousy, and strifes, and contentions ? Again. Let us view this transaction in another point of light. St. Paul had made converts, as I have said, in every city of Crete. Titus had attended him on his last visit to that island. If Presbyters were at this time considered as competent to the task of ordaining others, why did he not ordain one at any rate during his stay amongst them, and commission him instead of detaining Titus, to ordain Elders in every city ? The efforts of Titus were as much wanted as his own, to carry the light of the gospel to other nations who had not received it. Why

was it necessary that Titus should ordain Elders in *every* city? After the ordination of a *few*, would not *his* exertions have become useless, if *they* were able to complete the work which he had begun?

"In short, Titus seems to be entrusted with all the authority of a supreme ruler of the Church. He is directed to ordain Presbyters—to rebuke with all authority—to admonish hereticks, and in case of obstinacy, to reject them from the communion of the Church. These circumstances infallibly designate the presence of a Bishop. Accordingly we find that the united voice of ancient writers declares him to have been the first Bishop of Crete. Eusebius informs us 'that he received Episcopal authority over the Church of Crete.' So also says Theodoret, St. Chrysostom, St. Jerome, St. Ambrose. If these considerations united do not show that Titus possessed in Ephesus powers superior to those which were held by the Presbyters of those Churches, I know not what considerations would."*

And again:

"The case of Timothy alone, had we no other evidence from Scripture, would, when taken into connexion with the testimony of ancient writers, be perfectly satisfactory to me. This alone demonstrates all that we can desire. He was placed by St. Paul to superintend the Church of Ephesus. This case is even stronger than was that of Titus in Crete. It cannot be denied that there had long been Presbyters in the Church of Ephesus. Listen then to the language which St. Paul speaks in his Epistles to him, and see if it is possible that he possessed no superiority over the Presbyters of that Church. 'I besought thee,' says he to Timothy, 'to abide still at Ephesus when I went into Macedonia, that thou mightest charge some that they teach no other doctrine.' Would Timothy have been commissioned to charge

* Cyprian, No. II. *Collec.* p. 64, 65.

the Presbyters to teach no other doctrine had he possessed no superiority over them? Would they not have had a right to resist any attempts at a control of this kind as an encroachment on their privileges? Again, Timothy is directed to try and examine the Deacons, whether they be blameless or not. If they prove themselves worthy, he is to admit them into the office of a Deacon; and upon a faithful discharge of that office, they are to be elevated to a higher station. 'Likewise,' says he, 'must the Deacons be grave, not double-tongued, not given to much wine, not greedy of filthy lucre, holding the mystery of faith in a pure conscience.' 'Let these also be first proved, and then let them use the office of a Deacon, being found blameless.' Here we find no mention made of the Presbyters of Ephesus, in the ordination of Deacons. They are not associated with him at all in the work. Does not this indicate, does it not demonstrate a superiority of power on the part of Timothy? Timothy is also exhorted to 'lay hands suddenly on no man.' There is no such thing as a recognition even of the co-operation of Presbyters with him. He seems to be the *supreme* and the *only* agent in the transaction of these affairs.

"Now, I appeal to the common sense of mankind, had the Presbyters of Ephesus possessed an authority equal to that of Timothy; had they, like him, possessed the power of ordination, would not St. Paul have recognized their agency in connexion with his? Would it not have been to treat them with improper neglect not to mention them? But what consummates our evidence on this point, and places the subject beyond all doubt, is the charge which St. Paul gives to Timothy in relation to the penal discipline he was to exercise over his Presbyters. Timothy is required to 'receive an accusation against an elder or Presbyter, only before two or three witnesses.' 'Them, (that is, those amongst the Presbyters,) that sin, rebuke before all, that others also may fear.' Can any one imagine that Timothy would have been com-

missioned to *listen to accusations made against Presbyters*, openly to *rebuke them*, had not his authority transcended theirs? Does not this single circumstance unquestionably establish the point of his superiority? 'The man,' says a learned and ingenious writer of our country, 'who shall not find a Bishop in Ephesus, will be puzzled to find one in England.'*

"I cannot conceive of a case that could be more clear and unequivocal, that could speak more loudly to the common sense of mankind, than the case of Timothy in Ephesus. He is obviously intrusted with apostolic authority. Every thing which the Apostle could do in his own person, he commissions Timothy to perform during his absence. He is to *adjust the affairs of the church;* he is to prove and examine Deacons; he alone is to *ordain them;* he alone is recognized in the performance of the task of *ordaining Elders or Presbyters;* he possesses *perfect control* over these Presbyters. If they are guilty of any offences or misdemeanours, he is to *inflict punishment* upon them. I cannot conceive of a case more satisfactory in proof of the apostolic original of the Episcopal form of Church government. Had Timothy been of the same order with the Presbyters of Ephesus, can it be imagined that the Apostle would, by elevating him to such high privileges amongst them, have endangered the peace of the Church, have taken a step so well calculated to excite discontent and dissatisfaction amongst the remaining Presbyters or Elders? This cannot be imagined. Timothy was then undeniably intrusted with Episcopal authority in the Church of Ephesus; he was the Bishop of that place. This is proved by the concurring voice of ancient writers. Eusebius tells us 'that he was the first Bishop of the province or diocese of Ephesus.' The anonymous author of his life in Photius says, 'that he was the first that acted as Bishop in Ephesus, and that he was ordained Bishop of the metropolis of Ephesus by the great St. Paul.' In the council of Chalce-

* Dr. Bowden, in his answer to Dr. Stiles.

don twenty-seven bishops are said to have succeeded in that chair from Timothy. To prove the same point goes the testmony of St. Chrysostom and Theodoret; and in the apostolical constitutions we are expressly told, that he was ordained Bishop of Ephesus by St. Paul."*

The *Layman* speaks to the same purpose.

"In whom was the power of ordination vested in the Churches of Ephesus and Crete? Clearly in Timothy and Titus alone. Them alone the apostle addresses, and them alone he speaks of as ordaining Elders, or as committing the things they had received from him to faithful men, capable of teaching others. Is this not utterly inconsistent with the Presbyterian system? What individual among them could with propriety be addressed as the apostle addresses Timothy and Titus? Not one. The power among them is in a numerous body of *equals*, lest there should be '*lords over God's heritage*.' The power, in Ephesus and Crete, was in Timothy and Titus, to whom the Presbyters were subject, liable to be tried and punished for misconduct. It is on this plain statement of facts, relative to Ephesus and Crete, as well as to other churches, taken in connexion with the uniform and uninterrupted testimony of the church universal for fifteen hundred years, that Episcopalians rest their cause. They have never endeavoured to derive arguments from the names made use of. This has been the practice, exclusively, of the advocates of parity. Driven from the ground of fact, not able to deny that Timothy and Titus were supreme Governors in the churches of Ephesus and Crete, possessing alone the power of ordination, they say that Timothy is called a Presbyter, and was therefore upon a level with those very elders whom he ruled, whom he could control as to the doctrines they preached, whom he had power to try and to punish!"†

* Cyprian, No. III. *Collec.* p. 74, 75.

† Layman, No. V. *Collec.* p. 56.

"It is very easy," says he, "to see why the advocates of parity would exclude from view the situation of Timothy in the church of Ephesus, since it carries absolute death to their cause. Is it an immaterial circumstance that Timothy ruled the whole church of Ephesus, both clergy and laity, the Elders or Presbyters being subject to his spiritual jurisdiction? Is it an immaterial circumstance that Timothy alone exercised the power of ordaining Ministers, and thus of conveying the sacerdotal authority? What then becomes of the doctrine of parity? Destroyed, utterly destroyed. The Church of Ephesus, planted by St. Paul, and placed, by that Apostle, under the government of Timothy, was constructed upon a totally different principle. It had, in Timothy, a Bishop, possessing jurisdiction over the other clergy, and exercising all the powers which are claimed for the Bishops of the church now. Is it of no consequence that the ancients, who speak on the subject, unanimously represent Timothy as the first Bishop of Ephesus? What says Eusebius? 'He was the first Bishop of the province or diocese of Ephesus.' Eccl. Hist. Bib. iii. chap. 4. What says Chrysostom? 'It is manifest Timothy was intrusted with a whole nation, viz. Asia.' Hom. 15th in 1 Tim. v. 19. Theodoret calls him the Apostle of the Asiatics. The Apostolical constitutions expressly tell us that he was ordained Bishop of Ephesus by St. Paul; and in the council of Chalcedon, twenty-seven Bishops are said to have succeded him in the government of that Church.

"We are perfectly safe, then, so far as relates to Timothy, in resting our cause upon the situation which he occupied at Ephesus, and on the powers which he exercised there. The constitution of the Church of Ephesus was undeniably Episcopal. This part of the subject the advocates of parity do not choose to meddle with, running off constantly to the term *Presbytery*, that poor word being the chief basis of their cause."*

* *Proscript to the* LAYMAN, No. VIII. *Collec.* p. 81.

And thus the Episcopal arm has "carried death to our cause!" And thus "the doctrine of parity" is "destroyed, utterly destroyed!"

Not so fast, good Mr. Layman. We have an objection or two to such a settlement of our affairs; and shall take the liberty of stating them.

The reader will remember that we confine ourselves, at present, to the *Scriptural* argument; and therefore shall not notice any quotations from the Fathers. One thing at a time; and every thing in its place.

This is the argument which the Layman tells us "the advocates of parity do not choose to meddle with." If it be so, the terrour is needless. But the assertion is only a polemical flourish, such as the Layman is accustomed to make for the entertainment of his friends: the fact, as usual, being quite the other way. For if he will be at the trouble, for the first time, as we presume, in his life, to inspect the writings of the advocates of parity at any period from the reformation to this day, he will find that they have not only "meddled" with his argument, but so mauled and maimed it, so battered and crushed it, that even skilful diocesan doctors have given it up for dead, and wondered at that delirious fondness which, instead of decently interring it, insisted upon keeping it above ground. Its ghost, however, seems disquieted, and walks in company with the Lay-

man and Cyprian, to frighten the Presbyterian women and children—We must lay it.

Merriment apart—What do these long extracts, with their glowing interrogations, prove? Why, that Timothy and Titus were superior to Presbyters! Who denies it? "What! do you allow that they had, severally, the power of ordaining to the ministry, by their sole authority?" Yes, we do! That they had authority to inquire into the doctrines taught by Presbyters?" Yes. "To coerce the unruly?" Yes. "To expel the heretical?" Yes—We never thought of disputing it—"Then, certainly, they were diocesan Bishops!" *C'est une autre affaire, Monsieur.* That is another point. We admit the premises here stated, but deny the conclusion. Timothy and Titus could do all these things without being diocesan Bishops. An apostle could do them in virtue of his apostolic office: an evangelist, as Timothy, and consequently, Titus, undoubtedly was,* could do them in virtue of his office *as an evangelist;* and yet be very unlike a diocesan bishop. And to infer that Timothy and Titus were bishops in the prelatical sense of the term, because they enjoyed a pre-eminence and an authority which they might enjoy *without being such bishops at all*, is to abuse the understanding of the reader. Our opponent ought to prove not only that they exer-

* 2 *Tim.* iv. 5. "Do the work of an EVANGELIST."

cised the powers enumerated, but that they did so as *ordinary officers in whom a precedent was set for the future government of the church.* He must prove that their powers were not an appendage of their *special* and *extraordinary character*, like the powers peculiar to the apostolic character. This he neither has done, nor is able to do: and thus the boasted demonstration of Episcopacy from the history of Timothy and Titus, is a mere begging of the question—taking for granted the very thing in dispute.

Let us apply this all conquering argument to other cases which appear to be perfectly parallel.

Episcopal argument.

Titus ordained elders in every city—*Therefore* Titus was Bishop of Crete.

Parallelism.

Paul and Barnabas ordained elders in every church, to wit, in Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch, at least*—*Therefore* Paul and Barnabas were joint Bishops of Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch.

Episcopal argument.

Timothy instructed and charged the Ephesian elders—*Therefore* he was Bishop of Ephesus!

Parallelism.

Paul instructed and charged the Ephesian elders†—*Therefore* PAUL was Bishop of Ephesus.

*Act. xiv. 20, 21. 23.

† *Act.* xx. 17, &c.

Episcopal argument.

Timothy had power to inflict censure on Presbyters, and even to excommunite heretics—*Therefore* Timothy was Bishop of Ephesus.

Parallelism.

Paul had power to excommunicate offenders in the Corinthian church*—*Therefore* Paul was Bishop of Corinth.

The parallel might be run further: but the foregoing will evince, that the very same mode of reasoning which proves Timothy to have been Bishop of Ephesus, and Titus of Crete, will also prove every one of the Apostles to have been bishop of every place where he exercised any of those functions which the Episcopal church has restrained to her prelates. This her advocates know to be absurd; and so does all the world beside. And yet let them show, if they can, that our argument for the diocesan *ubiquity* of the apostles, is not fully as fair and as conclusive as their own for the bishopricks of Timothy and Titus; and is not founded on the very same principles.

There is nothing else in the Layman or Cyprian, which has even the shadow of an argument, unless it be such suggestions as these:

"Will it be imagined by any reasonable man, that St. Paul had converted so many cities on this island," (Crete,) "with-

* 1 Cor. v. 5.

out having ordained any elders amongst them? What! when it was his uniform and invariable practice to ordain elders in every country in which he made proselytes? What! could he have neglected to ordain those amongst them who were absolutely necessary to transact the affairs of the church in his absence? Would he have left the work he had begun only half performed?"*

Cyprian sets himself down in his study at Albany, and, knowing infinitely more than any author sacred or profane has told him, first determines what the Apostle *ought to have done* seventeen hundred and fifty years ago in Crete: next, very wisely concludes that Paul, being also a wise man, *actually did* as he, Cyprian, has laid down and determined; then, furnishes the churches of Crete with Presbyters; and, wanting still more, manufactures Titus into a Bishop to supply the deficiency. Excellent! But where did Cyprian get his facts? Where did he learn so positively what was Paul's "uniform and invariable practice," in the article of ordination? He ought to have been cautious of affronting his old guide, whose account of Paul's "practice," is entirely different from his own.

"One qualification for a Bishop was, that he should not be (*Νεοφυτος*) a novice; that is, one newly converted; time being required to prove men before they could be intrusted with the care of the church. And therefore the Apostles *used not to ordain ministers in any place before the* SECOND *time of their coming thither*—Sometimes, when they

* CYPRIAN, as above.

had no prospect of returning, they gave others a commission to ordain ministers. For which reason Titus was left in Crete by St. Paul to *ordain ministers in all cities.* But there will scarce be found *any instance* of their ordaining ministers at the *first time* of their coming to any place."*

It was rather bold in Cyprian to chastise the Archbishop of Canterbury, whom on other occasions he so implicitly follows, for being ignorant of Paul's "uniform and invariable practice:" but there is something bolder behind: for, if we mistake not, the rector's rod has reached the back of the Apostle himself. He broadly insinuates, that Paul could not, without culpable negligence, have omitted to create officers who were necessary to transact the affairs of the church in his absence; and that had he done so, he would have left his work only half performed. Now it so happens that Paul, according to his own testimony, *did not* furnish the churches in Crete with the requisite officers, or else he left Titus to ordain such as were not absolutely necessary—he did actually leave the work he had begun unfinished; whether only "half performed," or one third, or two thirds, he does not say; but so much was undone as to demand the stay of Titus to complete it. The express terms of his commission are, "That thou shouldest set in order the *things that are wanting.*" or, as the margin of our English version has it, the

* Potter. *Discourse on Church Government*, p. 101, 102.

things that are "*left undone*,"* and one of these things, as the very next words indicate, was the ordination of Presbyters—"and ordain Elders in every city." Cyprian's assumption, therefore, that Paul ordained Presbyters in Crete, is without a particle of evidence. There is not a syllable in the whole narrative, from which we can infer that there was a single Presbyter in the island at his departure. The contrary inference is much the more natural. If Titus was instructed to ordain Presbyters in every city, the presumption is, that none had been ordained hitherto. For, to turn the edge of Cyprian's weapon against himself, it is very improbable that the Apostle in organizing the several churches, would *begin* to ordain Presbyters; would stop in the middle of his business; hie off to another place; do the same sort of half work there; and so from city to city; and then send Titus upon a travelling tour to compensate for the deficiencies occasioned by his haste, his negligence, or his whim. But so it is. Titus *shall* be Bishop of Crete. The proof of his title will fail if there be no Presbyters there—Well, then, there *shall be* Presbyters there, or else Paul shall be convicted of neglecting his duty:—But Paul did not neglect his duty; therefore there *were* Presbyters in Crete when he left it; therefore Titus was a Bishop. Excellently well reasoned, Mr. Rector! And so—"Fair play," interrupts an

* τα λειποντα.

Episcopal voice, "it does not follow from the representation of Cyprian, that Paul ordained *some* elders in every city; and left Titus to ordain the rest. His words will bear another meaning: viz. that the full complement of Presbyters were ordained in some cities, but none at all in others: and that Titus was directed to ordain in these, which would not have been necessary, had Presbyters possessed the power of ordination: seeing that those of one district might have ordained for another, as is done at this day by the Presbyterians. And so, Mr. Reviewer, you are still in the wrong, and Titus *is* a Bishop."

Not *yet*, if you please, dear Sir. Allowing your premises, your conclusion is not good. The Presbyters newly ordained had abundance of occupation, with very little experience. A proper choice of officers in the first instance was all important to the infant churches. Titus had superiour qualifications for making a wise selection; he could also resolve many difficulties which might have been too hard for others. He was deputed by the Apostle to set every thing in order through the island, that when he should be gone the stated officers might have less trouble. In ordaining Presbyters he was doing the work of an Evangelist. The churches were organized in the best manner, and with the greatest expedition; while the Presbyters were permitted to superintend, without distraction, the flocks just committed to

their care. There is no example of the Apostle's calling away Presbyters from their charges immediately after their erection, and sending them round the country to ordain others. This was the *appropriate employment of the apostles themselves, and their assistants, the evangelists.* They established the evangelical order, and consigned it to the ordinary ministry. Presbyters, therefore, might have been ordained in some cities, (although this is a mere supposition;) Titus might, notwithstanding, ordain others in the remaining cities, and yet not be Bishop of Crete. And certainly if *his* ordaining some elders proves *him* to have been Bishop of that island; *Paul's* ordaining some, proves *him also* to have been her Bishop.

Having exposed the weakness and vanity of the argument drawn for diocesan Episcopacy from the examples of Timothy and Titus, we might rest the cause here: but we advance a step further, and offer, what no laws of discussion exact from us, to establish the negative. That is, the proof, as we have manifested, that they *were* such Bishops, having miserably failed, we shall assign reasons for our conviction that they were *not.*

1. The very terms of their commission favour us.

What does Paul say? That he gave Ephesus to Timothy, and Crete to Titus, as their regular and permanent charges? No: nothing like it. The former staid, at the Apostle's request, to resist the inroads of false doctrine, which had begun to in-

fect some of the public teachers. The latter to finish the organization of the churches begun by the Apostle himself. Each, then, had a specific charge, relating not to the government of *settled* churches, but to their *preparation* for it; or to the correction of abuses for restoring and preserving their purity. In both cases the charge was temporary. Paul seized these occasions to furnish his substitutes with written directions containing a manual of general instruction to them, and through them to the future ministry; and, with such an object in view, it was perfectly natural for him to compress into his instructions so great a compass of matter.

2. Paul's mode of addressing Timothy implies that Ephesus was not his peculiar charge. I BESOUGHT *thee*, says he, *to abide still at Ephesus.* A strange formula of appointment to a man's proper station! it carries a strong and evident implication, that Timothy remained there not because it was his diocese, but to gratify the apostle by attending to the exigencies of the public service. It bespeaks reluctance in Timothy to stay behind; Paul had to *entreat* him. All which, again, is entirely natural upon the supposition of his being the apostle's *companion and assistant in planting churches:* but offensive and monstrous upon the supposition of his being bishop of Ephesus.

"For why," says DAILLE', *beseech* a Bishop to "remain in his diocese? Is it not to beseech a

man to stay in a place to which he is bound? I should not think it strange to beseech him to leave it, if his service were needed elsewhere. But to beseech him to abide in a place where his charge obliges him to be, and which he cannot forsake without offending God and neglecting his duty, is, to say the truth, not a very civil entreaty; as it plainly presupposes that he has not his duty much at heart, seeing one is under the necessity of *beseeching* him to do it."*

This is the language of good sense—No squeezing; no twisting; no forcing; all which the hierarchy must do when she puts into the mouth of Paul such an awkward, bungling speech as, *I besought thee to abide still at Ephesus ;*—for—"I constituted thee bishop of Ephesus." We shall, however, suggest an improvement, for which we look for the benedictions of some gentlemen in lawn; viz. That Timothy being Bishop of Ephesus, and relishing confinement to his charge so little as to lay the Apostle under a necessity of *beseeching* him to stay in it, affords the best possible precedent and plea for priests and Bishops who had rather be detected any where than in their parishes and dioceses—except—at tything time.

3. "If Timothy was bishop of Ephesus, it must be when the first epistle was written. For it is in that epistle in which he is said to receive his pretended charge of exercising his Episcopal power

* Daille', *ci-dessus*, p. 23.

in ordination and jurisdiction. But now this first epistle was written when Paul was at Macedonia, as the learned, both new and old, Papists and Protestants, agree. And it was after this when Paul came to Miletum accompanied with Timothy, and sends for the elders of the Church of Ephesus unto him, and commends the government of the Church unto these Elders, whom he calls Bishops. Now surely if Timothy had been constituted their Bishop, (in the sense of our adversaries,) the Apostle would not have called the elders Bishops before their Bishop's face, and instead of giving a charge to the Elders to feed the flock of Christ, he would have given that charge to Timothy, and not to them: and no doubt he would have given some directions to the Elders how to carry themselves towards their Bishop. And because none of these things were done, it is a clear demonstration to us, that Timothy was not at that time Bishop of Ephesus.

"To avoid the force of this argument, there are some that say, that Timothy was not made Bishop of Ephesus till after Paul's first being a prisoner at Rome, which was after his being at Miletum. But these men, while they seek to avoid the *Scylla* of one inconvenience, fall into the *Charybdis* of another as great. For if Timothy was not made Bishop till Paul's first being at Rome, then he was not Bishop when the first Epistle was written to him (which all agree to be written before that

time.) And then it will also follow, that all that charge that was laid upon him, both of ordination and jurisdiction, and that entreating of him to abide at Ephesus, was given to him not as to the Bishop of Ephesus, (which he was not,) but as to an extraordinary officer, sent thither upon special occasion, with a purpose of returning when his work imposed was finished. From both these considerations we may safely conclude,

"That if Timothy were neither constituted Bishop of Ephesus before Paul's first being prisoner at Rome, nor after; then he was not constituted Bishop at all. But he was neither constituted Bishop before nor after, &c. *Ergo*, not at all."*

By this time we trust the reader is satisfied that Timothy was not Bishop of Ephesus; and, as it is agreed that his functions and those of Titus were alike, the conclusion is, that the latter was not Bishop of Crete. What were they then? We answer, they were *extraordinary officers, known in the Apostolic church by the name of* EVANGELISTS; *and employed as travelling companions and assistants of the Apostles, in propagating the gospel.*

For this purpose their powers, like those of the Apostles, were extraordinary; their office too was temporary; and therefore their superiority over Presbyters is no precedent nor warrant for retaining such superiority in the permanent order of the

* *Jus divinum ministerii Anglicani. p.* 65, 66 4to. 1654.

church. That such was the nature of the office of an evangelist, we have testimony which our Episcopal brethren will not dispute—the testimony of bishop *Eusebius.*

This celebrated historian tells us, that even in the second century there were disciples of the apostles, "who every where built upon the foundations which the apostles had laid: preaching the gospel, and scattering the salutary seeds of the kingdom of heaven over the face of the earth. And, moreover, very many of the disciples of that day travelled abroad, and performed *the work of* EVANGELISTS; ardently ambitious of preaching Christ to those who were yet wholly unacquainted with the doctrine of faith, and to deliver to them the scripture of the divine gospels. *These, having merely laid the foundations of the faith, and* ORDAINED OTHER PASTORS, *committed to them the cultivation of the churches newly planted; while they themselves, supported by the grace and co-operation of God, proceeded to* OTHER COUNTRIES AND NATIONS. For *even then,* many astonishing miracles of the divine spirit were wrought by them."*

Eusebius has used the very expression of Paul to Timothy, viz. *the work of an evangelist;* and if the reader compare his description of that work with the epistles to Timothy and Titus, and with their history as it may be gathered from the New Testament, he will perceive the most exact ac-

* EUSEBII, *His. Eccles.* Lib. III. c. 37. *ed. Reading,* T. I. p. 133.

cordance. That is, he will perceive the work of an evangelist, like the work of an apostle, to have been altogether extraordinary and temporary.

Paul took up Timothy at Lystra,* according to the chronology of our bibles, in the year of Christ, 52. He accompanied the apostle in his travels; for at the close of the next year, 53, he was with him at Berea, and staid there when Paul was sent away by the brethren.† By the persons who conducted Paul he received a message to come to him at Athens; but did not join him, as appears, till he was at Corinth,‡ the year after, 54. The next two years he made a part of the apostle's retinue; was with him when he wrote both his Epistles to the Thessalonians;‖ and, at the close of that period, was sent, with Erastus, into Macedonia, *anno* 56.§ Three years after he was despatched to Corinth:¶ and the next, *anno* 60, had returned, and was with Paul when he wrote his second Epistle to the church in that city.** He was one of the seven distinguished personages who composed the apostle's train that same year, when he left Greece and went into Asia.

It was in this very journey that Paul sent for the elders of Ephesus to Miletum, and laid upon them that solemn charge to feed the flock over which the Holy Ghost had made them overseers.††

* Act. xvi. 1—4.
† xvii. 14.
‡ Act. xviii. 5.
‖ 1 Thess. i. 1. 2 Thess. i. 1.
§ Act. xix. 1. 10. 22.
¶ 1 Cor. iv. 17.
** 2 Cor. i. 1.
†† xx. 28.

Timothy was there,* and if Bishop of Ephesus at all, must have been appointed either then or before. For as Paul never saw the Ephesian brethren afterwards,† he never had afterwards an opportunity of ordaining a Bishop over them. If Timothy were their diocesan already, he had been very little with them, as the narrative evinces. And is it not strange that the whole of the apostle's charge should be addressed to the Presbyters, and not a syllable to their Bishop, nor to them on their duty to him? On the other hand, if he was *then* ordained to his see, is not the silence of Paul on the subject of their mutual duties equally mysterious? That he should address them as having the *oversight* of the flock; when the fact was that it belonged not to them but to Timothy, and should do this to their Bishop's face without recognizing his pre-eminence in the most distant manner?

They who can swallow all this, when they are boasting of the scriptural evidence that Timothy was Bishop of Ephesus, have a most happy knack at self-persuasion! We own that our credulity does not contain a passage for so large a camel!

But let us see what becomes of Timothy. Whether he constantly attached himself afterwards to the person of Paul we know not; but we do know that he was with him when a prisoner at Rome, *anno* 64, and shared in his bonds.‡

Let any sober man look at this itinerant life of

* 2 Cor. v. 5. 13. † v. 25. 38. ‡ Heb. xiii. 23.

Timothy, and ask whether his occupations resembled those of a diocesan Bishop? Whether there is even the shadow of a presumption that he had a fixed charge? And whether there is not just as good evidence of his being Bishop of Berea, of Corinth, or of Thessalonica, as of Ephesus?

Titus is in the same situation. In the first chapter of Paul's epistle to him, the object of his stay at Crete is specified. The last chapter declares it to have been temporary; for Paul mentions his design of sending another to take his place; directs him to come without delay to him at Nicopolis; and to bring with him Zenas and Apollos.* Whence, by the way, it is clear that Titus had coadjutors in Crete. For Apollos was an eloquent preacher of the gospel; and in estimation near the apostles themselves.†

On this point, the Inquirer, in the collection under review, p. 132, had asked,

"Since Paul sent for Titus, after he had "set in order the things that were wanting," to come to Nicopolis, took him along with him to Rome, and then sent him into Dalmatia, may not Titus be properly called an *Evangelist;* or a *travelling* rather than a *diocesan* Bishop?"

A very reasonable and modest question, one would think. But Dr. Hobart, in his note, calls upon Bishop Hoadley to shut the mouth of the Inquirer.

"Let Bishop Hoadley answer this inquiry, and silence the only objection which the anti-Episcopalians can bring against the evident superiority of Timothy and Titus over the other

* Tit. iii. 12, 13. † 1 Cor. i. 12. ii. 6.

orders at Ephesus and Crete, that they were *extraordinary officers*, *Evangelists*, *travelling Bishops*. ' It is of small importance whether *Timothy* and *Titus* were *fixed Bishops*, properly so called or not. Perhaps at the first plantation of *churches* there was no such necessity of *fixed Bishops* as was found afterwards ; or perhaps at first the superintendency of such persons as *Timothy* and *Titus* was thought requisite in many different churches, as their several needs required. If so, their office certainly was the same in all *churches* to which they went ; and *ordination* a work reserved to such as they were, persons superior to the settled *Presbyters*. But as to *Ephesus* and *Crete*, it is manifest that *Timothy* and *Titus* were to stay with the *churches* there, as long as their presence was not more wanted at other places: And, besides, if they did leave these churches, there was as good reason that they should return to them to perform the same office of *ordination* when there was again occasion, as there was at first, why they should be sent by St. Paul to that purpose. Nor is there the least footstep in all antiquity, as far as it hath yet appeared, of any attempt in the *Presbyters* of *Ephesus* or *Crete*, to take to themselves the *offices* appropriated in the forementioned *Epistles*, to a superior order of men.' *Hoadley's Def. of Episc.* ch. i.--*Ed.*"

The anti-Episcopalians do not, so far as we understand them, deny the " superiority of Timothy and Titus over the other orders at Ephesus and Crete." But they deny the *inferences* which the *jure divino* prelatists draw from that superiority, viz. 1. *therefore*, Timothy was Bishop of Ephesus, and Titus of Crete; and 2. *therefore* Diocesan Episcopacy is of apostolic institution. These things they deny. They contend that a ministry extraordinary and temporary cannot be a rule for a ministry which is ordinary and permanent—that

functions which, like those of the apostles and evangelists, admitted of no fixed charges, cannot be a model for a sytem of fixed charges, as diocesan Episcopacy undoubtedly is—that the method pursued in *founding* churches is no precedent for *governing* them when *founded.* It would be, in their estimation, quite as fair and as reasonable, to infer the form of government prescribed for a conquered country, from the measures adopted by the invaders for effecting and completing the conquest. Or to deduce the powers and jurisdiction of the different departments in a civil constitution, from the powers of those who set it up. This would be most fallacious reasoning; and the whole world would agree in rejecting it as not only false but extremely dangerous. Yet it is precisely the fallacy of the Episcopal reasoning from the powers of Timothy and Titus to those of ordinary rulers in the church. No. When we inquire who are the fixed officers, and what is the fixed order of the church? we must inquire, not what apostles and evangelists did in executing their peculiar trust; but what officers and order *they fixed in the churches planted by their care.* This, and this alone, can be our pattern. In the history of their proceedings we have the most incontestable evidence of their ordaining Presbyters in fixed charges. But we challenge all the advocates for Episcopacy to produce a *single example* of their assigning a fixed charge to any officer above a

Presbyter; or of their exercising, without immediate inspiration in any settled church, a *single act of power which they refused to Presbyters.* When Hoadley tells us that fixed charges might not be so necessary in those days as afterwards, he confesses his inability to prove either that Timothy and Titus were diocesan bishops; or that diocesan Episcopacy has an apostolic sanction. For if it were not, as a system of fixed charges, necessary *then*, the apostles did not then establish it. If they did not *then* establish it, they *never* established it at all; for it cannot be pretended that they left instructions for its introduction afterwards. And if it was not *then* instituted, we reject its claim; if not *then* necessary, we must have better authority than the prelates themselves to satisfy us that it has been necessary at any period since. Hoadley, therefore, with his *ifs* and *perhaps*, instead of silencing our objection, has confirmed it. We *drove* the nail, and my lord of Winchester has most obligingly *clenched* it. Dr. Hobart has our permission to draw it at his leisure.

We finish this scrptural view with observing, that whatever may be the difficulty of Dr. Bowden, *we* can see prelates in England without going to Ephesus or Crete for spectacles: and that if no more of prelacy had prevailed in the one, than the scriptures show to have existed in the other, it had been infinitely better, at this day, for the most precious interests of Old England.

In an early stage of this review, we joined issue with our Episcopal brethren upon a proposition of the Layman, viz. "The question of Episcopacy is a question of fact, to be determined by a sound interpretation of the sacred volume." We not only consented, but insisted, that the question should be decided by the scripture alone.* We closed the scriptural argument in our last number, and therefore, have closed the argument upon the merits of the case. God's own word *must* contain the law of his own house. The idea cannot be admitted for a single moment, that those master-principles, without which there could be no Christian order, nor any system of instituted worship, are left unsettled in the rule of faith. Whatever is to govern our consciences must have its foundation here, and a foundation deep and strong. We think we have demonstrated that the Episcopal claim has no such foundation. *Who* set up the hierarchy, is a question not worth the expense of a thought, seeing God has not appointed it in his word. When we follow its advocates to the ground of ecclesiastical history, we yield them a courtesy which they have no right to expect. The instant we cross the line of inspiration, we are out of the territory where the only rightful tribunal is erected, and where alone we shall permit ourselves to be tried.

However, as the argument which prelacy de-

* See page

rives from the testimony of the fathers, is in truth her best argument; let us pay it the compliment of an examination. Thus she states it from the mouth of a bishop:

"Is it not reasonable to suppose that the primitive Fathers of the church must have been well acquainted with the mode of ecclesiastical government established by Christ and his apostles? Now, *their* testimony is *universally* in our favour. What course, then, have the enemies of Episcopacy for the most part pursued? Why, they have endeavoured by every art of misrepresentation to invalidate this testimony of the Fathers. Ignatius was born before the death of St. John. Seven of his Epistles have been proved by Bishop Pearson to be genuine, to the satisfaction of the whole learned world. In these Epistles he repeatedly mentions the three orders of Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons, and speaks of the order of Bishops as necessary in the constitution of every Christian church. All this has been done; and still, the Presbyterian teachers mislead the people, by artfully insinuating that none of the writings are genuine which go under the name of Ignatius. Another artful method pursued by our opponents is to collect all the errors into which the Fathers have fallen, with respect to particular points of doctrine; to paint these errors in the blackest colours; and when they have thus prejudiced the minds of the people against them, boldly to go on to the preposterous conclusion, that the testimony of these Fathers is not to be regarded when they stand forth as witnesses to a matter of fact. But is this fair dealing? May not a man of sincerity and truth be liable to errors, as to matters of opinion; and still be a true witness, as to things which he has seen and heard?

"Pursuing the usual mode of *artful misrepresentation*, our Miscellanist has endeavoured to represent Jerome as favouring the Presbyterian scheme of church government; and with the

same spirit, he abuses the church of England as too nearly bordering on Popery. After seeing what has been published on these subjects, if your opponent has any spark of modesty remaining in his bosom, he will never produce the testimony of Jerome in support of his cause."*

Thus, from the mouth of a priest :

"Here let me appeal to the common sense of every unprejudiced reader, to bear witness to the truth of the following proposition.

"If we had only obscure hints given us in scripture of the institution of this form of government by the Apostles, and if at a very early period—as soon as any distinct mention is at all made of the subject, this appears to be the only form of government existing in the church, have we not the strongest possible presumption, have we not absolute demonstration, that it was of Apostolic original? Who were so likely to be acquainted with the intentions, with the practices, with the institutions of the Apostles, as their *immediate successors?* If, then, we should admit for a moment, (and really it is almost too great an outrage against sound reasoning, to be admitted even for a moment ;) I say, if we should admit, for the sake of argument, that "the Classical or Presbyterial form of church government was instituted by Christ and his Apostles," at what period was the *Episcopal* introduced? When did this monstous innovation upon primitive order find its way into the church of Christ? At what period did the Bishops make the bold and successful attempt of exalting themselves into "lords in God's heritage." These are questions which the advocates of parity have never yet been able to answer, which they never will be able to answer. They tell us, indeed, of a change that must have taken place at an early period, that Episcopacy is a corrupt innovation ; but they can produce no proof on which to ground these bold assertions. They are countenanced, in these as-

† Cornelius, *Collec.* p. 135.

sertions, by none of the records of these times that have been transmitted to us. It is a mere conjecture, a creature of the imagination. It is conjectured that this change took place immediately after the Apostolic age. It must be that this change took place, or Presbyterian principles cannot be maintained. Thus a mere *conjecture* on their part is to overbalance the most solid and substantial *proofs* on ours. In order to follow these ærial adventurers in their excursions, we are to desert the broad and solid bottom of facts, and launch into the regions of hypothesis and uncertainty.

"We say, then, and I hope it will be well remembered, that from the *earliest* information which is given us concerning the institutions and usages of the Christian church, it undeniably appears, that there existed in it the three distinct orders of Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons. We say, that this circumstance amounts to demonstrative evidence, that these three orders were of divine institution—were of Apostolic appointment."—"But we do not stop here. We maintain that to suppose the form of government in the church of Christ to have been so fundamentally altered at this time, is the wildest imagination that ever entered into the head of man. Let us contemplate the circumstances of this case.

"It is *supposed* that Christ and his Apostles instituted originally but one order of ministers in his church, equal in dignity and authority. It is *imagined*, that immediately after their death, a number of aspiring individuals abolished this primitive arrangement, elevated themselves to supreme authority in the church of Christ. Concerning the *time* at which this innovation was effected, the advocates of Presbyterianism are by no means agreed. The most learned among them, however, admit that it must have taken place before the middle of the second century, about *forty or fifty years after the times of the Apostles.* Blondel allows that Episcopacy was the established government of the church within forty years after the Apostolic age. Bochart assigns as the period of its

origin, the age that immediately succeeded the Apostles. He says it arose, *paulo post Apostolos.* Salmasius even allows that this government prevailed in the church before the death of the last of the Apostles. And, in fact, this is the only period at which it can be supposed to have originated with any degree of plausibility. It shall be my task to show that it is altogether *improbable*, that it is almost *impossible*, that any innovation upon primitive order and discipline could have been effectuated at this early period.

" Within forty years after the times of the Apostles, we are told, that the Bishops, by a bold and successful effort, trampled upon the rights and privileges of the Clergy, and elevated themselves to the chair of supreme authority! What! Those who were the immediate successors of the Apostles—those who had received from these miraculous men the words of eternal truth, the institutions of God's own appointment—so soon forget the reverence and duty which they owed them—so soon, with a rash and impious hand, strike away the foundation of those venerable structures which they had erected! Would they not permit the Apostles to be cold in their graves before they began to undermine and demolish their sacred establishments? Would such iniquitous proceedings have been possible with men who exhibited, on all occasions, the warmest attachment to their Saviour, and to all his institutions? Will it be imagined that the good Ignatius, the venerable Bishop of Antioch, he who triumphantly avowed that he disregarded the pains of martyrdom, so that he could but attain to the presence of Jesus Christ—will it be imagined that he entered into a conspiracy to overthrow that government which his Saviour had established in his church? Would the illustrious Polycarp, the pride and ornament of the churches of Asia, have engaged in the execution of so foul an enterprise—he, who, when commanded to blaspheme Christ, exclaimed, " Four-score and six years have I served him, and he never did me any harm; how, then, shall I blaspheme my King

and my Saviour?" In short, can all the pious Fathers that succeeded these, be supposed to have co-operated in perfecting the atrocious work which they had begun? These things will not be credited.

"But even supposing that these pious men, whose meek and unaspiring temper renders it altogether incredible that they made any such sacrilegious attempt, were inclined to obtain this pre-eminence in the church; can it be imagined, that the remaining *Presbyters* would have *witnessed* these daring *usurpations* with *indifference?* Would they have made no effort to save themselves and their brethren from the control of so undue and illegitimate an authority? Could none be found amongst them possessed of so much zeal in the service of their divine master, so ardently attached to his holy institutions, as to induce them to resist such a bold and impious attempt? In short, would not such an attempt by a few Presbyters, according to the uniform course of things, necessarily have agitated and convulsed the church? Would not the period of such an innovation have become a marked and peculiar era in her existence? Can the advocates of parity show any thing in the history of man analagous to their supposed change in ecclesiastical government at this time? Could ever such a radical and important alteration have been produced in any government, civil or ecclesiastical, without being accompanied by violence and convulsion? We find that the congregations, at this time, were extremely jealous of the authority that was exercised over them. This jealousy made its appearance even during the times of the Apostles. Some took it upon themselves to call in question the authority of St. Paul, others that of St. John. From the Epistle of Clemens to the Corinthians, it would seem as if some disorders had arisen amongst them from a similar source. Is it to be supposed then that any number of Presbyters would have dared, would have proved successful had they dared, to endeavour to accumulate in their hands such undue authority as that which was

claimed by Bishops? And even if we should allow that a few Presbyters might in some places have had the talents and address to elevate themselves to this superiority over their brethren, is it probable, is it possible, that this took place at the *same time* over the universal church? Can such a singular coincidence of circumstances be reasonably imagined? The church had, at this time, widely extended herself over the Roman empire. Did, then, the churches of Africa, of Asia, of Europe, by a miraculous unanimity of opinion, enter at the *same moment* into the determination to change their form of government from the Presbyterial to the Episcopal? I will not do so much discredit to the understanding of any reader as to imagine that he does not at once perceive the inadmissibility and the absurdity of such a supposition.

"Let us, however, suppose the most that our adversaries can desire. Let us suppose that the primitive rulers of the church were destitute of principle. Let us suppose them devoid of attachment to the institutions of Christ. Let us suppose that they waited every opportunity to promote their own aggrandizement. Let us suppose the difficulties removed that opposed them in their ascent towards the chair of Episcopal authority. What was there, at this period, in the office of Bishop to excite their desires, or to invite their exertions to obtain it? The veneration attached to it, as yet, extended no farther than to the family of the faithful. The church was on all hands encountered by the bitterest enemies. By elevating themselves, therefore, to the pre-eminence of Bishops, they only raised themselves to pre-eminence in difficulties, in dangers, in deaths. Their blood was always the first that was drunk by the sword of persecution. Their station only exposed them to more certain and more horrid deaths. Was an office of this kind an object of cupidity? Is it to be supposed that great exertions would be made, many difficulties encountered, to obtain it? But I need say no more on this part of the subject.

"The idea that an alteration took place at this time in the form of government originally established in the church of Christ, is altogether unsupported by any proof.

"It is proved to be unfounded by unnumbered considerations."*

After hearing the bishop and the priest, let us hear also the Layman:

"Calvin found the whole Christian world in possession of the Episcopal form of government. The most learned supporters of the opposite doctrine scruple not to admit that Bishops existed, universally, in the church, as distinct from, and superior to, Presbyters, within forty or fifty years after the last of the Apostles. Such is the concession of *Blondel*, of *Salmasius*, of *Bochartus*, of *Baxter*, of *Doddridge*. Some of them, indeed, carry it up to a much earlier period; Salmasius going so far as to admit that Episcopacy prevailed shortly after the martyrdom of Paul and Peter, and long before the death of St. John.

"It is surely incumbent on those who advocate a form of government admitted to be thus *new*, and thus opposed to the *early*, *universal*, and *uninterrupted* practice of the church, to give us the most convincing and unequivocal proof of the divinity of their system. More especially when it is recollected that they can produce no record of a change; but are obliged to *imagine* one, in opposition to the uniform testimony of the primitive fathers of the church. The age in which they suppose a change to have taken place was a learned age, abounding in authors of the first eminence. The most minute events are recorded, and yet not a word is said of the revolution, which some men talk of, so fundamental in its nature, and so interesting in its consequences. The change, too, which they imagine, must have been both *instantaneous* and *universal;* and this at a time when there were no Christian princes to

* Cyprian, No. V. *Collec.* p. 144—147.

promote it; when no general council had met, or could meet to establish it; and when the fury of persecution cut off all intercourse between distant churches; leaving their Clergy, also, something else to attend to than projects of usurpation. Such are the strange and almost incredible absurdities into which men will run, rather than give up a system to which they have become wedded by educaton and by habit."*

The sum of the foregoing argument is this:

"Immediately after the death of the apostles, the *whole Christian world* was Episcopal, and remained so, without interruption, or question, for fifteen hundred years—that no cause short of Apostolic institution, can, with any show of reason, be assigned for such an effect—that it is absurd to suppose a sudden, universal, and successful conspiracy, to change the primitive order of the church—and therefore, that Episcopacy is, at least, of apostolic origin."

Contracted into a more regular form, the argument stands thus:

That order which the church universal possessed at, or shortly after, the death of the apostles, is the order which they established and left:

But the order of the church universal, at, or shortly after the death of the apostles, was Episcopal:

Therefore, Episcopacy is the order established by the Apostles.

This reasoning appears, at first sight, to be conclusive. It certainly ought to be so, considering

* Layman, No. VII. *Collec.* p. 99.

the interests which depend upon it, and the triumph with which it is brought forward. Nevertheless, we more than suspect a fallacy in the reasoning itself, and an errour in the assumption upon which it confessedly relies.

Supposing the fact to have been, as our Episcopal friends say it was, viz. that the accounts of the state of the Christian church after the death of the apostles, represent her, without an exception, as under Episcopal organization, we should still impeach the conclusion that Episcopacy was established by the apostles. We acknowledge, that, upon our principles, the phenomenon would be extraordinary, and the difficulty great So great, that did there exist no other records of the first constitution of the church, than the testimony of the primitive fathers ; and did this testimony declare her to have been Episcopal, as that term is now understood, there could be, in our apprehension, no dispute about the matter. Common sense would instruct us to decide according to the best evidence we could get: that evidence would be altogether in favour of the Episcopal claim, which, therefore, no man in his senses, would think of disputing. We say, such would be the result *were the testimony of the fathers correctly stated* by the hierarchy ; and *had we no other documents or records* to consult. But we have other and better testimony than that of the Fathers. We have the testimony of the Apostles themselves: We have

their own authentic records: We have the very instrument in which the ascended Head of the church has written her *whole charter* with the finger of his unerring Spirit: We have the New Testament. This charter we have examined. We have minutely discussed the parts upon which our opponents rely: we have compared them with other parts of the same instrument, and we have proved that Episcopacy is *not there.* Admitting then, what, however, we do not admit, that the testimony of the fathers to Episcopacy is precise and full, it would be nothing to us. They must testify one of two things; either that the plan of the hierarchy is laid down in the New Testament; or simply that it existed in their days. The former would refer to the written word which we can understand as well as themselves, if not much better; so that we should not take their assertion for our interpretation. The latter could only furnish us with a subject worthy of investigation; but could not be a solid foundation for so splendid and ponderous a superstructure as the Episcopal hierarchy. Were the language of the New Testament ambiguous throughout: did it contain no internal principles of satisfactory exposition: were it, (which would render it a miraculous equivoque,) were it *equally* adapted to an Episcopal, or an Anti-episcopal, order; in this event, too, the testimony of the fathers would turn the balance. But as neither its language nor its facts can be made,

without negligence or violence, to accord with the institutions of the hierarchy, she is not at liberty to set off the testimony of the fathers against that of the scripture; and to *infer* that she is of apostolical extraction, merely because she was found in being after her pretended spiritual progenitors were dead. It never can be tolerated as sound reasoning to determine the meaning of a law from certain observances which are to be tried by the law itself; and, by *inference from extraneous facts*, to establish, as law, a point which the law does not acknowledge. A question is at issue, whether Episcopacy is of apostolic authority or not. The law of God's house, penned by the apostles themselves, is produced; and the verdict, upon trial, is for the negative. The Episcopal counsel appeals to the Fathers; they depose, he says, that Episcopacy was in actual existence, throughout the Christian community, a little while after the death of the Apostles; and he insists that this fact shall regulate the construction of the Christian law.

"By no means;" replies the counsel on the other side. "We accuse Episcopacy of *corrupting* the Christian institutions; and her counsel pleads the *early existence* of her alleged crime, as a proof of her having conformed to the will of the Lawgiver; and that the fact of her having committed it from nearly the time of promulging the law, is a demonstration that the law not only allows but enjoins the deed!!"

The United States are a republic, with a single executive periodically chosen. Suppose that three hundred years hence they should be under the reign of a hereditary monarch ; and the question should then be started whether this was the original order or not? Those who favour the negative go back to the written constitution, framed in 1787, and show that a hereditary monarchy was never contemplated in that instrument. Others contend that "The expressions of the constitution are indefinite; there are some things, indeed, which look a little republican-like, and might be accommodated to the infant state of the nation ; but whoever shall consider the *purposes* of the order therein prescribed, and the nature of the *powers* therein granted, will clearly perceive that the one cannot be attained, nor the other exercised, but in a hereditary monarchy." Well, the constitution is produced; it is examined again and again; but no hereditary monarchy is recognized there; it breathes republicanism throughout: What, now, would be thought of a man, who should gravely answer, "The concurrent testimony of all the historians of those times is, that at, or very shortly after, the death of the members of the convention of 1787, monarchy prevailed throughout the United States; and this is proof positive, that it was established by the convention."

"Nay," would the first rejoin, "your facts are

of no avail. The question is, not what prevailed *after* the constitution was adopted: but what is the constitution itself? There it is: let it argue its own cause."

"But," says the other, "how could so great a change, as that from a republic to a monarchy, happen in so short a time? and that without resistance, or, what is still more astonishing, without notice?"

"You may settle that, "retorts the first," at your leisure. That there has been a material change, I see as clearly as the light: *how* that change was effected, is none of my concern. It is enough for me that the constitution, fairly interpreted, knows nothing of the existing monarchy."

Every child can perceive who would have the best of this argument; and it is just such an argument as we are managing with the Episcopalians. Granting them all they ask concerning the testimony of the fathers, their conclusion is "good for nothing," because it concludes, as we have abundantly shown, against the New Testament itself. It is vain to declaim upon the improbability and impossibility of so sudden and universal a transition from Presbytery to Episcopacy, as they maintain must have taken place upon our plan. The revolution would have been very extraordinary, we confess. But many very extraordinary things are very true. All that the hierarchy gains by the testimony of the fathers, even when we allow her

to state it in her own way, is an extraordinary fact which she cannot explain for herself; and, therefore, insists that we shall explain it, or else bow the knee. We excuse ourselves. We are not compelled to the latter, and we are under no obligation to the former. The controversy must perpetually return to a simple issue, viz. Whether Episcopacy and the New Testament agree or not? We have proved, as we think, that they are irreconcilcable. This is enough. Here is the New Testament on one side, and the hierarchy on the other. Conceding that she had very early possession of the church, what follows? Nothing but that order of the church was very early corrupted! Whether we can or cannot trace the steps and fix the date of this corruption, does not alter the case. Corruption is corruption still. If we can tell nothing about the rise of the hierarchy, our ignorance does not destroy its contrariety to the scripture. If we could ascertain the very hour of its rise, the discovery would not increase that contrariety. Our ignorance and our knowledge on this subject leave the original question exactly where they found it. A thousand volumes may be written; and after all, the final appeal must be "to the law and to the testimony."

It is clear, therefore, that should we even acquiesce in the account which our episcopal brethren give of the primitive testimony, we are justified in denying their conclusion: seeing that

all *inferences* against the decision of the New Testament itself, are necessarily invalid and false, be the facts from which they are deduced ever so many, ever so strong, or ever so indisputable.

But although, in our own opinion, the ground on which the prelatists have chosen to make their principal stand, affords them so little advantage as not to repay the trouble of dislodging them, we shall, for the sake of their further satisfaction, proceed to do them this service also.

They have heaped assertion upon assertion, that the testimony of the primitive church is *universally* in their favour; so explicitly and decisively in their favour, that if Episcopacy had not been instituted by apostolic authority, the whole Christian church must *suddenly* have changed her government from one end of the world to the other, without any adequate cause, and without any opportunity of previous concert.*

When our opponents talk of the early and general prevalence of episcopacy, they must mean episcopacy *as embraced by themselves*, i. e. as *restricting the power of ordination and government to the superior order of clergy called bishops;* or else they are fighting for a shadow.

We deny their representation and shall prove it to be false.†

* See the foregoing extracts.

† We cannot forbear remarking, by the way, a striking coincidence between the popish and the episcopal method of defence.

More than *fourteen hundred years ago* the superiority of the Prelates to Presbyters was attacked, in the most direct and open manner, as having no authority from our Lord Jesus Christ. The banner of opposition was raised not by a mean and obscure declaimer; but by a most consummate Theologian. "By one who, in the judgment of

When they begin to feel themselves pressed, they betake themselves to the scriptures; but finding themselves hard pushed here, they retreat to the fathers. There is scarcely a peculiarity of popery for which some papal polemics do not pretend to have their sanction. Take a sample.

"They of your" (the protestant) "side, that have read the fathers of that unspotted church, can well testify (and if any deny it, it shall be presently shown) that the Doctors, Pastors, and Fathers of that church do allow of traditions; that they acknowledge the real presence of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar: that they exhorted the people to confess their sins unto their ghostly fathers: that they affirmed, that Priests have power to forgive sins: that they taught, that there is a purgatory: that prayer for the dead is both commendable and godly: that there is *Limbus Patrum;* and that our Saviour descended into hell, to deliver the ancient fathers of the Old Testament; because before his passion none ever entered into heaven; that prayer to saints and use of holy images was of great account amongst them: that man had free-will, and that for his meritorious works he receiveth, through the assistance of God's grace, the bliss of everlasting happiness.

"Now would I fain know whether of both have the true Religion, they that hold all these above said points, with the primitive Church; or they that do most vehemently contradict and gainsay them? They that do not disagree with that holy church in any point of religion; or they that agree with it but in very few, and disagree in almost all?

"Will you say, that these fathers maintained these opinions, contrary to the word of God? Why you know that they were

"Erasmus, was, without controversy, by far the most learned and most eloquent of all the Christians; and the prince of Christian Divines."* By the illustrious JEROME.†

Thus he lays down both *doctrine* and *fact* relative to the government of the church, in his commentary on Titus 1. 5.

the pillars of Christianity, the champions of Christ his church, and of the true Catholic religion, which they most learnedly defended against diverse heresies; and therefore spent all their time in a most serious study of the holy scripture. Or will you say, that although they knew the scriptures to repugn, yet they brought in the aforesaid opinions by malice and corrupt intentions? Why yourselves cannot deny, but that they lived most holy and virtuous lives, free from all malicious corrupting, or perverting of God's holy word, and by their holy lives are now made worthy to reign with God in his glory. Insomuch as their admirable learning may sufficiently cross out all suspicion of ignorant error; and their innocent sanctity freeth us from all mistrust of malicious corruption." *Challenge of a Jesuit to Bishop Usher.*

In the course of his full and elaborate answer to this challenge, Usher quotes Cardinal *Bellarmine* as one "who would face us down that *all the ancients both Greek and Latin, from the very time of the Apostles, did constantly teach that there was a purgatory.* Whereas," replies Usher, "his own partners could tell him in his ear, that *in the ancient writers there is almost no mention of purgatory; especially in the Greek writers.*" USHER'S *Answer*, &c. p. 170, 4to. 1625.

For "Purgatory," put "Episcopacy," and you will see pretty nearly how the account stands between eminent Episcopalians themselves.

* We quote the words of one who was assuredly no friend to our cause, vid. CAVE, *His. Litt. Script: Eccles.* p. 171. Ed. 1720. Fol.

† PROSPER, who was nearly his cotemporary, calls him *magister mundi:* i. e. the teacher of the world. *Ib.*

*That thou shouldest ordain Presbyters in every city, as I had appointed thee**—" What sort of Pres-

* " Qui qualis Presbyter debeat ordinari, in consequentibus disserens hoc ait: Si qui est sine crimine, unius uxoris vir," et cætera: postea intulit, " Oportet. n. Episcopum sine crimine esse, tanquam Dei dispensatorem." Idem est ergo Presbyter, qui et Episcopus, et antequam *diaboli instinctu*, studia in religione fierent, et diceretur in populis: " Ego sum Pauli, ego Apollo, ego autem Cephæ:" *communi Presbyterorum consilio* ecclesiæ gubernabantur. Postquam vero unusquisque eos, quos baptizaverat, suos putabat esse, non Christi: *in toto orbe decretum est, ut unus de Presbyteris electus superponeretur cæteris, ad quem omnis ecclesiæ cura pertineret*, et schismatum semina tollerentur. Putet aliquis non scripturarum, sed nostram, esse sententiam Episcopum et Presbyterum unum esse; et aliud ætatis, aliud esse nomen officii: relegat Apostoli ad Philippenses verba dicentis: Paulus et Timotheus servi Jesu Christi, omnibus sanctis in Christo Jesu, qui sunt Philippis, cum Episcopis et Diaconis, gratia vobis et pax, et reliqua. Philippi *una* est urbs Macedoniæ, et certe in una civitate *plures* ut nuncupantur, *Episcopi esse non poterant*. Sed quia *eosdem Episcopos illo tempore* quos et *Presbyteros* appellabant, propterea indifferenter de Episcopis quasi de Presbyteris est locutus. Adhuc hoc alicui videatur ambiguum, nisi altero testimonio comprobetur. In Actibus Apostolorum scriptum est, quod cum venisset Apostolus Miletum, miserit Ephesum, et vocaverit Presbyteros ecclesiæ ejusdem; quibus postea inter cætera sit locutus: *attendite vobis, et omni gregi in quo vos Spiritus sanctus posuit Episcopos, pascere ecclesiam Domini quam acquisivit per sanguinem suum*. Et hoc diligentius observate, quo modo *unius civitatis* Ephesi *Presbyteros* vocans, postea eosdem *Episcopos* dixerit.—Hæc propterea, ut ostenderemus *apud veteres* eosdem fuisse Presbyteros quos et Episcopos. *Paulatim* vero, ut dissensionum plantaria evellerentur, ad *unum* omnem solicitudinem esse delatam.—Sicut ergo Presbyteri *sciunt se ex ecclesiæ consuetudine* ei, qui sibi propositus fuerit, esse subjectos, ita Episcopi noverint se *magis consuetudine quam dispositionis dominicæ veritate*, Presbyteris esse majores, Hieronymi *Com: in Tit:* l. 1. *Opp. Tom.* VI. p. 168 *ed: Victorii, Paris*, 1623. *Fol.*

byters ought to be ordained he shows afterwards: *If any be blameless, the husband of one wife*, &c. and then adds, *for a bishop must be blameless, as the steward of God*, &c. A *Presbyter*, therefore, is the *same* as a *bishop:* and before there were, *by the instigation of the devil*, parties in religion; and it was said among different people, *I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas*, the churches were governed by *the joint counsel of the Presbyters.* But *afterwards*, when every one accounted those whom he baptized as belonging to himself and not to Christ, it was *decreed throughout the whole world* that one, chosen from among the Presbyters, should be put over the rest, and that the whole care of the church should be committed to him, and the seeds of schisms taken away.

"Should any one think that this is my private opinion, and not the doctrine of the scriptures, let him read the words of the apostle in his epistle to the Philippians; 'Paul and Timotheus, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons,' &c. Philippi, is a *single* city of Macedonia; and certainly in one city there could not be *several bishops* as they are now styled; but as they, at that time, called the very same persons bishops whom they called Presbyters, the Apostle has spoken without distinction of bishops as Presbyters.

"Should this matter yet appear doubtful to any

one, unless it be proved by an additional testimony; it is written in the acts of the Apostles, that when Paul had come to Miletum, he sent to Ephesus and called the Presbyters of that church, and among other things said to them, 'take heed to yourselves and to all the flock in which the Holy Spirit hath made you bishops.' Take particular notice, that calling the PRESBYTERS of the single city of Ephesus, he afterwards names the same persons BISHOPS." After further quotations from the epistle to the Hebrews, and from Peter, he proceeds: "Our intention in these remarks is to show, that, among the ancients, *Presbyters and Bishops were* THE VERY SAME. But that BY LITTLE AND LITTLE, that the plants of dissentions might be plucked up, the whole concern was divolved upon an individual. As the Presbyters, therefore, KNOW that they are subjected, BY THE CUSTOM OF THE CHURCH, to him who is set over them; so let the Bishops know, that they are greater than Presbyters MORE BY CUSTOM, than by ANY REAL APPOINTMENT OF CHRIST."

He pursues the same argument, with great point, in his famous Epistle to Evagrius, asserting and proving from the Scriptures, that in the beginning and during the Apostles' days, a Bishop and a Presbyter were the same thing. He then goes on: "As to the fact, that AFTERWARDS, one was ELECTED to preside over the rest, this was done as a remedy against schism; lest every one drawing

his proselytes to himself, should rend the church of Christ. For even at Alexandria, from the Evangelist Mark to the Bishops Heraclas and Dionysius, the Presbyters always chose one of their number, placed him in a superior station, and gave him the title of Bishop: in the same manner as if an army should MAKE an emperor; or the deacons should choose from among themselves, one whom they knew to be particularly active, and should call him ARCH-DEACON. For, excepting ordination, what is done by a Bishop, which may not be done by a Presbyter? Nor is it to be supposed, that the church should be one thing at Rome, and another in all the world besides. Both France and Britain, and Africa, and Persia, and the East, and India, and all the barbarous nations worship one Christ, observe one rule of truth. If you demand authority, the globe is greater than a city. Wherever a Bishop shall be found, whether at Rome, or Eugubium, or Constantinople, or Rhegium, or Alexandria, or Tanis, he has the same pretensions, the same priesthood."*

* Quod autem postea *unus electus* est, qui cæteris præponeretur, in schismatis remedium factum est: ne unusquisque ad se trahens Christi Ecclesiam rumperet. Nam et Alexandriæ à Marco Evangelista usque ad Heraclam & Dionysium Episcopos, *presbyteri semper unum ex se electum, in excelsiori gradu collocatum, Episcopum nominabant:* quomodo si exercitus imperatorem *faciat;* aut diaconi *eligant de se*, quem industrium noverint, & *archidiaconum vocent.* *Quid* enim facit, *excepta ordinatione, Episcopus*, quod *pres-*

Here is an account of the origin and progress of Episcopacy, by a Father whom the Episcopalians themselves admit to have been the most able and learned man of his age; and how contradictory it is to their own account, the reader will be at no loss to perceive, when he shall have followed us through an analysis of its several parts.

1. Jerome expressly denies the superiority of Bishops to Presbyters, by *divine right.* To prove his assertion on this head, he goes directly to the scriptures; and argues, as the advocates of parity do, from the interchangeable titles of Bishop and Presbyter; from the *directions* given to them without the least intimation of difference in their authority; and from the *powers* of Presbyters, undisputed in his day. It is very true, that the reasoning from *names*, is said, by those whom it troubles, to be "miserable sophistry," and "good for nothing:" But as Jerome advances it with the utmost confidence, they might have forborne such a compliment to the "prince of divines" in the fourth century; especially as none of his cotemporaries, so far as we recollect, ever attempted to answer

byter non faciat? Nec altera Romanæ urbis Ecclesia, altera totius orbis existimanda est. Et Galliæ, & Brittaniæ, & Africa, & Persis, & Oriens, & India, & omnes barbaræ nationes unum Christum adorant, unam observant regulam veritatis. Si auctoritas quæritur, orbis major est urbe. Ubicumque fuerit Episcopus, sive Romæ, sive Eugubii, sive Constantinopoli, sive Rhegii, sive Alexandriæ, sive Tanis; ejusdem meriti, ejusdem & sacerdotii. *Hieron. Opp. T. II.* p. 624.

it. It is a *little* strange that laymen, and clergymen, deacons, priests, and bishops, should *all* be silenced by a page of "miserable sophistry!"

2. JEROME states it, as a *historical fact*, that, in the original constitution of the church, before the devil had as much influence as he acquired afterwards, *the churches were governed by the joint counsels of the Presbyters.*

3. JEROME states it as a *historical fact*, that this government of the churches, *by Presbyters alone*, continued until, for the avoiding of scandalous quarrels and schisms, it was thought expedient to *alter* it. "*Afterwards*," says he, "when every one accounted those whom he baptized as belonging to himself, and not to Christ, it was *decreed throughout the whole world*, that one, chosen from among the Presbyters, should be put over the rest, and that the whole care of the church should be committed to him."

4. JEROME states it as a *historical fact*, that this change in the government of the church—this creation of a superiour order of ministers, took place, not at once, but *by degrees*—"*Paulatim*," says he, "by little and little." The precise date on which this innovation upon primitive order *commenced*, he does not mention; but he says positively, that it did not take place till the factious spirit of the Corinthians had spread itself in different countries, to an alarming extent. "*In populis*," is his expression. Assuredly, this was

not the work of a day. It had not been accomplished when the apostolic epistles were written, because Jerome appeals to these for proof that the churches were then governed by the joint counsels of Presbyters; and it is incredible that such ruinous dissensions, had they existed, should not have been noticed in letters to others beside the Corinthians. The disease indeed, was of a nature to spread rapidly; but still it must have time to travel. With all the zeal of Satan himself, and of a parcel of wicked or foolish clergymen to help him, it could not march from people to people, and clime to clime, but in a course of years. If Episcopacy was the *apostolic* cure for schism, the contagion must have smitten the nations like a flash of lightning. This would have been quite as extraordinary as an instantaneous change of government; and would have afforded full as much scope for pretty declamation, as the dream of such a change, which Cyprian and the Layman insist we *shall* dream whether we will or not. No: The progress of the mischief was gradual, and so, according to Jerome, was the progress of the *remedy* which the wisdom of the times devised.*

* Our opponents, who contend that nothing can be concluded from the promiscuous use of the scriptural titles of office, are yet compelled to acknowledge that *Bishop* and *Presbyter* were *afterwards* separated and restricted, the former to the superiour, and the latter to the inferiour order of ministers. We would ask them *when* and *why* this was done? If it was not necessary to distinguish these officers by specific titles in the apostles' day, what necessity

We agree with them, who think that the experiment introduced more evil than it banished.*

5. JEROME states as *historical facts*, that the elevation of one Presbyter over the others, was a *human contrivance;*—was not *imposed* by authority,

was there for such a distinction afterwards? The church might have gone on, as she began, to this very hour; and what would have been the harm? Nay, there *was* a necessity for the distinction; and Jerome has blown the secret. When one of the Presbyters was set over the heads of the others, there was a *new officer*, and he wanted a *name*. So they appropriated the term *Bishop* to him; and thus avoided the *odium* of *inventing* a title unknown to the scripture. The people, no doubt, were told that there was no material alteration in the scriptural order; and hearing nothing but a name to which they had always been accustomed, they were the less startled. The Trojan horse over again!

* One thing is obvious. Had there never been, in the persons of the prelates, a sort of spiritual *noblesse;* there could never have been, in the person of the Pope, a spiritual *monarch*. For the very same reason that a Bishop was appointed to preserve unity among the Presbyters, it was necessary, in process of time, to appoint an *Archbishop* for preserving unity among the bishops; for we never yet heard, that increase of power makes its possessors less aspiring. In the same manner a *patriarch* became necessary to keep their graces the Archbishops in order: and finally, our sovereign lord the Pope, to look after the patriarchs! The analogy is perfect; the reasoning one; and the progression regular. What a beautiful pile! How correct its proportions! how elegant its workmanship! how compact and firm its structure! the Christian *people* at the bottom; rising above them, the *preaching deacons:* next in order, the *Presbyters;* above them, the *Bishops;* these support the *Archbishops*, over whom tower the *patriarchs;* and one *universal Bishop* terminates the whole. Thus this glorious *Babylonish* edifice, having for its base the Christian world, tapers off, by exquisite gradations, into "*his holiness*" at Rome.

but *crept in by custom*;—and that the Presbyters of his day, *knew* this very well. *As, therefore*, says he, *the Presbyters* KNOW *that they are subjected to their superiour by* CUSTOM; *so let the bishops know that they are above the Presbyters, rather by the* CUSTOM OF THE CHURCH, *than by the Lord's appointment.*

6. JEROME states it as a *historical fact*, that the first bishops were made by the *Presbyters themselves;* and consequently they could neither have, nor communicate any authority above that of Presbyters. "*Afterwards*," says he, "to prevent schism, one was *elected* to preside over the rest." Elected and commissioned by whom? By the *Presbyters:* for he immediately gives you a broad fact which it is impossible to explain away. "At Alexandria," he tells you, "from the evangelist Mark to the Bishops Heraclas and Dionysius," i. e. till about the middle of the third century, "the Presbyters *always chose* one of their number, *placed him in a superiour station*, and gave him the title of *Bishop*."

We have not forgotten the gloss put upon this passage, by *Detector*, in the collection under review.

"The truth is," says he, "that Jerome affords no authority for this assertion. In his Epistle to Evag. he says, "Nam et Alexandriæ, a Marco Evangelista usque ad Heraclam et Dionysium Episcopos, Presbyteri semper unum ex se electum, excelsiori gradu collocatum, Episcopum *nominabant*, quomodo si exercitus imperatorem faciat, aut diaconi eligant de se quem industrium noverint, et archidiaconum vocent." "At Alex-

andria, from Mark down to Heraclas and Dionysius the Bishops, the Presbyters always *named* one, who being chosen from among themselves, they called their Bishop, he being placed in a higher station, in the same manner as if an army should make their general, &c." Does St. Jerome here declare, as the fictitious "Clemens" asserts, that "the Presbyters *ordained* their Bishop?" No; Jerome merely asserts, that the Presbyters *named*, *chose* one to be their Bishop. Does it hence follow, that they *gave him his commission;* that they *ordained* him? Does it *always* follow, that because an army choose their general, he does not receive his commission from the supreme authority of the state?"*

With all deference to this learned critic, we cannot help our opinion, that the appointment, or, if you please, ordination, of the first bishops by Presbyters, not only *follows* from the words of Jerome, but is plainly *asserted* by them.

Dr. Hobart, overlooking the Roman idiom, has thrown into his *English*, an ambiguity which does not exist in the *Latin* of Jerome. According to the well known genius of that language, especially in writers who condense their thoughts, a verb governing one or more participles, in the construction before us, expresses the same meaning, though with greater elegance, as would be expressed by verbs instead of participles.† It is

* Detector, No. 1. *Collec.* p. 84.

† Ex. gr. In Cæsar's description of the bridge which he constructed over the Rhine, the first sentence is exactly analogous to the sentence of Jerome: "Tigna bina sesquipedalia, paullum ab imo *præacuta*, *dimensa* ad altitudinem fluminis, intervallo pedum duorum inter se *jungebat*." *De Bello Gallico*. Lib. IV. c. 17. p. 187. *ed.* Oudenorpii. 4to. 1737.

very possible that the *Detector* might not use this construction; but then the *Detector* does not write Latin like old Jerome. We should display the sentence at length, converting the participles into verbs, were it not for fear of affronting a scholar who insists that he has "sufficient learning to defend the Episcopal church."*

"The truth is," that this "famous" testimony of Jerome, points out, in the process of bishop-making, but *one agency*, and that is the agency of *Presbyters*. Dr. H. himself has unwittingly confirmed our interpretation in the very paragraph where he questions it. His words are these: "Jerome merely asserts that the Presbyters *named*, *chose* one to be their bishop." Not *merely* this; for the words which Dr. H. renders "being placed in a higher station," are under the very same connection and government with the words which he renders, "being chosen from among themselves;" and if, as he has admitted, the latter declare a bishop to have been *elected* by the Presbyters, then, himself being judge, the former must declare him to have been *commissioned* by them. This is an awkward instance of *felo de se;* yet a proof, how properly the Reverend critic has assumed the ap-

We humbly apprehend that Cæsar had as much to do in *sharpening* and *measuring* the beams, as he had in *joining* them; and did not mean to say that the last operation was performed by his *own hands*, and the former by his *workmen*.

* Hobart's *Apology*, p. 20.

pellation of *Detector;* for he has completely *detected* himself, and no one else!

That we rightly construe Jerome's assertion, is clear, from the scope of his argument, and from his phrascology toward the close of the paragraph.

His position is, that a Bishop and a Presbyter were, at first, the same officer. And so notorious was the fact, that he appeals to the history of the church in Alexandria, as an instance which lasted a century and a half, that when Bishops were made, they were made by Presbyters. But had Dr. H.'s construction been right, had Prelates alone ordained other prelates, the fact, instead of being *for* Jerome, would have been directly *against* him: and surely he was not so dull as to have overlooked this circumstance; although it seems to have escaped the notice of some of his sagacious commentators.

Jerome says, moreover, that Presbyters originally became Bishops, much in the same way as if an army should "MAKE an Emperor; or the deacons should elect one of themselves, and call him *Arch-deacon.*"

The *Detector* has given the passage a *twist*, in the hope of *twisting* Jerome out, and *twisting* the hierarchy in. "Does it *always* follow," he demands, "that because an army choose their general, he does not receive his commission from the supreme authority of the state?" Certainly not: Although he would have gratified some of his

readers by producing examples of the armies of those ages choosing their general, and remitting him to a higher authority for his commission. But how came the *Detector* to alter Jerome's phrase from "*making*" to "*choosing*" a general? We always thought, that *making* and *commissioning* an officer, are the same thing. Further, how came the Detector to render Jerome's "*imperator*" by "*general?*" *Almost* all the world, (for the Detector seems to be an exception,) knows that "*Imperator*," in Jerome's day, signified not "general," but "*Emperor;*" and was the highest official title of the Roman monarchs. It is further known, that the army had, on more occasions than one, *made* an emperor; and that this was all the commission he had. "You inquire," says Jerome, "how the bishops were at first appointed. Suppose the deacons should get together and elect one of their number to preside over the rest, with the title of *Arch-deacon;* or suppose the army should elevate a person whom they thought fit, to the Imperial throne; just so, by their own authority and election, did the Presbyters make the first Bishops."—And yet Dr. H. can find, in this very testimony, a salvo for *Episcopal* ordination.—His powers of *detection* are very uncommon;

> For optics sharp he needs, I ween,
> Who sees what is not to be seen!

7. Jerome states it, as a *historical fact*, that even in his own day, that is, toward the end of the

fourth century, there was no power, excepting ordination, exercised by a Bishop, which might not be exercised by a Presbyter. "What does a Bishop," he asks, "excepting ordination, which a Presbyter *may not* do?"

Two observations force themselves upon us.

1st. Jerome challenges the whole world, to show in what prerogative a Presbyter was, at *that time*, inferiour to a Bishop, excepting the single power of ordination. A challenge which common sense would have repressed, had public opinion concerning the *rights* of Presbyters allowed it to be successfully met.

2d. Although it appears from Jerome himself, that the prelates were not then in the habit of associating the Presbyters with themselves, in an equal right of *government*, yet, as he told the former, to their faces, that the right was undeniable, and ought to be respected by them, it presents us with a strong fact in the *progress* of Episcopal domination. Here was a power in Presbyters, which, though undisputed, lay, for the most part, dormant. The transition from disuse, to denial, and from denial to extinction of powers which the possessors have not vigilance, integrity, or spirit to enforce, is natural, short, and rapid. According to Jerome's declaration, the hierarchy did not pretend to the exclusive right of government. Therefore, there was but *half* a hierarchy, according to the present system. That the Bishops had, some

time after, the powers of ordination and government both, is clear. How did they acquire the monopoly? By apostolic institution? No. Jerome refutes that opinion from the scriptures and history. By apostolical tradition? No. For in the latter part of the fourth century, their single prerogative over Presbyters was the power of ordination. Government was at first exercised by the Presbyters in common. When they had, by their own act, placed a superiour over their own heads, they rewarded his distinction, his toils, and his perils, with a proportionate reverence; they grew slack about the maintenance of troublesome privilege; till at length, their courtesy, their indolence, their love of peace, or their hope of promotion, permitted their high and venerable trust to glide into the hands of their prelates. We have no doubt that the course of the *ordaining power* was similar, though swifter.

Nothing can be more pointless and pithless than the declamation of Cyprian, the Layman, and their Bishop, on the *change* which took place in the original order of the church. They assume a *false fact*, to wit, that the change must have happened, if it happened at all, *instantaneously:* and then they expatiate, with great vehemence, on the *impossibility* of such an event. This is mere noise. The change was *not* instantaneous, nor sudden. The testimony of Jerome, which declares that it was *gradual*, has sprung a mine under the very

foundation of their edifice, and blown it into the air. Were we inclined to take up more of the reader's time on this topic, we might turn their own weapon, such as it is, against themselves. They do not pretend that Archbishops, Patriarchs, and Primates, are of Apostolical institution. They will not so insult the understanding and the senses of men, as to maintain that these officers have no more power than simple Bishops. Where, then, were all the principles of adherence to Apostlic order when these creatures of human policy made their entrance into the church? Among whom were the daring innovators to be found? Where was the learning of the age? Where its spirit of piety, and its zeal of martyrdom? Where were the Presbyters? Where the Bishops? What! all, all turned traitors at *once?* All, all conspire to abridge their own rights, and submit their necks to new-made superiours? What! *none* to reclaim or remonstrate? Absurd! Incredible! Impossible! These questions, and a thousand like them, might be asked by an advocate for the divine right of *Patriarchs*, with as much propriety and force as they are asked by advocates of the simpler Episcopacy. And so, by vociferating on *abstract principles*, the evidence of men's eyes and ears is to be overturned, and they are to believe that there are not now, and never have been, such things as Archbishops, Patriarchs, or Primates in the Christianized world;

seeing that by the *assumption* of the argument, they have no divine original; and by its *terms*, they could not have been introduced by mere human contrivance.

To return to Jerome. The Prelatists being unable to evade his testimony concerning the change which was effected in the original order of the church, would persuade us that he means a change brought about by the *authority of the Apostles* themselves.* But the subterfuge is unavailing. For,

(1.) It alleges a *conjectural tradition* against the authority of the *written scriptures*. For no trace of a change can be seen there.

(2.) It overthrows completely all the proof drawn for the hierarchy from the Apostolic records. For, if this change was introduced by the Apostles *after* their canonical writings were closed, then it is vain to seek for it in those writings. The consequence is, that the Hierarchists must either retreat from the New Testament, or abandon Jerome.

(3.) It makes the intelligent father a downright fool—to plead Apostolic authority for the original equality of ministers; and in the same breath to produce that same authority for the inequality which he was resisting!

(4.) To crown the whole, it tells us that the apostles having fixed, under the influence of *divine inspiration*, an order for the church; found, upon a few years' trial, that it would *not do*, and were

* Hobart's *Apology*, p. 174, &c.

obliged to mend it: only they forgot to apprise the churches of the alteration; and so left the exploded order *in* the rule of faith; and the new order *out* of it; depositing the commission of the prelates with that kind foster-mother of the hierarchy, *Tradition!**

We may now remind our reader of the Layman's declaration, that we "*can produce* NO *record of a* CHANGE; *but are obliged to* imagine *one, in opposition to the* UNIFORM *testimony of the primitive Fathers!*" And of the declaration of Cyprian, that we talk "*of a change that must have taken place at an early period; but can produce* NO PROOF on which *to ground our bold assertions*"—That we "*are countenanced by* NONE OF THE RECORDS *of these times that have been transmitted to us*"—That our opinion is "*mere conjecture, a creature of the imagination!!*" These gentlemen have, indeed, made their excuse; they have honestly told us, what their pages verify, that they are but "striplings" in literature. But that a prelate, from whom we have a right to look for digested knowledge, and scrupulous accuracy, should deal out the same crude and unqualified language, excites both surprise and regret. He has been pleased to say, that our late brother, the Rev. DR. LINN, in "*representing Jerome as favouring the Presbyterian scheme of church go-*

* If any of our readers wishes to have a fuller view of the writings of the hierarchy on Jerome's spear, we advise him to read Dr. Hobart's Apology, p. 174—194.

vernment," has "*pursued the usual mode of* ARTFUL MISREPRESENTATION." With *whom* the *misrepresentation* lies, we leave to public opinion. But as we wish to give every one his due, we cannot charge the Right Reverend Prelate with any *art;* nor withhold an advice, that when he is searching, on this subject, for a "spark of modesty," he would direct his inquiries to a "bosom" to which he has much easier access, than to the bosom of any Presbyterian under heaven.

After this exhibition of Jerome's testimony, it would be superfluous to follow with particular answers, all the petty exceptions which are founded upon vague allusions and incidental phrases. Jerome, like every other writer upon subjects which require a constant reference to surrounding habits, conforms his speech to his circumstances. He could not be for ever on his guard; and if he had been, no vigilance could have secured him from occasional expressions which might be interpreted as favourable to a system which he solemnly disapproved. This will sufficiently account for those disconnected sentences which the friends of the hierarchy have so eagerly seized. We could show, taking them one by one, that they fall very far short of the mark to which they are directed.*

* The quotation which stands most in the way of our argument, and of Jerome's testimony, is from his "Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers;" where, says Dr. Hobart, "he *records* as a *matter* of fact, 'JAMES, immediately after our Lord's ascension, having been

When we want to know a man's matured thoughts on a disputed point, we must go to those parts of his works where he has deliberately, and of set purpose, handled it. All his looser observations must be controlled by these. A contrary procedure inverts every law of criticism; and the inversion is not the more tolerable, or the less reprehensible, because advocates of the hierarchy have chosen to adopt it. But if Jerome's testimony is to be slighted, because he was fervid, impetuous, and unceremonious, we much fear that some of the most important facts in ecclesiastical and civil history must be branded as apocryphal. We are very sure that none of Dr. H.'s friends could ask

ORDAINED BISHOP OF JERUSALEM, undertook the charge of the church at Jerusalem. TIMOTHY was ORDAINED BISHOP *of the Ephesians by* PAUL, TITUS of *Crete.* POLYCARP was by JOHN ORDAINED BISHOP of Smyrna.' Here, then," the reader perceives the triumph, " here, then, we have *bishops* ordained in the churches by the apostles themselves." HOBART'S *Apology*, p. 194.

There is a small circumstance rather unfavourable to this voucher.—It is not JEROME'S. Of that part which relates to Timothy and Titus, this is expressly asserted by the episcopal historian, CAVE; and by Jerome's popish editor. Vide CAVE, *Script. eccles. hist. litter.* p. 172, *ed. Colon.* 1720. HIERON. *Opp. T. I.* p. 265. 268. *ed. Victorii.* The articles JAMES and POLYCARP are so precisely in the same style with the others, and so diametrically repugnant to Jerome's own doctrine, that if, by "*bishop,*" is meant such a bishop as was known in his day, it is inconceivable they should have proceeded from his pen. That they are interpolations, or have been interpolated, we think there is internal evidence. At least, when several articles of the same catalogue, tending to the *same point*, and written in the *same strain*, are confessedly spurious; it is hardly safe to rely upon the remainder as authentic testimony.

the credence of the world to a single assertion in his Apology. And if similar productions were the fashion of the day, we have no reason to wonder at indignant feeling and vehement language in men of a less fiery spirit than father JEROME.

The advocates of Episcopacy assert that the whole current of fact and of opinion for *fifteen hundred years* after Christ, is in their favour; that we "can produce *no* record of a *change*," in the government of the church, "but are obliged to *imagine* one in opposition to the *uniform* testimony of the primitive fathers."

We have met them on this ground; and have "produced" the "testimony" of one of the "primitive fathers," directly against the divine original of the hierarchy. This was JEROME, the most learned, able, and distinguished of them all. He tells us, in so many words, not only that the episcopal pre-eminence is without divine authority; but that this was a fact which could not, with any show of reason, be disputed; as being a fact well ascertained and understood. "The Presbyters," says he, "*know*, that they are subjected *by the custom of the church*, to him who is set over them."*

To elude the force of Jerome's deposition, it is alleged, among other things, that his opinion is of no weight unsupported by facts; and that his testimony, in the fourth century, concerning facts in the first and second centuries, that is, two or three

* See page

hundred years before he was born, is no better than an opinion; and so he is excluded from the number of competent witnesses.*

By this rule some other witnesses who have been summoned by our Episcopal brethren, must be cast without a hearing. Eusebius, Chrysostom, Augustin, Theodoret, Epiphanius, must all be silenced. It is even hard to see how a single man could be left, in the whole catalogue of the Fathers, as competent to certify any fact of which he was not an eye-witness. To say that they derived their information of times past from credible tradition, or authentic records, is indeed to overrule the principle of the objection. But when this door is opened to admit the others, you cannot prevent Jerome from walking in. We will allow that Eusebius had access to "all the necessary records of the churches." But had Jerome no records to consult? Was "the most learned of all the Christians," as Erasmus calls him, with Cave's approbation, in the habit of asserting historical facts without proof? If he was, let our opponents show it. If he was not, as his high reputation for learning is a pledge, then his testimony is to be viewed as a summary of inductive evidence reaching back to the days of the Apostles. In his estimation, the facts of the original parity of ministers, and of the subsequent elevation of prelates

* Cyprian, No. VII. Essays, p. 167. Hobart's Apology, p. 171—178.

by the *custom of the church*, were so undeniable, that he did not think it worth his while to name a document. The conduct of this great man was different from that of some very confident writers whom we could mention. He sifted his authorities, and then brought forward his facts without any specific reference, instead of making stiff assertions upon the credit of authors, whom he never read, nor even consulted.

Jerome, we contend, is not only as good a witness in the case before us, as Eusebius or any other father, but that he is a far better and more unexceptionable witness than either that renowned historian, or any other prelate or friend of prelates. Whatever Eusebius, Chrysostom, Epiphanius, Theodoret, &c. testify in *favour* of episcopacy, must be received with this very important qualification, that they were *themselves bishops;* and were testifying in favour of their *own* titles, emolument, grandeur, and power. They had a very deep interest at stake. An interest sufficient, if not to shake their credibility on this point, yet greatly to reduce its value. On the contrary, Jerome had nothing to gain, but much to lose. He put his interest and his peace in jeopardy. He had to encounter the hostility of the episcopal order, and of all who aspired to its honours. He had to resist the growing encroachments of corruption, and that under the formidable protection of a civil establishment. He had, therefore, every possible

inducement to be *sure of his facts* before he attacked a set of dignitaries who were not, in his age, the most forbearing of mankind.* The conclusion is, that JEROME, as we said, is a more unexceptionable witness than any prelate. To illustrate—let us suppose a tribunal erected in England to try this question, *Is Episcopacy of divine institution?* that no witnesses can be procured but such as were brought up in the church itself; and that the judges were obliged to depend upon their report of facts. The bishop of Durham is sworn, and deposes that he has examined the records of the church, and finds her to have been episcopal from the beginning. A presbyter of the same church, of equal talent, learning, and application, is sworn, and deposes that he too has examined the records, and finds that, at the beginning, these Christian ministers were of equal rank; but that by degrees inequality crept in; and that the bishops have no pre-eminence but what the custom of the church has given them. In general character, for integrity, the witnesses are equal. They flatly contradict each other. Who, now, is the most credible witness? The presbyter runs the hazard of almost every thing in life by *his* testimony. The testimony of my lord of Durham goes to protect his own dignity in the church; his seat in the house of peers; and a revenue of £20,000 sterling, per annum. A child can decide who is

* MOSHEIM, Vol. I. p. 356.

most worthy of credit. Nearly such is the difference between the witnesses for Episcopacy, and JEROME, the witness for Presbytery.

But we waive our advantage. We shall lay no stress upon JEROME's *opinion.* We shall cut off from his deposition every thing but what came within his personal observation. "The presbyters," says he, "*know* that they are subject to their bishop, by the custom of the church." His testimony embraces a fact in existence and obvious at the time of deposition; viz. the knowledge which the presbyters of *his day* had of their being subject to their bishops, solely by the custom of the church, and not by Christ's appointment. This assertion is correct, or it is not. If it is not, then JEROME appealed to all the world for the truth of what he knew, and every body else knew, was an absurd lie. No brass on the face of impudence, inferiour to that of the Duc de Cadore, is brazen enough for this. On the other hand, if the assertion be correct, how is this knowledge "of the presbyters" to be explained? Where did they get it? From one of two sources. Either there must have been such a previous discussion of the subject, as ended in establishing a general conviction in the minds of the Christian clergy, that prelacy is a human invention; or which is more probable, the remnants and the recollection of the primitive order still subsisted in considerable vigour, not-

withstanding the rapid growth of the hierarchy since the accession of Constantine.

It is inconceivable how JEROME should tell the bishops to their faces, that Christ never gave them any superiority over the presbyters; that custom was their only title; and that the presbyters were perfectly aware of this; unless he was supported by facts which they were unable to contradict. Their silence under his challenges, is more than a presumption that they found it wise to let him alone. It amounts to little short of absolute proof, that there was yet such a mass of information concerning their rise, and so much of unsubdued spirit in the church, as rendered it dangerous to commit their claim to the issue of free inquiry. JEROME, with the register of antiquity in his hand, and the train of presbyters at his back, was too potent an adversary. They could have crushed the man; but they trembled at the truth; and so they sat quietly down, leaving to time and habit, the confirmation of an authority which they did not, as yet, venture to derive from the word of God.

In the next age, when JEROME was dead, the presbyters cowed; and the usurpation of the prelates further removed from the reach of a reforming hand; EPIPHANIUS did, it is true, bluster at no ordinary rate against the "heretic" AERIUS; for what reason we shall shortly see. But it is very remarkable, that in the fourth century, when the pretensions of the prelates were pretty openly can-

vassed, they spoke with great caution, and with manifest reluctance on those parts of Scripture which touch the point of parity. Let any one, for example, look at the commentaries of Chrysostom on the epistles to Timothy and Titus. Copious and fluent on other passages, he is most concise and embarrassed on those which relate to ministerial rank. Something he was obliged to say: but the plain words of the apostle exhibit a picture so unlike the hierarchy, that the eloquent patriarch, under the semblance of interpretation, throws in a word or two to blind the eyes of his readers, and shuffles off to something else; but never so much as attempts to argue the *merits* of the question upon scriptural ground. This is the reverse of Jerome's practice in his exposition. At this early day we find the advocate for parity boldly appealing to Scripture; examining, comparing, and reasoning upon its decisions; and the prelatical expounder skipping away from it with all possible haste and dexterity. We leave the reader to draw his own inference.

The sentiment that Prelates are superiour to Presbyters, not by any divine appointment, but merely by the prevalence of custom, extended, among the Latins of the fourth century, much further than Father Jerome. He himself tells us, that the Presbyters of his day not only *thought* so, but *knew* so; and, assuming this as an incontrovertible fact, he grounds upon it an admonition to

the Bishops to recollect their origin. "Let them know," says he, "that they are above the Presbyters more by the custom of the Church, than by any institution of Christ." Considering him as an honest witness, which is all we ask, and our Episcopal friends will not deny it, he asserts, without qualification, that the Presbyters, i. e. the *mass of Christian clergy*, in his time, were convinced, upon satisfactory proof, that the authority exercised over them by the prelates, limited, as it *then* was, and nothing like what they *now* claim, had no warrant whatever, either in the word of God, or even in apostolical tradition! We repeat it; the great body of the Christian clergy, according to JEROME, were aware of this!! Here, since they call for *facts*, here is a fact more ponderous than all the facts of Episcopacy put together; a fact which there is no frittering away, not even by the force of that vigorous criticism which inverts persons and tenses; transmutes Hebrew verbs into others with which they have no affinity; and changes the very letters of the Hebrew alphabet; so that a ז (*zain*,) is charmed into a נ (*nun*,) and, by this happy metamorphosis, the throat of an ill-conditioned argument escapes from suffocation!*

The testimony of JEROME is corroborated by a contemporary writer of high renown, and an unexceptionable witness in this case, as being him-

* *Churchman's Magazine* for May and June, 1810. on Exod. xxxiii. 19. p. 178.

self a Prelate; we mean AUGUSTIN, the celebrated Bishop of Hippo. In a letter to JEROME, he has these remarkable words:—

"Although, according to the names of honour "which the *usage of the Church has* NOW *acquired*, the office of a Bishop is greater than that of a Presbyter, yet in many things Augustin is inferiour to Jerome."* The sense of this acknowledgment is thus given by a distinguished Prelate of the Church of England, as quoted by Ayton:—"The office of a Bishop is above the office of a Priest, not by the authority of the Scripture, but after the names of honour which, through the custom of the Church, have now obtained."†

The concession is so clear and ample, that Cardinal BELLARMINE, with all his integrity, which was not a little, had no other evasion, than to pretend that these words *are not opposed to the ancient time of the Church;* but to the *time before the Christian Church; so that the sense is, before the times of the Christian Church these names*, Bishop *and* Presbyter, *were not titles of honour, but of office and age; but now they are names of honour and dignity.*‡

Quibbles were scarce when a distressed cardinal could muster up nothing more plausible. As

* Quanquam secundum honorum vocabula quæ *jam Ecclesiæ usus obtinuit*, episcopatus presbyterio major sit; tamen in multis rebus Augustinus Hieronymo minor est. *Ep.* 19. *ed* HIERON.

† JEWEL. Defence of his apology, p. 122, 123.

‡ *Jameson's Nazianzeni querela*, p. 177, 178.

if names of *office* were not names of *dignity !* As if Augustin, in the very act of paying a tribute of profound respect to Jerome, should think of giving him a bit of grammar lesson about the words "Bishop" and "Presbyter!" Verily, the Jesuit was in sore affliction; and had he uttered all his soul, would have exclaimed, like a certain *Arminian* preacher, when hard pressed by Scriptural reasoning;—"O argument, argument! The Lord rebuke thee, argument!"

Not much happier than the cardinal, nor much less anxious for such a rebuke to argument than the Arminian preacher, will be those critics who shall maintain that Augustin's words regard only the *names* of office, without any opinion on the powers or rank of the offices themselves.

1. Such a construction makes the Bishop assert a direct falsehood; the *terms* were in use from the beginning of the Christian Church; and, therefore, could not have been introduced by her customs.

2. If, by saying that he was superiour to Jerome "according to the names of honour which the Church had obtained by usage," Augustin meant that he enjoyed only a *titular* pre-eminence over that Presbyter, he either insulted Jerome by flouting at him with a lie in the shape of a compliment, or else the Prelates in his day had only a *nominal*, and not a real, power over the Presbyters. The

second is contrary to fact; and the first is too absurd for even a troubled cardinal.

If, on the other hand, it be alleged that Augustin, in flattery to Jerome, seemed to claim only a titular precedence, while he was conscious, at the same time, of enjoying an essential superiority, and that by divine right, the disputant will turn himself out of the frying pan into the fire; for he exhibits the venerable father as acting the knave for the pleasure of proving himself to be a fool. So paltry a trick was not calculated to blow dust into the eyes of Jerome. The distinction might appear ingenious to some modern champions of the hierarchy, as it is much in their manner; but could never degrade the pen of the Bishop of Hippo. He is contrasting his *official* superiority over Jerome, with Jerome's *personal* superiority over himself. The former is the superiority of a Bishop over a Presbyter, which, he says, has grown out of the custom of the Church. The compliment to Jerome consists in this—that while the office which sets him above Jerome was the fruit, not of his own deserts, but of the Church's custom, those things which gave Jerome *his* superiority, were personal merits. The compliment is as fine, and its form as delicate, as the spirit which dictated it is magnanimous.

But our concern is with the *fact* which it discloses. Turn Augustin's words into a syllogism, and it will stand thus:

Augustin is greater than Jerome, according to the honours which have been created by the custom of the Church.

But Augustin is greater than Jerome, as a Bishop is greater than a Presbyter.

Therefore, a Bishop is greater than a Presbyter by the custom of the Church.

Here, now, is Augustin himself, a Bishop of no common character, disclaiming, unequivocally, the institution of Episcopacy by divine right: For he refers the distinction between Bishop and Presbyter not only to a merely human original, but to an original the least imperative; to one which, however potent it becomes in the lapse of time, is at first too humble to arrogate authority, too feeble to excite alarm, and too noiseless almost to attract notice. He calls it the creature of *custom*. What shall we say to this testimony of Augustin? He was under no necessity of revealing his private opinion. He had no temptation to sap the foundation of his own edifice; to diminish the dignity of his own order. All his interests and his prejudices lay in the opposite direction. Yet he speaks of Episcopacy as the child of custom, in the most frank and unreserved manner; without an apology, without a qualification, without a caution. He does this in a letter to Jerome, the very man to whom, upon *modern* Episcopal principles, he should not, would not, and could not have done it—the very man who had openly, and boldly, and repeat-

edly attacked the whole hierarchy; whose sentiments, reasonings, and proofs, were no secret to others, and could be none to him—the very man, whose profound research, whose vigorous talent, and whose imposing name, rendered him the most formidable adversary of the prelature, and threatened to sway more decisively the public opinion, than a thousand inferiour writers—the very man, therefore, whom it became his duty to resist. Yet to this man does Augustin, the Bishop, write a letter in which he assigns to Episcopacy the very same origin which Jerome himself had ascribed to it—*human custom!!*

Was Augustin ignorant? Was he treacherous? Was he cowardly? Was he mad? To write in this manner to Jerome! and to write it with as much composure, and *sang froid*, as he would have alluded to any the most notorious fact in existence! No. He was not ignorant, nor treacherous, nor cowardly, nor mad. But he spoke, in the honesty of his heart, what he knew to be true; and what no well advised man would think of denying. Such a concession, from such a personage, at such a time, under such circumstances, is conclusive. It shows, that in his day, the Bishops of the Latin Church did not dream of asserting their superiority to Presbyters by divine right. They had it from the custom of the Church, and so long as that custom was undisturbed, it was enough for them. Among the Greeks, the blundering, and

hair-brained Epiphanius set up the claim of a *jus divinum;* but his contemporaries were discreet enough to let him fight so foolish a battle single handed.

To Jerome and Augustin we may add Pelagius, once their intimate friend, and afterwards, on account of his heresy, their sworn enemy. "He restricts all Church officers to *priest* and *deacon:** and asserts, that *priests*, without discrimination or restriction, are the *successors of the apostles.*"† He has more to the same purpose; reasoning as Jerome reasoned, from the Scriptures; and coming, as did Sedulius, Primasius, and others, to the same result; viz. the identity of Bishop and Presbyters.‡

Let not the *heresy* of Pelagius be objected to us. Our Arminians will not surely cast opprobrium upon the name of this, their ancient sire. For our parts, we, with Augustin, hold him in detestation, as an enemy of the grace of God. But his heresy does not vitiate his testimony in the present case. Fiercely as he was attacked by Jerome and Augustin, his opinions on the subject of Prelacy made no article of accusation against him as a heretic. Could it have been done with any show of reason, we may be certain it would not have been spared. But the silence of his Prelatical

* In Rom. xii. † In 1 Cor. i.

‡ Not having access to these writers, we quote from *Jameson's Nazianzen:* p. 176, 177.

antagonists, on that head, is a proof both of the justness of our foregoing comments on Augustin's letter, and also of the general fact, that the Bishops were conscious of their inability to meet the question of their order upon the ground of divine right.

There are two considerations which clothe our argument with additional force.

The *first* is, that all *able* heretics, as Pelagius confessedly was, in their assault upon the Church of God, direct their batteries against those points in which they deem her to be the least defensible Rightly judging, that it is good policy to make a breach, no matter where. Only unsettle the popular mind as to any one object which it has been accustomed to venerate, and the perversion of it with regard to many others, is much facilitated. If, in this policy, *Pelagius* and his coadjutors attacked the authority of the Bishops, they seized upon the defenceless spot; and the bishops were beaten without a struggle. It is easy to perceive what an immense advantage was gained by the heretics in their grand conflict, when their opponents were put fairly in the wrong on an incidental point, but a point which, in itself, touched the very nerves of the public passions.

The *second* consideration is, that persons of such different conditions, and such hostile feelings, could never have united in a common opinion upon a deeply interesting topic, had not the facts upon

which their union rested been perfectly indisputable.

Here is Presbyter and Prelate; the monk of Palestine, and the African Bishop; orthodoxy and heresy; Augustin and Pelagius; all combining in one and the same declaration—that Episcopacy has no better original than the *custom of the Church!* Nothing but truth—acknowledged truth—truth which it was vain to doubt, could have brought these jarring materials into such a harmony; these discordant spirits into such a concurrence.—Stronger evidence it is hardly possible to obtain; and it would be the very pertness of incredulity to demand. Yet there are writers who do not blush to look us in the face, and assert that the testimony of the primitive Fathers is *universally* in favour of Episcopacy, as having been established by Christ and his apostles!!*

Does the sun shine? Is the grass green? Are stones hard? Another shove, and we shall be in Dean Berkeley's ideal world!—If every thing sober and solid is to be thus outfaced, there is nothing for it, but to abandon fact and demonstration as chimeras, and to take up what was once the ditty of a fool, but is now the best philosophy,

Παντα κονις, και παντα ΓΕΛΩΣ, και παντα το ΜΗΔΕΝ.

* Essays, p. 135.

CONSIDERATIONS ON LOTS.

CONSIDERATIONS ON LOTS.

No. I.

The frequency of public lotteries, the enormous system of private frauds which has grown out of them, the extensive ramifications of their *principle* through the community, and the facility with which many well disposed persons are seduced into the support of that principle, seem to require an investigation of the true nature and use of the *lot*. We shall accordingly devote some papers to that subject.

A lot is an action, intended to decide a point without the aid of human skill or power. This definition includes every form of the lot, or every decision which in common language, is said to be *left to chance*. Thus, whether the lot or the chance consist in drawing a ticket at random out of the lottery-wheel, after it has been turned

round to prevent collusion, or in the position of a die which is thrown after rattling it in the box, or in the particular distribution of cards after a promiscuous shuffle, or in the tossing up of a piece of money, is a matter of no moment. The principle of the action is still the same; the decision to be effected is put avowedly out of the control of human skill and power.

My design is to show that every such action, that is, every lot, is a direct appeal to the living God, as the governor of the world, and that his holy providence is concerned in the event.

For, if it be not an appeal to God, what is it? Not a reference to the tribunal of men; for it is so constructed as purposely to exclude their jurisdiction. Not a reference to any other creatures superior to man; for it would suppose them to be omnipresent, which is an attribute of Deity. Not a reference to nothing; for that is a contradiction. Not a reference to chance; for that is atheism. There is, indeed, much talk of chance: and, in its popular use, signifying something which happens in a manner unforeseen by us, the term is harmless enough. But when used philosophically, that is, when applied to the doctrine of cause and effect, it is either absurd or blasphemous. For what is this chance? It either has a real existence or not. If it has no existence, then when you say that a lot is determined by chance, you say that it is determined

by nothing: that is, you say here is a sensible effect produced by no cause at all. This is pure nonsense. If your chance is a real being, what sort of being? Either it has life, intelligence, and power, or not. If not, then you say that millions of effects (for there are millions of lots in the world) are produced by a cause which has neither power, nor intelligence, nor life: that is, you say, that millions of actions are performed by an agency which is essentially incapable of any action whatever. And this is as pure absurdity as the former. If you say that your chance is a living, intelligent, and active being, I ask who it is? and how you got your knowledge of it? You certainly imagine it to possess omnipresence and omnipotence; for you suppose it capable of producing, at the same moment, millions of effects in millions of places; and thus you have found out a being that displays perfections of God, and yet is not God. This conclusion is as blasphemous as the others are insane. There is no retreat. Survey the subject in any possible light, and you are driven to this issue, that the lot is, by the very nature of the case, a direct appeal to the living God, as the Governor of the world.

As the appeal is to him, so his providence regulates the event.

To many it seems irrational that the High and Lofty One who inhabits eternity should descend

to our little affairs, and take cognizance of things which minister to our amusement or agitate our passions. They can conceive of a providence which keeps worlds in their sphere and legislates for the universe. This general government fills them with magnificent ideas, worthy as they think of the Supreme; but to such petty concerns as the common incidents of human life, they judge it beneath his majesty and felicity to attend!

This sort of argumentation is not the only instance in which atheism puts on the cloak of reverence for God. I do not assert that all who adopt such notions are atheists, but that the doctrine itself is atheistical there can be no doubt. It makes a distinction between a *general* and a *particular* providence, admitting the former and exploding the latter. We are to believe, then, that Jehovah rules the *whole* of his universe but not its *parts;* or that he has fixed certain laws by which its operations go on independently of his interposition. A fine world of creatures truly, that can "live, and move, and have their being," in a state of complete separation from the influence of their Creator! According to this scheme, he has had no sort of interest in them from the moment he gave them out of his plastic hand, and never shall have any during the whole period of their being. And as for those who dream of his presiding over suns and

stars, without noticing the puny inhabitants of our globe, they might with equal reason dream of his creating suns and stars without his having created men, or beasts, or insects, at all. That which it was not unworthy of him to create, it is not unworthy of him to preserve and govern. It would surely be inverting all propriety to maintain, that in proportion as creatures are feeble, they can dispense with his fostering care; and that rational creatures, formed for immortality, are exempted from the empire of his law. For however artfully the sophist may play off his quibbles, a sound mind will perceive that, without a particular providence, man cannot be accountable.

This doctrine of a providence extending even to the most trivial occurrences pervades the system of revelation, and is stated in the scriptures with the utmost precision and perspicuity. *I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil.* I, JEHOVAH, *do all these things.* (Is. xlv. 7.) *Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they* (the young animals) *are created; and thou renewest the face of the earth.* (Ps. civ. 30.) *Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father: but the very hairs of your head are all numbered.* (Mat. x. 29, 30.) What can be of less importance than the perishing of a sparrow? What more worthless than

a hair of one's head? And yet, the Truth itself being witness, both are objects of the divine regard. "It accords with the most liberal spirit of philosophy to believe, that not a stone can fall or plant rise without the immediate agency of divine power."* This is good sense, and Christianity owns it all. If, then, the providence of God directs and disposes all other, the most minute events, by what reasoning shall it be proved to have no concern with lots? especially as he has declared the lot to be under his immediate inspection? *The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord.* (Prov. xvi. 33.) This will be decisive with him who in simplicity and reverence inquires after the truth. But as there are captious spirits which seek to hide themselves in the mist of objections, and as arguments addressed to the love of dissipation and of gain are apt to make "the worse appear the better reason," we shall pursue a little farther the denial of such a providence as embraces the drawing of a ticket or the cast of a die.

To deny, then, that the divine providence is concerned in decisions obtained by lot, is to deny that it has any concern with individuals or their actions. For it cannot be shown that the government of God affects *any* individual or *any*

* Malthus. Essay on the Principle of Population. Vol. II. p. 67.

action, but upon the broad principle of its extending to *every* individual and *every* action. If this position is incorrect, a line of distinction must be drawn between persons and actions that *are* and *are not* under his immediate control. If there are individuals to whom his providence, which is another name for the administration of his government, does not reach, then all such individuals are exempted from the obligation of his law, and are neither accountable nor dependent. For it is absurd to talk of dependence, and law, and responsibility, while you exclude the only agency which, by ascertaining facts, motives, and character, can lay the basis of a perfect judgment.

If, on the other hand, the divine providence embraces all *persons*, but not all *actions*, it follows that the actions thus omitted are not subject to the divine law; and, of course, that men are at one period of their lives amenable to God for their conduct, and at another period are not amenable. And between these two states of being *with* and *without* law to God they are perpetually vibrating. But how are they to know when these alterations take place? God has not revealed it, and they cannot discover it for themselves. But no judicious man can be reconciled to so miserable a subterfuge from a pinching argument. It will not bear examination for a single moment. The alternative is,

that the providence of God directs every thing or nothing. If the former, then even the casting of a die; if the latter, we are plunged into atheism at once; for a God who does not govern the world is no God at all.

Perhaps it will be urged, that the Creator has "fixed certain laws in the physical world; that the doctrine of chances, founded upon these laws, is a subject of calculation; and that their operation is the only thing to be seen in the combination of chances."

I assent to the proposition, but contend that the objection grounded upon it is either futile or impious.

Futile—for it amounts to no more than this, that the Most High acts by *second* causes; unless, indeed, they can act *without* him. The objection, to have any force, must mean that they *can* so act; and then,

It is impious—for it strikes at the *whole government of God*, in so far as it is carried on through the medium of physical laws. To repeat the substance of a remark already made, if his providence has no concern in one, two, or twenty actions or events, occurring according to physical laws, it is equally unconcerned in *all* such events and actions; and thus we arrive at the old inference, that God has nothing to do with us nor our affairs. This mode of reasoning, pushed a little farther, will expel every thing

but physical laws out of the universe. If I may shut my Maker out of all events happening according to these laws, why not myself and every other rational agent? And if I set my neighbor's house on fire, or cut his throat, why not refer these things to the class of facts happening according to the laws of muscular motion? You shall not tell me that my rational and moral nature acted through the instrumentality of the firebrand or the knife; because this is to assert what you have just denied, viz. that intelligent and moral power acts by physical means. On my principles I admit your solution, but then it spoils your philosophy; for I shall as soon believe that an axe can hew wood without the agency of man, as that physical events can be produced, or physical law exist, without the agency of God. And I shall as soon deny the hewing of wood with an axe in my hand to be my own act, as deny the production of an event by physical laws to be an act of the divine providence. In truth, all moral order is maintained, and all moral events come to pass, by the intervention of physical law. And thus the conclusion forces itself upon us, that the disposing of the lot is as much the act of God, as if he were to perform it by some visible interposition. And therefore a wanton or needless appeal to him by the lot is a *profanation of his name.*

It will not avail to plead, "the unseemliness of supposing that men of profane minds can, whenever they please, *compel* the Almighty to become umpire between them." The same objection applies to the *oath.* Shall men of profane minds compel the Almighty at their pleasure to ascend his throne of judgment, and decide on perjuries and blasphemies? Such language is irreverent and ought not to be uttered. The plea, however, may be retorted. Shall the laws of God's world be suspended, or his ordinary agency interrupted, because men choose to be wicked? Shall they oblige him to work miracles in order to keep himself out of the way so often as they incline to sport with his providence? Nay, his appointments stand. His laws go on. His agency in them ceases not for a moment. And if men convert them to an unholy use, he will not alter his course to prevent either their crime or their punishment.

To exhibit this matter in another light. If the divine providence is not to be considered in the lot, why is it to be considered in any other action? And if in no other, upon what principle can there be any religious worship? Why should men pray? Is the Most High to leave them in their pastimes and sins, and come at their beck in the hour of trouble? How can there be any future retribution? For this proceeds upon the supposition of God's perpetual presence and

agency; as there is none in earth or heaven, but himself, who can render to every one according to his works.

The sum is, that against the interposition of God's providence in the decision by lot, there can be advanced no arguments which do not lead directly to atheism. Consequently, all such arguments are false; and a decision by the lot is a decision of God's own providence. And as the lot, in every form and under all circumstances, is an appeal to him, it ought to be employed in a manner suitable to its nature. What the proper use of the lot is, and how it is abused at the expense of much sin, shall be pointed out hereafter.

No. II.

It has already been proved from the very nature of the thing, that a lot is, in every form and upon every occasion, an appeal to the Most High God as the Governor of the world, and that the decision obtained by it is to be regarded as his decision. My doctrine, however, comes clothed with an authority much higher than that of argument, the authority of his own oracles. *The*

lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. (Prov. xvi. 33.) This *whole disposing*, a good translation from a term of great latitude, cannot comprehend less than the following declarations:

1. That as soon as the lot leaves the hands of men, it passes into the hand of God.

2. That the direction of it to its issue is his own act; and,

3. That he acknowledges the result as a judgment given by himself.

Can there remain any doubt on this point with a serious mind? Is there any suspicion that the reasoning upon it may have been overstrained, or the sense of the passage just quoted mistaken? Let us compare them with scriptural facts.

The patriarch Jacob, on his dying bed, foretold by the spirit of prophecy the future condition of his sons, and even marked out the districts which some of them should inhabit. Moses, in his parting blessing, was equally particular with respect to certain of the tribes. And yet the land of their inheritance, by a statute of Moses himself, was directed to be *divided by lot:* and was actually so divided under the inspection of Joshua, Eleazer, and the principal men of the nation. Thus, also, in the election of the first king of Israel, Saul, the son of Kish, a Benjamite, was pointed out to Samuel the prophet by special revelation, as the man whom God had

designated for that high station. For *The Lord had told Samuel in his ear, saying, To-morrow, about this time, I will send thee a man out of the land of Benjamin, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel. And when Samuel,* the next day, *saw Saul, the Lord said unto him, Behold the man whom I spake to thee of! This same shall reign over my people.* In pursuance of this intimation Samuel took Saul apart, and poured a phial of oil upon his head, and kissed him, and said, *Is it not because the Lord hath anointed thee to be captain over his inheritance?*

This affair, the reader will notice, was between Samuel and the new monarch alone, as the former had, of set purpose, excluded all witnesses. It appears also to have been kept a profound secret. For when God had given to Saul "another heart," and the prophetic spirit had fallen upon him, the people were astonished, and *said one to another, What is this that is come unto the son of Kish?* But had they known the nature of the interview between him and Samuel, they would have been prepared for this singular, and to them inexplicable, occurrence.

Shortly after these transactions, the good old prophet assembled the tribes of Israel, before God, in Mizpeh; and when he had, in the most dignified manner, but without success, remonstrated against their folly and their sin in reject-

ing their God, and desiring a king, he ordered them to present themselves by their tribes, and to choose their king by *lot*. The tribes came near; the lot was cast; and fell first on the tribe, next on the family, and finally on the person, of Saul.

Other instances are at hand, but these two are sufficient. The certainty of the event is previously ascertained in both, by the testimony of God; and yet the lot is cast in the same manner as if nothing had been revealed! Who does not see, that the credit of his prophets and the truth of their inspiration, were put, by such a proceeding, to the most hazardous of all possible experiments. Who does not see, in the exact coincidence of the sortilege with the prediction, a divine finger directing the lot to that same issue which a divine prescience had foretold? The alternative is plain. You must either deny the scriptural narrative to be true, or you must concede that the "whole disposing of these lots was from the Lord." Samuel exclaimed, when Saul was produced to the people, *See ye him, whom the Lord hath chosen?* They knew of no choice but that of the *lot*. They never so much as hesitated whether it was the divine act or not. Nor was their opinion at all uncommon. The very same opinion runs through the whole history of lots as recorded in the Bible. And, by the way, it is not impertinent to ask, How such

a notion took possession of the minds of men? To say that superstition early prevailed, and that it easily corrupts the moral and intellectual powers, may satisfy an infidel, but not an inquirer, far less a thinker. Superstition obscures, abuses, and degrades, whatever it touches, but it creates nothing. It misapplies, and throws into a thousand absurd contortions, the religious character of man; but without the pre-existence of that character it can have no materials to act upon. The lot could never have been an engine of superstition; I will add, could never have found its way into sober discussion, and thence into foolish pastime, but in consequence of a deep laid conviction that it is a mode of manifesting the divine will. Ring the changes upon the word superstition as often and as loud as you please; you do but beg the question; you give no explanation; you are not a hair's breadth nearer the solution of the problem. Besides, in the cases which we have examined, there was no room for superstition. It is not the attribute of that blind and senseless tyranny to look into the secrets of a future age; and the coincidences between the prophecy and the lot, both in the division of Canaan and the elevation of Saul, were too many, too minute, and too public, to have been either fortuitous or fraudulent. What remains, but that the conviction of which we are speaking could have had no other origin

than a faith in the particular providence of God, commingling with affairs apparently the most casual, overruling them to a proper termination, and instamping the lesson upon the use of the lot? This beautifully elucidates certain scriptural phraseologies which otherwise are hardly intelligible. *Thou sustainest* MY LOT. *Thou shalt stand in* THY LOT. *The rod of the wicked shall not rest upon the* LOT *of the righteous.* INHERITANCE (LOT) *among them that are sanctified. Giving thanks unto the Father who hath made us meet to be partakers of the* INHERITANCE (LOT) *of the saints in light. Neither as being lords over God's* HERITAGE (LOTS).

How could men ever have submitted their wishes, their reason, their fortunes, their lives, to the lot, without a strong assurance that the wise and righteous God speaks by it? How could the term "lot" have been adopted to signify their condition and circumstances, as ordered by his providence, without a settled belief that the lot is regulated by his providence? Or, if this belief is erroneous, how could it have been admitted into the *devotional language* of his church, and sanctioned, from time immemorial, by his Spirit of truth?

These considerations preclude, in a great measure, an objection which readily offers itself, and is not without force. "That the lots mentioned in scripture, were extraordinary, and be-

came appeals to God, and expressed his will, in virtue of his own commandment, which is equally necessary to every similar application of them; and therefore, that the instances quoted do neither prove his particular agency in ordinary lots, nor furnish any general principle of reasoning as to their nature and use."

This objection, though deemed by some to be unanswerable, is not valid.

1. It is incorrect in its *facts*. For although there are instances of God's directing an appeal to him by lot for special purposes; yet there are others in which the appeal was not founded upon any such direction; and so must have rested upon the known design of the lot.

2. It is incorrect in its assumption, viz. that it was the special injunction of God which converted the lot into an appeal to him. Whereas the injunction *presupposes* such an appeal as being essential to the lot; and in appointing it to be employed on special occasions, only appointed the use of a *known method of bringing a matter before the divine tribunal*, in preference to other methods which might have been selected.

3. The objection throws its authors and advocates into that gulf of atheism, to which, it was demonstrated in our first paper, the denial of God's providence in the lot most certainly tends.

From the whole of the foregoing view we collect, that the lot is an act of high and solemn worship, as an appeal to the God of the earth and of the heavens must necessarily be; and that it ought never to be interposed but in matters which warrant such an appeal.

What then are the uses of the lot? When is it proper? And how should it be conducted?

The *uses* of the lot are two.

1. It bears witness to a *particular providence.*

It does not merely acknowledge God as an upright judge who will, at such time as shall please him, reward the good and punish the evil; but it incorporates with an act of worship, a profession of faith that he is present, and pronounces judgment *on the spot.* It is *his* finger which moves the lot, and *his* voice which utters the decree! The operation, then, of the lot, is to check, by a *visible* rebuke, that forgetfulness of God to which we are so prone, and which produces, in all their variety, the bitter fruits of iniquity and of wo—to assert his dominion not only over every world, but over every creature, and over all the circumstances which relate to that creature's happiness or misery—to erect a barrier against the inroads of both speculative and practical atheism—and to strengthen the influence of that pure and undefiled religion which is built upon the doctrine of a particular providence.

2. The lot is of use to determine questions among men.

Like the oath, it is a last resort. The one appeals to God for the sincerity of our declarations: the other for the direction of our choice. They are different forms of acknowledging his government, but the effect of both is the same—to put an end to controversy, by putting a limit to human research. Thus the scripture represents them—

"*An* OATH,	"*The* LOT,
For conformation, is *an end of all strife.*" Heb. vi. 16.	Causeth *contentions to cease*, and parteth between the mighty." Prov. xviii. 18.

The parallel is exact, and leads to the second question,

When is the lot *proper?*

In cases of importance; which cannot be decided by other means in the exercise of our reason; and for the prevention or termination of strife.

The case must be *important;* for appeals to the living God with thoughtless frequency, upon mere trifles, is an impiety which cannot be indulged with impunity, nor thought of without horror.

The case must not only be difficult, but such as our *best discretion is unable to bring to a comfortable issue.*

For if we appeal directly to the judgment of God in things which may be fairly and wisely settled without so appealing, we depreciate the value, by superseding the exercise of our rational faculties—we endeavor to disturb the order which God has established, subjecting the tribunal of human reason to the tribunal of his supremacy; inasmuch as we attempt to abolish the inferior tribunal by withdrawing causes which are of its proper jurisdiction; and thus, impeaching his wisdom, not honoring his throne, we provoke him rather to inflict his curse than to command his blessing.

Cases in which the lot may lawfully be used, are such as these:

The division of property: when the portions of it are adjusted with impartiality and skill; and yet the claimants cannot agree upon the distribution. The appointment of men to a service of a peculiar interest or hazard; when more than the requisite number appear; and their respective qualifications or disqualifications are pretty equally balanced.

The selection of victims; when several, involved in the same crime, are under the same condemnation: but the government, leaning to mercy, and resolving to make an example, re-

quires only a part to suffer, and does not name the individuals. The reader can easily add other illustrations.

I have only to answer the third question upon this head; viz.

How should the lot *be conducted?*

As it is an act of worship, the glorious majesty of Him with whom they have to do, should be present to the minds of the worshipers. Passion, levity, indiffernce, should be laid aside. The name of God should be invoked by prayer; and the lot cast as under his eye. When the issue is declared, the parties concerned should repress every feeling of resentment or dissatisfaction; and acquiesce with promptitude and reverence, as they undoubtedly would have done, had their Almighty Umpire rendered himself visible, and given sentence in their hearing.

There cannot be a happier elucidation of the right manner of applying the lot than the example of the apostles at the election of a colleague to fill the place of Judas. They knew that an apostle could be chosen only by the immediate act of their Master in heaven. They knew, however, that he must have certain qualifications which Peter mentioned. They looked round among their brethren, and found *two* thus qualified. They had gone as far as they could go in fixing upon the man by ascertained rules, and an insuperable difficulty presenting itself in the

circumstance of *two* answering the general description, while only *one* was wanted, they refer the decision to their ascended Lord. Having set the candidates before him, *they prayed and said, Thou, Lord,* (it was the Lord Jesus to whom they prayed,) *Thou, Lord, which knowest the hearts of all men, show whether of these two thou hast chosen, that he may take part of this ministry and apostleship, from which Judas by transgression fell, that he might go to his own place. And they gave forth their lots, and the lot fell upon Matthias; and he was numbered with the eleven apostles.* The decision was received with profound submission, as the decision of the Lord Jesus himself. Not a soul disputed it; not a whisper was heard of discontent or doubt. Let Christians, in their use of the lot, go and do likewise.

No. III.

In the preceding numbers we have established to the satisfaction, we hope, of the serious reader, these two propositions:

1. That the *lot* is a direct appeal to God as the Governor of the world, founded on the faith of a particular providence.

2. That when used on proper occasions, and in a proper manner, both of which have been explained, it is an act of high and acceptable worship.

From this doctrine the conclusion is plain, that all unnecessary, light, careless, or customary uses of the lot; all uses of it, other than such as are holy, reverent, and warranted by the rules of the written word, are sinful, and to be avoided as profanations of the divine name.

For under the *name of God* is comprehended every thing by which *he makes himself known.* In the oath he is solemnly invoked as the Omniscient, whose "eyes are upon the truth." In the lot a decision is put into his hands as the Sovereign Umpire between his creatures, who dispenses to them the most pure and perfect righteousness. In both, his dominion over us, his right to dispose of us and our affairs, and the account which we shall render to him, are fully acknowledged.

The sinfulness of profane swearing consists in treating with levity that NAME of God which the spirits of heaven adore; in impairing our sense of his majesty; in weakening the restraint which his authority imposes on the lusts of men; and diffusing, in the same proportion, the influence of practical atheism. If, then, as has been proved, the lot is an ordinance of the same general nature with the oath; if it involves the same homage to the divine government; if it is calculated to promote the same great moral and social purposes, who can doubt that the irreligious use of it is of the same complexion with the irreligious use of the oath, and like it belongs to that "taking of the name of the Lord in vain," which "the Lord will not hold guiltless?" We question not that many who would on no account pollute their lips with a profane oath, are in the habit of misapplying the lot without any conscientious scruple whatever. The reason is to be sought in their want of instruction and reflection. That they sin is not less certain than that the lot is an appeal to God. Their sin, we hope, must be referred to ignorance; but that ignorace cannot be invincible; and is, therefore, culpable; and the excuse arising from it grows less valid with every opportunity of information, and with every call to "consider their ways."

This deduction from the foregoing reasoning we might submit without comment to the *conscience* of our readers. It contains the substance of those conclusions by which, on many accounts public and private, we wish them to try the use of the lot as it occurs in the present state of society. But as a general truth is often best perceived in its details, we shall exemplify our principle by pointing out several *abuses* of the lot.

1. It is often employed as a means of determining the spiritual state and character of individuals. This is done in three ways.

Cards, with texts of scripture on one side, the other being blank, are shuffled together, and then dealt out to the company, who read the text on their own cards, under an impression of its being a *divine message* to them respectively. To what lengths this species of *game* is carried, or under what restrictions it is conducted, we pretend not to know; but that such a game exists we are perfectly certain.

In place of these cards the leaves of the Bible are sometimes substituted; the book being kept shut, a *pin is stuck between the leaves*, and a message from God is looked for in one of the pages between which the pin is inserted.

Nearly allied to this, and substantially the same, is the practice of *opening the Bible at ran-*

dom, and taking the passage first caught by the eye as the message intended.

These methods of applying the word of God carry with them the mark of such puerile and absurd superstition, that it may seem needless even to mention them. But the mind in distress about eternal things, under the influence of erroneous views of religion, is often bewildered, and impelled by temptation to expedients very ill calculated to yield relief. However incredible it may be thought, this very practice of *turning the Bible into a lottery* has filled some weak yet well meaning people with unfounded confidence, and driven others almost to desperation. One man finds on his card, or selects with his pin, or catches by a sudden glance of his eye, an assurance of grace, or a promise of eternal life, and he is transported with ecstasy. Another by the same means lights upon a threatening or a curse, and he is broken with terrors as if an angel of God had written before his eyes a sentence of reprobation. That which has happened already may happen again, and Christians should be on their guard against such delusion. Delusion it undoubtedly is, if words of truth and soberness are entitled to our regard.

"All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly fur-

nished unto every good work." But in order to reap this excellent fruit from the holy writings, they must be studied, searched, compared. They are addressed to us as rational beings, whose faculties are to be exercised in discovering their sense, that we may understand what is the revealed will of God, and what opinion we are to form of our own character. Serious inquiry into these matters, with an ardent desire for the guidance of the Spirit of truth, will, for the most part, enable us to determine with tolerable precision every question affecting our substantial interests. They who are the most devoted to it are not only the most intelligent Christians, but, ordinarily, enjoy the most settled peace, and are most abundant in the "fruits of righteousness which are by Jesus Christ to the praise and glory of God." But now all this use of the scriptures, and all the blessed effects accruing from diligent and holy investigation of them, are completely set aside by converting them into a lottery. The greatest and the least acquaintance with them are exactly on a level. Progress in the knowledge of their doctrines, precepts, promises, is of no avail. All comparing of things spiritual with spiritual is at an end. There is no more room for self-examination. The trial of tempers, affections, habits, principles, corruptions, graces, declensions, revivals, by the word of God, is superseded. The

Bible ceases to be a rule of faith and conduct, for every judgment is made to rest upon an *immediate revelation obtained by lot.* They who resort to such a summary method of getting at spiritual results ought in all consistency to pursue it in temporal things. It would prevent the trouble of much circuitous industry; it would engender no sloth more ignoble than what it creates in the concerns of the soul; and it is obviously as proper to decide by the turn of a shilling whether we shall plough or not, as to interrogate the point of a pin whether we shall be saved or perish.

It is surprising that they, who are addicted to this unhallowed use of the scriptures, do not perceive their self-contradiction; and what is infinitely worse, their endeavor to draw into self-contradiction the God with whom they have to do. They either lay some stress on the issue of their lottery speculations in the scripture, or none. If none, the contradiction lies in their attempting to produce *something* by means which, according to their own concession, can produce *nothing*. If, on the other hand, any stress be laid on them, the contradiction lies in attempting to make these very means destroy their own result, which is always done by *repeating* the experiment. And when the issues differ, as in most cases they will, one conclusion is set off against the other, and yet *both* are

valid. Thus, if a man shall draw a blessing this moment, and a curse the next, he is bound to believe himself both blessed and accursed; for the reason of his believing the one is equally strong for believing the other, or else for not believing either, which would be as gross a contradiction as the former.

If this, however, were all; if in these their liberties with the Bible men of vain, irregular minds, merely displayed their own folly, they might expose themselves at their leisure. But they actually endeavor to draw the Most High God into self-contradiction. For if they view those passages of his word which are assigned to them by lot, as expressing *his* decision, they ought never to *try again*, because *his* "counsel shall stand." Whereas, by the very fact of "trying again," they ask him to reverse his own judgment. And thus, *their characters remaining the same*, should they happen, as in the example above, to get now a curse and then a blessing, they ascribe to him two opposite judgments, in one of which he must necessarily certify a falsehood. These are daring freedoms indeed. The very thought of perverting his book of life into a book of gambling should fill us with horror.

But let not our reprehension of such profaneness, for by no softer name can we call it, be misunderstood. Let us not be suspected of denying that portions of divine truth, suddenly and

unexpectedly presented to the mind, have in many instances been accompanied with extraordinary effects. A careless man has unintentionally opened the Bible at a place which arrested his notice and flashed light in upon his conscience. It was an arrow from the quiver of the Etenal, shot into his very heart, and it stuck there, drinking up his spirit, till it was extracted by the healing hand of mercy.

So, likewise, many of those who "fear the Lord," and yet "walk in darkness and have no light," proceeding in the path of duty, mourning and depressed, have taken up their Bible, hardly knowing whether they should read it or not; and have been directed to some unlooked for passage, which, being powerfully applied to their hearts, has dispelled their fears, and filled them with "peace and joy in believing." We know that all this is exploded by many, and even by some who are called, and who ought to be, ministers of the gospel, as blind fanaticism. If the reader be of that class, we have at present no dispute with him. He is welcome to the consolation of laughing at that which multitudes of believers, now in the church, and multitudes more among the "spirits of just men made perfect," can attest to be a divine reality. He has much higher reason to doubt his own Christianity than the sobriety of their experience.

But while we allow in the amplest manner for such cases as these—while we are far from "limiting the Holy One of Israel"—we cannot forget that his sovereignty is not our rule of action, nor concede that his interposition in such instances as we have mentioned affords the smallest countenance to the practice we have condemned. "To the law and to the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them." But the sentence of "the law and the testimony" is not to be procured by cutting it up into lottery tickets, nor to be used as if the promises of life and the denunciations of death were pasted among its leaves, to be distributed by lot. As well might the divine promises and threatenings be parceled out on a back-gammon board, and the *dice* be rattled for a *chance* of heaven or of hell. If every man, whose soul is not lost to seriousness, shudders at this idea, let him also shudder at the other, which is equally profane. It is a gross abuse of the lot, and therefore a prostitution of an ordinance by the proper use of which the name of God is glorified.

No. IV.

We exposed, in our last number, that signal abuse of the lot which employs it as a means of determining the spiritual state and character of individuals. We proceed to point out another abuse far more extensive in its operation and most fatal in its effects, we mean *games of chance.* Under this general appellation we comprehend *cards*, *dice*, and other games, of which the *lot* is an essential part.

The universal and decisive objection to them in every form and under all circumstances is, that they are *profane appeals to the divine throne, and a wanton prostitution of a divine ordinance.* For the premises which support this conclusion we refer the reader to our first two numbers.

We are aware that our position will not readily obtain the concurrence of many who are far from being friendly to gaming or gamblers. Both are held in abhorrence by sober-minded men throughout the whole world. But their opinions greatly vary as to the nature of the games.

Some consider them, or at least certain forms of them, as innocent and pleasant recreations, when they are not subservient to the sordid passions; that is, when the parties either do not play for money, or for no more than is necessary to keep up the spirit of the competition.

Others despise them as frivolous and ignoble pastimes, without attaching to them the blame of direct immorality, unless they become incentives to crime by becoming the sources of unlawful gain.

Many beyond doubt there are, whose indulgence in these sports carries them to no such excess; who treat gaming and gamesters with merited contempt; and who, while they give a leisure hour to the card-table or the die, have not the smallest suspicion that their amusement has an irreligious taint, or tends to weaken in the slightest degree the sense and effect of those obligations by which man is bound to God his Maker.

With these we remonstrate: with all who are not strangers to compunctious feeling after they have risen from a game of hazard; and with all, who, although they have occasionally speculated upon the question, have never been at the pains to decide it satisfactorily to their own minds.

Gaming has always had an evil reputation in all civilized countries, especially such as have been enlightened by the Christian revelation. It is both curious and instructive to mark the gradations of this sentiment.

Gamesters themselves, in whom the avaricious lust has not quite overpowered both integrity and shame, know and feel that their occupation is vile; for they study secrecy, not merely to

elude the penal statutes of the law, but also to save appearances among men better than themselves. Fame, low as is her credit for veracity, has put less truth into her tattle, than is usual even with her, if there are not in this very city of New York, *gentlemen*, and *ladies* too, who consume their midnights over the fascinating chance, amid piles of money; but who could never meet, in broad day, the infamy which confronts an avowed gambler.

This, it may be said, is referable to that wholesome discipline by which public opinion coerces the impudence of vice. For the most part it is so. But public opinion is an effect, and like all other effects must have a cause. Set the gamblers aside, and there remains a large body of sober, discreet members of the community who never gamble, who view gaming for money as altogether unjustifiable, as a system of rapacity and plunder, and would on no account whatever so far degrade themselves in their own eyes as to pollute their hands with the product of the gaming board. Yet a game of chance, detached from such applications of it, they will not stigmatize as immoral. How did they arrive at the distinction? How will they show that a thing lawful for the purposes of amusement may not be lawful for the purposes of emolument also? Why should that be ill-gotten which is not gotten by ill means? Why

should an hour or two spent at the card-table *gratis* be consistent with virtue, and that same time spent in the same employment be condemned as criminal the moment it profits one's purse? Making money is not vicious; by the terms of the argument cards and dice are not vicious; and yet making money by cards or dice is accounted vicious by such a strong and general coincidence of opinion as imposes law upon society. What is there, then, to render the *combination* immoral? It cannot be mere excess of ardor in the pursuit of lucre. Labor may be excessive; enterprise may be excessive; economy may be excessive; yet economy, enterprise, and labor, are not immoral methods of acquiring property. If the dreadful *consequences*, which in all ages have followed the spirit of gaming, be assigned as the reason, we ask why these dreadful consequences *have* followed? In the government of God evil consequences are the punishment of evil deeds. The loss, dishonor, and wretchedness, which sooner or later overtake the wicked, are the *natural* penalties by which he chastises sin, vindicates the goodness of his law, and proclaims his determination to enforce its authority. The universe cannot produce an example of a train of miseries associated, in every age, in every country, in every state of society, with any action or set of actions, in which there is no abuse of some divine

institution. Thus, falsehood, debauchery, covetousness, dishonesty, revenge, and a thousand other vices, will all be found, upon close examination, to be abuses of God's institutions, and their deplorable effects to be the punishments which he has annexed to them respectively.

Now as the fact is incontestible, that no curses are more conspicuous or regular than those which come down upon the head of the gambler, the inference is irrefragable that gaming must be a most provoking abuse of some divine institution. What is it? We answer, the *lot*. This solution alone goes to the bottom of the difficulty. This alone explains the moral phenomena which invariably attend the system of gaming. An ordinance which God has appointed for the holy and reverend acknowledgment of his superintendence over the affairs of men, has been perverted to the ends, first of amusement, and then of lucre. This perversion he resents and punishes. It will be a pitiful evasion to plead instances of persons who play with moderation as invalidating our general argument. There are degrees of transgression and of correction. "Lust, when it hath conceived, bringeth forth sin;" but it is not till "sin is "*finished*" that it "*bringeth forth death.*" And the death which smites the perfected sin is only smiting the progeny of the parturient lust. The game of chance and downright gambling are but dif-

ferent stages of the same iniquity. They have always been coexistent; if not in the same individual, yet certainly in the same community. Let the former take its course, and the latter inevitably follows. So, when the spirit of gambling, which is the matured offspring of the game of chance, suffers the pains of divine displeasure, the blow is aimed at both together. It is the *principle* which the "Governor among the nations" is judging. If he strike it chiefly in its most depraved state and most offensive form, he does not indicate that in its earlier states and less ruinous connection he tolerates it as innocent, but gives another document that he *is long suffering* and *slow to anger*. If this conclusion be at any time reversed, it is only a new fact in the history of an old imposture. *Because sentence against an evil work is not executed* SPEEDILY, *therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil.*

All this, we are sensible, will be laughed to scorn by those who "like not to retain God in their knowledge." We leave them to their propensities and their reward. *Judgments are prepared for* SCORNERS, *and stripes for the back of* FOOLS.

But to those who have never weighed the subject seriously, or who are "halting between two opinions," as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the games in question, we address ourselves

with better hope. They will not contemn, as unworthy of their regard, the reasonings which have already been submitted to them. They will hardly suppose that moralists, divines, and statesmen—Jews, Greeks, and Romans—political legislatures, and ecclesiastical councils—public principle, and private virtue, would all unite in reprobating an *innocent* amusement. But they have united in reprobating games of chance. A combination which seems impossible unless upon the ground of some common and strong conviction of their intrinsic immorality.

That the gospel of Jesus Christ has divinely illuminated the doctrine of morals, nothing but a profligate warfare against truth will deny. Where that gospel reigns in its purest influence; rectifying speculative and practical error; setting the heart at liberty from the bondage of depravity; and imparting a quick sensibility to the conscience, games of chance are always held in the *worst* repute.

So long as a man continues profane and wicked, he can generally game himself, and make companions of those who do. But when "he turns from his vanities to serve the living God;" when he ceases to have "fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness;" when his delights are with the saints, with the excellent of the earth; and, in the hope of seeing Jesus as he is, he "purifies himself, even as *he* is pure,"

he cannot easily fail to throw away his cards and his dice. There have been, and there are, professors of religion who retain a predilection for these amusements; but they are not, and never have been, noted for circumspect and exemplary Christians. Go the whole round of those numerous circles which encompass the card-table. You will find selections of all sorts, from low vulgarity up to accomplished fashion—from the refuse of the grog-shop, up to the most brilliant assemblage of the drawing-room; but if you fall in with a single card-party, composed of those who "worship God in spirit and in truth;" who remember that they were "redeemed from their VAIN CONVERSATION, with the precious blood of Christ;" and who are constrained by his love, to "live, not unto themselves, but unto him who died for them and rose again;"—if you fall in with a single card-party composed of *such* Christians, (and they are the only ones who shall see God,) we will give up the cause.

What shall we say to these things? Shall we say that a point which appears so serious to the very best of the human race, is not worth our attention? Shall we say that in deciding on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a particular set of actions, we will prefer the judgment of the thoughtless, the profane, the abandoned, to the judgment of them who "fear God and

keep his commandments?" Shall we say that his church, in which his presence dwells, and his mercies are dispensed, is a worse guide in morals, than the "world which lieth in wickedness?" Shall we say that the Spirit and grace of our Lord Jesus Christ teach his people to cherish an unconquerable antipathy against practices which are not forbidden by his law? Who, that has not parted with reverence for whatever is most holy, and just, and good, will embrace the affirmative? And who, that vindicates the game of chance, does not embrace it?

The reader perceives that the immorality which we attribute to games of hazard, does not arise from *circumstances;* but is *essential* to their nature. We pronounce them immoral and unlawful, precisely on the ground of their *abuse and profanation of the lot*, which is an institution of God for special religious and moral purposes. We have introduced a view of their *effects* no further than was necessary for the prosecution of this argument. Not that we think these effects of trifling moment. They are of great and terrible moment. They should never be forgotten by any who incline to more indulgence than severity toward the games. By the light of the penalty, men often learn to read the law. An ear deaf to the voice of religion, may sometimss listen to the admonitions of prudence. An eye which sees no vice, may

discern meanness; and the fear of disgrace or loss may control those who who are intractable by piety.

For the sake of such, and for the confirmation of those who already obey the dictates of a well-informed conscience, we shall give in our next, a sketch of some evils *incident* to games of chance.

No. V.

Evils incident to Games of Chance.

We have repeatedly stated, in the course of these papers, that our great objection to lots as they are commonly used, is the impiety of their principle; and that this constitutes the unlawfulness of games of chance, such as *cards*, *dice*, &c.

Assuming our doctrine as true, because it has been proved, we can view the mischiefs attendant upon gaming, in no other light than that of penalties which God inflicts upon the violation of his law. On the confirmed gamester we do not hope to make an impression. An understanding so blighted; a conscience so seared; a heart so cold, so selfish, and so hard, as enter into the composition of his character, render him deaf to remonstrance, and put him, for the most part, out of the reach of reform.

But they who hate gaming, while they love the game; who play freely for amusement, while they would, on no account, play for lucre; and who would shudder at the thought of promoting either vice or misery, are intreated to reflect whether there be not such evils connected with the game of chance, even in its least exceptionable form, and with its best limitations, as require them to abstain from it altogether.

1. A most unprofitable consumption of *time*, is, by general consent, among the fruits of the card-table and the dice-board.

Those relaxations and exercises which are necessary to health, to spirits, and to activity, ordinarily carry with them their own restriction. Bodily weariness, or the cessation of that charm which, for a short period, the mind perceives in occupations calculated to relieve it from its pressure, are of themselves, an admonition that the end is answered; that the recreation is over; and that we must return to the business of life. But there is, in the very nature of the game of chance, a perpetual and increasing incitement. It tempts, fascinates, absorbs. The glass runs out unheeded: hour is added to hour; and the party rises fatigued and exhausted. Exceptions there doubtless are; but that such is the *tendency* of the game, and such its very frequent effect, cannot well be denied. Let the reader pause. Let him ask himself whether this is an appropriation of time fit for one who means either to obey God, or do good to man? Let him ask, whether whole afternoons or evenings, thus expended, belong to the "redeeming of time;" or will afford a peaceful retrospect on the bed of death? Add up the moments which are squandered at the card-table, without the least imaginable benefit to body, to soul, or to society: look at their sum: see how much

thou mightest have lived in them to thyself, to thy friends, to God; and remember that it is all lost, worse than lost, from those days, for every one of which thou must give an account.

2. An inseparable concomitant of the card-table is *intellectual dissipation.*

The writer of these remarks numbers it among the mercies of God, that he has seldom, very seldom indeed, been placed in circumstances which compelled him to witness the operation of cards or dice on the minds of those engaged. He has seen enough, however, to satisfy him perfectly of their baneful influence. Can any thing be more debasing or contemptible, than that men and women, qualified to bear a respectable part in conversation, and even to adorn the social circle, should descend from the elevation of their own good sense to the level of every stupid thing, male and female, that can giggle or swear over a pack of cards! Religion out of the question, this is no scene for understanding. Leave it to the coxcomb and the coquet, to the sharper and the fool; but let not a man or woman of cultivated mind be dishonored by *taking a hand.* The very atmosphere which surrounds them is poison, at once to the intellect and the heart. It were much to be wished, that some who have imperceptibly learned to degrade their lips with the jargon of the gamester, could occasionally get such a re-

proof as the celebrated *Locke* administered to certain British noblemen. "One day, three or four of these lords having met at Lord Ashley's, when Mr. Locke was there; after some compliments, cards were brought in before scarce any conversation had passed between them. Mr. Locke looked upon them for some time, while they were at play; and, taking his pocket-book, began to write with great attention. One of the lords observing him, asked him what he was writing? 'My lord,' says he 'I am endeavoring to profit, as far as I am able, in your company: for having waited with impatience for the honor of being in an assembly of the greatest geniuses of this age, and at last having obtained the good fortune, I thought I could not do better than write down your conversation; and indeed, I have set down the substance of what has been said for this hour or two.' Mr. Locke had no occasion to read much of this conversation: those noble persons saw the ridicule of it; and diverted themselves with improving the jest. They quitted their play, and entering into rational discourse, spent the rest of their time in a manner more suitable to their character."* If a similar record were made of the conversation of our card-parties, and published to the world, the ridicule would be intolerable: and if it should not deter men and women of sense from play forever afterwards, it would at least

* Life of Mr. Locke, prefixed to his works, p. 22, 8vo.

show how perfectly, for the sake of this paltry pastime, they confound themselves with the most arrant fools in nature.

"When blockheads," says a writer who will not be accused of bigotry, "when blockheads rattle the dice-box, when fellows of vulgar and base minds sit up whole nights contemplating the turn of a card, their stupid occupation is in character; but whenever a cultivated understanding stoops to the tyranny of so vile a passion, the friend to mankind sees the injury to society with that sort of aggravation as would attend the taking of his purse on the highway, if upon the seizure of the felon he was unexpectedly to discover the person of a judge."*

3. Play for amusement leads to and perpetuates the *whole system of gaming for money.*

Very few, if any, learn to play with the design of becoming gamblers. But the progress to this issue is both natural and common. Knowledge of the cards is only a polite accomplishment, and an occasional hand no more than mere civility. What was acquiescence in the first stage becomes choice in the second, and passion in the third. A cent, a sixpence, or a quarter dollar, merely to keep up the spirit of the game, is all that many plead for or allow. The *sum* is indeed too trifling to be an objection, but are they aware of the *principle?* Do not

* The Observer, by Richard Cumberland, No. 22.

the languor of the game without and its animation with the aid of this pecuniary stimulus, very strongly mark its *tendency*? Is not here the commencement of a course which carries the adventurer along with accelerated step to deep and fatal stakes? Let it not be said that the sober circles, which are the object of these strictures, never permit and would be among the first to resist such extremes. They put it seems a rolling body on the top of a declivity, set it a going, and stop it before it reaches the bottom! An admirable expedient! Is there no danger of its slipping through their hands, or of acquiring a velocity which they cannot check? There is a much better method—*Never set it on the declivity at all!* Plainly. Can these moderate and cautious players be sure that none of those whom they train up in what they term *innocent* pastime, shall ever fall in with others who have less scruple? Have they never heard of a youth who received the rudiments of his gaming education from his circumspect friends, becoming, in consequence of this very acquisition, the companion of vile associates, and the victim of their crimes? Have they never heard of an unhappy fair one, initiated in the mystery of the card-table *under her father's roof*, being hurried away with the maddening fascination till her virtue and her peace were the price of redemption for her forfeited purse?

Such things have been, and such things may again be. The very possibility of their recurrence should inspire every one who values honor, truth, and purity, with a detestation of the sports which conduct to them, and impel him to lift up his voice and his example against their introduction or use in any shape or any circumstances. The amusement which they can afford will be a miserable compensation for a ruined wife or daughter, son, or brother, or sister. Considering the snares which beset the inexperienced foot, all the vigilance of parents and friends is little enough to keep our youth, the hope of our land, from error and harm.

It is neither right nor kind; it is wrong, and sinful, and cruel, to fit them for the most profligate company and deeds. Nothing does this more effectually than an acquaintance with games of chance; for there is no dissipated assemblage to which it is not a recommendation. To have the dearest parts of ourselves in a state of complete readiness for the most alluring temptation to the worst of crimes, is, to say the least of it, notwithstanding every safeguard, a most dangerous qualification. Keep them ignorant of cards and dice, and you erect the strongest human barrier against the seductions of gaming. Teach them the art, and that barrier is thrown down; thrown down by your own hands; thrown down to the breaking of your own heart; and

when the destruction to which you yourself have been accessary overtakes your children, you sit down and vent the bitterness of your soul in unavailing complaint. The *benefits* of gaming none but a villain or a fool will undertake to display! Its mischiefs are palpable, horrible, endless! Its history is written in tears and blood. Its vouchers are the most fell passions of the human heart, and the most fearful excesses of human depravity. And yet, while facts, which ought to send alarm and abhorrence along every shivering nerve, are repeating their admonitions every hour, parents—parents professing themselves Christians—do, both by example and precept, put their own children directly into the gambler's path! And as if the temptations which assault the age of puberty were too few, too feeble, or too tardy, parents themselves anticipate the work of corruption, antedate the progress of sin, and apply their own ingenuity to help in bringing forward their children to a *forced* maturity of vice. We cannot exempt from this censure any who permit gaming, under whatever form or pretext, in their houses, and who do not discountenance it in their offspring, or others subjected to them, by their severest displeasure. It admits not of dispute, that if the orderly and reputable members of society were utterly to discard the game of chance, gambling would soon be destroyed or

confined to the spendthrift and the thief. But how can we hope for such a blessed reformation, when, besides notorious gaming houses, many who figure in the higher classes of society play, and play deep, in their own houses. Could these public and private seminaries of all that is base and abominable be exposed at one view to the eye, we will not say of a Christian, but of a political moralist, he would almost despair of our country. The rage for play was lately so great in the city of New York, that public prints ascribed the desertion of the theatre to the multitude of gambling parties! A rare account of the virtue taught and learned at the theatre we must own! We ask a plain question. Had cards and dice not been reputable as an *amusement*, could they ever have become so general as a *vice*? And is it to be wondered at that those places of vile resort, the public gaming houses, should be crowded with our youth? Is it not a perfectly natural consequence of play among heads of families, merely to relieve a tedious hour, that children, apprentices, and servants, should pursue the practice farther, and at last plunder parents and masters, to meet the demands of the card-table and the billiard-room? The number of those fine young gentlemen who have nothing to do; heirs of estates with pockets full of money; lawyers and merchants' clerks; idlers, who, by a sad misnomer, are nick-

named *students;* beaux, whose greatest adroitness is shown in keeping out of the hands of the bailiff at the suit of tailors, and shoemakers, and washerwomen; *et id genus omne*, which flock about the gaming houses, is incredible to those who have no opportunities of observing them. But it is not more lamentable than true, that from nine in the morning till eleven at night, and often much later, these nuisances are attended by a succession of youth. Some spend there the chief part of the twenty-four hours, and there are always adepts in iniquity to decoy the inexperienced and uncorrupted. Why is the suppression of these enormities so difficult? Why are laws so easily, so openly, and so impudently evaded? One reason is plain—gaming grows less infamous. It grows less infamous because respectable people of both sexes game. The number of gamesters is so great because they are kept in countenance by so many who play only for amusement. Let the experiment be fairly tried. Let the latter give up their *sport*, and we shall soon see multitudes of the former give up their *lust*. The community would speedily be rid of legions of those fiends who now haunt its retreats, and prey upon its strength. That immovable selfishness; that cold-blooded malignity; that hardened impiety; that fell desperation, ready for fraud, for robbery, for murder, for suicide, which form the character of a

finished gamester, impose upon every man a solemn obligation to resist the gaming system in all its parts and progress. Every man, whom the extinction of virtuous feeling has not prepared for adding to the dishonor and the miseries of human life, will perceive the obligation in proportion as he reasons correctly, and applies the discoveries of his understanding to the regulation of his conduct. All our principles on this subject are false, and all our deductions from them impertinent, or it follows, that every one who plays at cards or dice is responsible, to the whole extent of the influence of his example in preserving the knowledge and practice of gaming, for all its tremendous effects on body and soul, on property, character, and happiness —on the best interests of his fellow-creatures here, and on their best hopes for the eternal world.

AN ACT

CONCERNING FAITH AND JUSTIFICATION,

DRAWN UP BY DR. MASON,

EMITTED BY THE

ASSOCIATE REFORMED CHURCH IN NORTH AMERICA,

JUNE 12, 1798

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THE ministers and elders in synod assembled, finding that dangerous errors are entertained and propagated concerning the doctrines of saving faith and of justification, feel it their duty to declare, and by this act they do declare, what they conceive the holy scriptures to teach on these important points, chiefly as they are at present perverted or opposed.

I. Of the *appropriation* and *assurance* of faith.

Faith, in its general idea, is assent to, and reliance on, testimony. Its peculiar character

must arise from the testimony on which it is founded. That divine faith, therefore, by which alone sinners are saved, must be an assent to, and reliance on, the divine testimony, as exhibited in the written word. The gospel is expressly termed the RECORD or TESTIMONY *which God gave of his Son*, and faith a BELIEVING of this record. (1 John v. 10.) In perfect harmony with the scriptures, its general character, its special office, and its true and only warrant, are comprehended in the concise and correct definition of the shorter catechism. "Faith in Jesus Christ is a saving grace, whereby we receive and rest upon him alone for salvation as he is offered to us in the gospel."

1. In its general character, which it has in common with other benefits of the covenant, it is said to be a *saving grace.*

A *grace*, or a free gift; an unmerited favor. *It is the* GIFT *of God*, and that both in its principle and in its exercises. Christians *believe even as the Lord* GIVETH *to every man.* And it is he who *deals out to every man the* MEASURE *of faith.*

A *grace*—being purchased for us by Christ's precious blood, and freely bestowed on us for his sake. *It is given unto us* IN THE BEHALF OF CHRIST *to believe on him.*

A *grace*—because it is wrought in the heart of a sinner by the free Spirit of God, through the instrumentality of the word. For this rea-

son he is called *the* SPIRIT OF FAITH; and the people of God *believe according to the working of* HIS MIGHTY POWER, *which*, by the Spirit, *he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places.* And this faith, so produced, *cometh by hearing, and hearing by the* WORD OF GOD.

This faith *saves.* As its origin is grace, so its issue is salvation from sin and from wrath both here and hereafter. *He that believeth* SHALL *be saved; he* HATH *everlasting life, and shall* NOT COME *into condemnation;* but *shall receive the end of his faith, even the salvation of his soul.*

2. The *special office* of faith is to *receive, and rest upon Christ alone for salvation.* But, in order to have just views of this part of the subject, we are previously to consider the *true and only warrant of faith*, which is *the free offer of Christ to us in the gospel.*

All that is necessary for elucidating this point may be summed up in the following propositions:

(1.) God hath made a *grant* of his Son, Jesus Christ, as an all-sufficient Savior, to a lost and perishing world. He hath not merely revealed a general knowledge of him, but has directly and solemnly *given* him to sinners as such that they may be saved. *God so loved the world that he* GAVE *his only begotten Son, that whosoever be-*

lieveth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.

(2.) This gift is *absolutely free;* independent, in every possible manner, on the worthiness or good qualities of men. This is essential to the very nature of his gift. Redemption *through the blood of Christ is according to the riches of his grace. It is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save the chief of sinners.*

(3.) This gift is indiscriminately to all the hearers of the gospel, and to every one of them in particular. *Unto* US *a child is born; unto* US *a Son is given. The word is nigh* THEE, *even in* THY *mouth, and in* THINE *heart; that is, the word of faith which we preach: That if* THOU *shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shall believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead,* THOU *shalt be saved.* No sins, however enormous or aggravated, place any sinner beyond the reach of this liberal grant. The very terms in which it is conveyed suppose the objects of it to be unbelieving, unrighteous, and even obstinate in transgression. *God gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever* BELIEVETH *on him might not perish;* manifestly implying that they to whom he is given are unbelievers. The Lord Christ, whose invitations to sinners must be grounded on the Father's gift of him as the covenant of the people, thus addresses them:

Hearken unto me, YE STOUT HEARTED, *that are* FAR *from righteousness; I bring near my righteousness.*

The Savior thus given God hath made it the duty of every one who hears the gospel to accept, that he may be saved; and he cannot reject the gift but at the peril of his soul. *This is the commandment of God, that we should believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ.*

Now, the divine command requiring all the hearers of the gospel to receive the Lord Jesus for salvation, it is manifest that he is freely given in the gospel offer to every one of them in particular. Moreover, all the hearers of the gospel are either believers or unbelievers. That Christ was offered to believers is evident from the fact that they have received him, and are saved by him; and that he is offered to unbelievers is no less evident, because they will be condemned for their unbelief. *He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.* But the righteous Lord, who loveth righteousness, will not condemn sinners for rejecting an offer which was never made.

From all this it results, that God hath laid in his word a firm foundation for the faith of sinners—that they have his own *warrant*, and therefore a perfect *right*, to take the Lord Jesus

in all his grace and fullness for their own salvation *in particular*.

Now, as saving faith must correspond both with the warrant of the divine testimony, and with the right to an offered Savior which that warrant creates, it is properly asserted to be *a receiving and resting upon Christ alone for salvation as he is offered to us in the gospel.*

It is to be carefully noted, that the true and only object of faith is the Lord Jesus Christ himself, set forth and given to sinners *as such*, in the free promise of the gospel; and that, in believing, we receive and rest upon HIM, and upon him *alone*, in all those relations, for all those ends, and in that manner which the divine testimony exhibits, and thus *set to our seal that God is true.*

This *receiving* of Christ and *resting* upon him are usually termed the *appropriation* and *assurance* of faith. By the former we take the Lord Jesus, who is ours in the general grant, to be ours in personal possession. By the latter we trust in him that we shall be saved; believing, that whatever he did for any of the human race he did for *us*, and that whatever God hath promised to his people shall be performed unto *us*. These are not to be considered as different acts, but as essential properties of the grace of faith. And that they are essential to it is most demonstrable.

First, then; *Appropriation* of the Lord Jesus to ourselves, for our own salvation in particular, is essential to saving faith—For,

1. Without such an appropriation faith could not answer to its warrant in the divine testimony, which, as hath been proved, tenders Christ to every one in particular; nor to the authority of the divine command, which requires every one in particular to take him thus tendered.

2. Without such an appropriation there would be no material difference between the faith of God's people, and that of hypocrites or devils. Both may believe in general that Christ died for sinners; that God is in him, reconciling the world unto himself; that he is able to save sinners, and that many shall be saved by him. Mere assent to the abstract truth of the gospel does not and cannot imply any complacency or interest in the salvation which it reveals. But that faith which may be found in the devils and the damned can in no sense be *saving* faith.

3. The condemnation of the law is particular. *Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.* When the Holy Ghost convinces of sin, the sinner sees himself in particular shut up under the curse. Thou *art the man*, says the violated law; *I am the man*, replies his awakened conscience. Nor is it possible that he should have peace or safety till the blood of Christ

purge his conscience, and he, for himself, be delivered from the curse. Therefore, if there were not in believing a particular application of Christ to the soul, the curse of the law would be more efficacious to destroy than the blood of Christ to save.

4. Salvation is particular. A sentence of justification must pass upon, and a work of sanctification be wrought in, *every one* who shall see the kingdom of God. But justification, and sanctification, and whatever else belongs to the salvation of the gospel, flow unto us only in and through Christ Jesus. And as we receive his benefits in believing; as they cannot be separated from himself; and as they are all communicated by particular application to our souls, it is evident that the faith which embraces him, and with him his benefits, is a faith of particular appropriation. *He is made of God unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption.*

5. The experience of God's people, as it is described in his word, proves that their faith is an appropriating faith. Whether they rejoice in the light, or mourn under the hidings, of his countenance, they equally claim him as *their* God, even their *own* God. *I will love thee, O Lord,* MY *strength. The Lord is* MY *rock, and* MY *fortress, and* MY *deliverer;* MY *God,* MY *strength, in whom I will trust:* MY *buckler, and*

the horn of MY *salvation, and* MY *high tower. Thou art the God of* MY *strength: Why dost thou cast me off? Why go I mourning because of the oppression of the enemy? O send out thy light and thy truth—Then will I go—unto God* MY *exceeding joy: Yea, upon the harp will I praise thee, O God,* MY *God.*

6. The scripture continually ascribes this appropriation to faith. It is illustrated by figures, than which nothing can more strongly mark its appropriating quality. It *receives* the Lord Jesus as a gift—*puts him on* as a garment—*flees to him* as a refuge—*lays hold* of him as a hope—*claims him* as a portion—*feeds upon him* as the living bread which came down from heaven. This indeed is the very life of a believer's soul, the fountain of his hope, his peace, his consolation, that Christ is *his* Savior, and God, in Christ, *his* covenant-God.

Secondly. In believing we not only appropriate the Lord Jesus to ourselves, but are persuaded that whatever he did for the salvation of sinners he did for *us*, and that whatever God has promised to his people shall be performed to *us*. This persuasion is the *assurance* of faith, and is inseparable from it.

1. Faith being an assent to and a reliance on testimony, respects nothing but the veracity of the testifier. It is this which distinguishes it from all other principles, and which is essential

to every kind of it, in every degree, and under every circumstance. Now the testimony of the living God hath set forth the Lord Jesus as a propitiation through faith in his blood. There can be no medium between receiving him by faith and rejecting him by unbelief; and in believing we can believe nothing but what God hath testified, because this is the sole ground of our faith. But he hath testified, that whatever Christ did as a Savior he did for them who receive him; and that to them, and every one of them, all the exceeding great and precious promises shall certainly be accomplished. I cannot, therefore, cast my soul upon Christ for salvation without believing the divine testimony; and this assures me, that as a believer I in particular shall be saved; so that my faith, corresponding with God's testimony, necessarily includes a persuasion of my own salvation in particular.

2. In the scripture faith is uniformly opposed to doubting. *If ye have faith and doubt not. O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt? If a man lack wisdom let him ask of God—but let him ask in faith, nothing wavering;* but doubting being the want of assurance, and being the reverse of faith, assurance is necessarily of the essence of faith.

3. The testimony of God's word to this property of faith is clear and decisive. It forms the

chief part of the definition which the Holy Ghost has given. *Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.** We are exhorted to *draw nigh* to the holiest of all *with true hearts, and in the full assurance of faith.* Where the truth contended for is doubly established. (1.) By direct assertion; *The assurance of faith*, i. e. the assurance which belongs to faith; or else the expression is destitute of meaning. (2.) By allowing degrees in this assurance—*the* FULL *assurance of faith.* Which implies the existence of the assurance itself; for a thing which has no being cannot have degrees of being. These passages alone, and especially in connection with others which represent faith as *building* on Christ the foundation, *trusting* in him, *resting* and *leaning* on him, do fully prove that assurance is of the nature of faith.

4. The fruits of faith do also bespeak assurance. Believers have peace in their consciences—they are freed from the dominion of sin—they overcome the world—they receive from the fullness of Christ Jesus—they mind the things of the Spirit, &c. All these blessings are the subject of promise, and are enjoyed only in the way of believing the promise. But how can he believe the promise who has no *confidence* in it? and how can a sinner have relief from the

* The original word, rendered "evidence," signifies demonstration—argument which forbids reply.

terrors of the law? How can this enlightened conscience be pacified? Much more, how can he walk in newness of life, unless he be persuaded that he in particular is reconciled to God; that he in particular shall be saved; and unless he repose his soul upon the faithfulness of God in Christ, who hath promised to do to him and for him far more abundantly than he can ask or think?

Against this doctrine of faith it cannot be justly objected, "that it requires every one who hears the gospel to believe that Christ died for him in particular, and thus terminates in the error of universal redemption."

This consequence is avoided by a very plain and important distinction between faith as a *general duty* and as a *special grace*. As a general duty, it is to believe assuredly on the *testimony of God*, who cannot lie, that Christ Jesus *is freely given* in the gospel offer to *me* in particular; and to take him to myself, as the Father's gift, for my own particular salvation; persuaded, in thus receiving him, that I shall be saved. It is this receiving of Christ which converts the indefinite promise of salvation to believers into a promise of salvation to me in particular; and without this appropriation of Christ none have a right to conclude that he died for them and that they shall be saved. As a special grace, faith does actually receive the Lord Jesus, and

thus binds the divine faithfulness to the particular salvation of him who believes; so that he may warrantably say and ought to be persuaded, and in some measure is persuaded, that whatever Christ did for sinners he did for *him*, and whatever God hath promised to his people shall be accomplished to *him*.

Nor can it be objected, that "this doctrine of faith, representing true believers as at all times undoubtedly assured of their own gracious state, is inconsistent with Christian experience, and with the encouragements held forth in scripture to those who labor under doubts and fears; and tends to make sad the hearts of those whom God hath not made sad."

The question is not concerning a believer's opinions of his state, which are influenced not only by his faith but by his feelings, by temptations, by corruptions, and especially by unbelief, but concerning the nature of his faith itself. That this is sometimes strong, sometimes weak, yea, so weak that he cannot discern its operations, and even disputes its existence, is most certain; but faith he has, notwithstanding. His being unconscious of it at the time does no more prove the want of it, than unconsciousness of the vital motions of the body proves a state of death. Though his faith be small as a grain of mustard-seed, and feeble as the first motion of embryo life, it is essentially the same with the branching tree, and with the active energy of a perfect

man. It is, therefore, as really opposed to every kind of doubting in its faintest as in its most vigorous exercise. The difference lies only in degree. Doubting believers there are, but doubting faith there cannot be. In so far as a believer doubts, he is under the power of unbelief; for be his darkness and his fears what they may, they prevail exactly in the same proportion as his faith fails. A doubting faith, then, is equivalent to an unbelieving faith; or, which is the same thing, a believing unbelief. But this is a contradiction. It is therefore undeniable, that in the midst of conflict and dejection, the believer does and cannot but trust, and that for himself, in the mercy and faithfulness of his covenant-God. This is evinced to others, and may be evinced to the satisfaction of his own soul by his clinging to the Lord Christ as his only hope, and by his horror at the thought of relinquishing his claim to the promises, and to the living God as his portion. Poor as he may call his hope, he would not barter it for millions of worlds. This bespeaks a trust, and that not a slender one, in the Lord's promise, in Christ, for personal salvation; and this trust is precisely the assurance asserted as essential to saving faith.

It would greatly conduce to clear views of this subject were the distinction between the assurance of *faith* and the assurance of *sense*

rightly understood and inculcated. When we speak of assurance as essential to faith, many suppose we teach that none can be real Christians who do not *feel* that they have passed from death unto life; and have not unclouded and triumphant views of their own interest in Christ, so as to say, under the *manifestations* of his love, "my beloved is mine, and I am his." But God forbid that we should thus offend against the generation of his children. That many of them want such an assurance may not be questioned. This however is the assurance, not of faith but of sense; and vastly different they are. The object of the former is Christ revealed in the *word;* the object of the latter Christ revealed in the *heart.* The ground of the former is the testimony of God *without us;* that of the latter the work of the Spirit *within us.* The one embraces the promise, looking at nothing but the veracity of the promiser; the other enjoys the promise in the sweetness of its actual accomplishment. Faith trusts for pardon to the blood of Christ; sense asserts pardon from the comfortable intimations of it to the soul. By faith we take the Lord Jesus for salvation; by sense we *feel* that we are saved, from the Spirit's shining on his own gracious work in our hearts.

These kinds of assurance, so different in their nature, are very frequently separated. The assurance of faith may be, and often is, in lively

exercise, when the other is completely withdrawn. "Zion said, *My Lord hath forgotten me;* and the Spouse, *My Beloved hath withdrawn himself and was gone.*" "He may be a forgetting and withdrawing God to my feelings, and yet to my faith, *my* God and *my* Lord still." This case is accurately described by the prophet. *Who is among you that feareth the Lord, that obeyeth the voice of his servant, that walketh in darkness, and hath no light? let him trust in the name of the Lord, and stay upon his God.* Here the believer, one who *fears the Lord*, is supposed to be absolutely destitute of sensible assurance, for he *walks in darkness and has no light;* yet he is required to exercise the assurance of faith by TRUSTING *in the Lord, and staying upon* HIS *God.*

Seeing, therefore, that the scriptures teach that there is in saving faith a special appropriation of the Lord Jesus Christ to the soul, with a persuasion of its own particular salvation through him; and that this doctrine is in nowise contrary, but most conformable to the experience of the saints; the synod do reject, and solemnly testify against the prevailing errors, that justifying faith does not necessarily contain an appropriation of Christ to ourselves, as our own Savior in particular; nor any assurance that we in particular shall be saved; but merely a belief and persuasion of God's mercy in Christ,

and of his ability and willingness to save those who come unto God through him. And the synod do warn their people against the principles herein condemned as contrary to the faith of God's elect; as tending to encourage in sinners a lying hope, founded on a general assent to the truth of the gospel; and to mar instead of promoting the growth and consolation of believers.

II. OF JUSTIFICATION.

Justification, being the reverse of condemnation, expresses a change, not of personal qualities, but of relative state. For, as condemnation does not make the subjects thereof wicked, so justification does not make them holy. But as the former is a sentence according to law, declaring a person unrighteous and adjudging him to punishment, so the latter is a sentence according to law, acquitting him from guilt and declaring him righteous. In justifying sinners, the Most High God, as an upright moral Governor, passes a sentence, *wherein he pardoneth all their sins, and accepteth them as righteous in his sight.* For he *forgiveth all their iniquities*, and *makes them accepted in the Beloved.*

This justification is an *act*, and is therefore completed at once. It is necessarily an *act*, because it is a legal sentence; and an act cannot

be progressive: this is the property of a *work.*

The origin of justification is the sovereign grace of God—We are *justified freely by his grace.*

The meritorious cause of it; that which renders it meet and right for God to absolve the sinner from the curse and receive him into favor, and on account of which he is just in justifying, is the righteousness of the Lord Jesus, consisting of his whole obedience to the law, both in its precept and penalty. *We have redemption through his blood,* and *by his obedience many are made righteous.*

This righteousness is conveyed to us by *imputation;* that is, is placed to our account as really and effectively as if it had been accomplished in our own persons. He was *made under the* law; *so* under it as to become SIN *for us, though he knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him;* i. e. as our sin, being charged on him, is sustained in law, as a sufficient reason for exacting from him, in our name, full compliance with all the demands of justice; so that compliance, which is his righteousness, being imputed unto us, is sustained in law as a sufficient reason for acquitting us, in his name, from guilt, and conferring on us a title to everlasting life. *The Lord hath laid upon him the iniquity of us all;* and, therefore, *by his stripes we are healed.*

With the imputation of the Surety's righteousness on the part of God the Judge, there is necessarily connected the cordial reception of it on our part. This is done by faith, the faith of the operation of God. It is in believing on the Lord Jesus, or, as has already been explained, accepting him for righteousness; on the divine warrant, that our *persons* are released from the curse, and we are *personally* instated in the right to the inheritance. In this sense, and in this only, does faith justify; not as being, in any possible form or degree, our justifying righteousness; but simply as it embraces the righteousness of the Surety to the entire exclusion of our own. So speaks the scripture: We are *justified by faith;* only as it is *faith in his blood.*

Hence it is apparent that personal justification takes place at the moment of believing, and not before. But as this part of the doctrine of justification has been recently and boldly denied within the bounds of the synod, they judge it their duty briefly to confirm it, and to bear their testimony against the contrary error.

1. It is not righteousness as *imputed* merely that justifies, but as *received* also. On this the scriptures lay particular stress. *As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God;* which receiving is immediately explained by *believing on his name.* No righteousness can justify me at the bar of justice,

unless I am warranted in law to plead it as my own. It is palpably absurd to plead a righteousness which I reject. The very plea supposes that the righteousness is mine, and that I trust in it. Now, the righteousness of Christ is not mine in possession till I accept it as the Father's gift, which I do in believing. Before believing, therefore, I have no righteousness to oppose to the claims of the law, and consequently neither am nor can be justified. It will not be questioned that the Lord never imputes righteousness to those who never believe, and that he always bestows the grace of faith on those to whom he imputes righteousness. And this demonstrates that there subsists such a connection between imputation on his part and faith on ours, that without the latter the former could not produce its effect. But that effect is our justification; therefore justification cannot take place before believing.

2. The law applies its curse to the person of every sinner in particular, and its terror to the conscience of every convinced sinner in particular.

That the gospel, as the ministration of righteousness, may be directly opposed to the law as the ministration of condemnation, and that its effect may completely destroy the effect of the law's curse, it is necessary that there be a particular application of righteousness to the

person of the sinner, and that the peace-speaking blood of Jesus be particularly applied to his conscience. Both are asserted in the scripture. Believers are *elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through* SPRINKLING *of the blood of Jesus Christ*, which *purges their conscience from* DEAD WORKS. But it has been shown under the preceding head, that it is faith which appropriates the Lord Christ in his saving benefits. And as there is no justification before he be thus appropriated, there can be none before believing.

3. The scriptures divide the hearers of the gospel into believers and unbelievers, and pronounce upon them sentences according to their respective characters. *He that believeth is not condemned; he is justified from all things; he hath everlasting life.* While he *that believeth not is condemned already, and the wrath of God abideth on him.* Till the sinner believe he is an unbeliever; and as long as he continues so he is in a state of condemnation; the wrath of God *abideth* on him. Justification, therefore, before believing, is impossible; it exhibits a monster which the Bible cannot know, *a justified unbeliever.* It includes the revolting absurdity of a man's being, at the same time, and in the same respects, both acquitted and condemned, both in a state of favor and in a state of wrath, at once a partaker of Christ and an heir of hell.

However plain and peremptory the scriptural doctrine on this point, there are not wanting some to corrupt and oppose it by teaching, not only that justification precedes believing, but that the elect were justified from eternity.

If nothing more were meant than that the Lord, from eternity, *purposed* to justify his elect through the righteousness of their Head, Jesus Christ, and that this gracious purpose or decree infallibly secures their justification in time, it would be a glorious truth. Though to call this *justification*, when it is in fact the same with *election*, would be a strange abuse of terms, and would engender an idle and unedifying strife of words. But it is contended that justification, strictly and properly speaking, is eternal: that Jehovah, having from eternity accepted the suretyship of the Son, accepted, and therefore justified, the elect in him: that as his will to elect is election, so his will to justify is justification: that this being eternally an *immanent* act of the Divine Mind, is the true justification: that the *transient* act, which passes in time on the person of a sinner, and which we style justification, is only an intimation to his conscience of what was done in eternity: and that the proper business of faith is not to justify, but to impart to the believer a clear manifestation and a comfortable sense of his eternal justification.

How contrary all this is to the nature of things, to the testimony of God's word, and to the experience of his people, may be easily demonstrated.

1. Justification, being the sentence of God the Judge, acquitting the sinner from guilt and pronouncing him righteous according to the tenor of the moral law, necessarily implies both the existence of the law and the breach of it by the person justified; neither of which can consist with the doctrine of eternal justification.

2. If, as is alledged, the will to justify is justification, as the will to elect is election, it is certain that the will to create is creation, the will to sanctify sanctification, the will to save salvation; so that men were created, sanctified, saved from eternity.

That sanctification is a change of personal qualities, and justification of legal relations, will neither alter the question nor remove the difficulty; for justification as necessarily supposes the existence of the relations affected by it, as sanctification does the existence of the person sanctified. Both these blessings impart a real and glorious change; only the subject of the latter is a sinner's person, and of the former his state. Beside, condemnation affects only legal relations; and if the will to justify is justification, the will to condemn must be condemnation; so that mankind were condemned from eternity;

that is, eternally before the covenant for the breach of which they were condemned had any being: or else the covenant with Adam was as eternal as the covenant with Christ; i. e. was made with Adam an eternity before he was created.

3. If the elect were justified from eternity in virtue of their being from eternity in Christ, by covenant representation, it must follow, either that they never were in Adam as a head of condemnation, or else that they were condemned in Adam after their justification in Christ; because the latter was from eternity and the former only in time; for it is evident that they could not be condemned in Adam before he fell under condemnation himself. But both these propositions are most repugnant to every principle and declaration of the scripture.

4. The elect could not be eternally justified in Christ their Surety, because the Surety himself was not thus justified. As the God-man, he was made under the law, both in its precept and penalty, nor was he discharged till he had satisfied both to the uttermost. God was first *manifested in the flesh*, then *justified in the Spirit.* This is usually called the *virtual* justification of the elect; by which must be understood, that in the obedience and death of the Lord Jesus a foundation was laid for their pardon and acceptance, so that God might be just in justifying

them, and the promise thereof made irreversibly sure to them as the seed. But that this was not their own proper justification is clear from the example of those, who, by faith in the Savior to come, were justified *before* his appearing to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.

5. If the elect were justified from eternity, and of course came justified into the world, it is undeniable that every elect person is regenerated and sanctified from the womb; or else that justification and sanctification may be, and often are, separated: so that a person in favor with God, and an heir of life, may notwithstanding be, for years and scores of years, under the dominion and wallowing in the filth of sin. The former is contrary to notorious fact, and the latter, exploding satisfaction as the necessary concomitant and test of justification, destroys our Lord's rule, that *the tree is known by its fruit.*

6. The notion of eternal justification overthrows the whole doctrine of the scripture concerning the office of the grace of faith. This is, pre-eminently, to receive Christ Jesus the Lord as Jehovah our righteousness; for *he is made of God unto us, righteousness;* and *with the heart man believeth unto righteousness.* But if the use of faith be merely to *manifest* our eternal justification, it can in no sense be said to *receive* Christ for righteousness, which implies that previously the person exercising it had none. In

addition to which it is obvious, according to this scheme,

(1.) That faith can no otherwise justify than works; because holiness, being the effect of cleansing by the blood of Christ, manifests our justification; yet the scriptures attribute justification to faith, and positively deny it to works.

(2.) That no person can be a believer who has not a comfortable sense of his justification, for faith *manifests* it; and he loses his faith as often as he loses the *manifestation* of his justification; so that there are either no believers in the world, or else men are believers or unbelievers, as their comfortable sense of their justification comes and goes.

(3.) That no sinner can be called by the ministry of the word to believe, or be condemned for unbelief. Not to believe; because the use of faith being to manifest justification, the call if general must be addressed to many who never were and never will be justified, and therefore have no justification to be manifested; and if restricted, must be grounded on election; the objects whereof no man knows, or can know. Nor could any be condemned for unbelief; for faith, not being a receiving of Christ for justification, but only manifesting our eternal justification, embraces no offer; and therefore unbelief, which is the reverse of faith, rejects none; and if sinners be condemned for their unbelief,

they will be condemned for a non-manifestation of what never existed.

7. The people of God, when enabled at first to believe, never do it as *already justified;* but feeling themselves accurst and perishing sinners, shut up under the most righteous condemnation of the law, flee to the Lord Jesus that they *may be* pardoned, and *may be* saved from the wrath to come. These views are absolutely inconsistent with the idea and the doctrine of eternal justification. To say that they are erroneous, seeing the elect sinner was eternally justified, though he does not know it, is, on the matter, to say that the Holy Ghost fills his people with groundless terrors, and leads them to lying exercises; for it is he who convinces them of sin by applying to their consciences both the precept and the curse of the law. Nor will it be any relief to plead, that the elect considered as in Christ are justified, but considered in Adam are children of wrath; for this not only silences the challenge of the apostle, *Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect?* but supposes them to remain under the very condemnation from which justification in Christ was intended to deliver them. And as, on this plan, there is no inconsistency *now* between their being justified in Christ, and at the same time condemned in Adam, there can be none at any future period: so that the elect may continue to all eternity in

the heavens, in the presence and in the enjoyment of God—children of wrath!

From this pernicious tenet, as from a root of bitterness and poison, spring many noxious errors, which at various times have infected the church of Christ, and which a regard to her spiritual health has compelled the synod, however reluctant in severity, to aim at extirpating from their bounds. Hence the infatuated notions that Christ is offered in the gospel to the elect only—that ministers have nothing to do with the reprobate—that the immediate duty of the hearer of the gospel is to believe, first of all, his personal election to eternal life—that one may be for a series of years in a gracious state without knowing it, or bringing forth the fruits of grace, and yet ought not to question it, with other of a like nature and tendency; all of which do necessarily arise out of the doctrine of eternal justification.

The synod do therefore bear this their explicit and public *testimony* against it; and do solemnly warn and enjoin both ministers and people under their care, as they regard the glory of the Lord Jesus and the welfare of their own souls, to discountenance it and every one, who, in any manner, inculcates it, as subverting the very foundations of the gospel, leading sinners to a false and ruinous confidence, and ministering powerful incentives to all ungodliness.

A CONTRAST

BETWEEN THE

DEATH OF A DEIST AND THE DEATH OF A CHRISTIAN:

BEING

A SUCCINCT ACCOUNT OF THAT CELEBRATED INFIDEL,

DAVID HUME, ESQ.

AND OF THAT

EXCELLENT MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL,

SAMUEL FINLEY, D. D.,

IN THEIR LAST MOMENTS.

A CONTRAST, &c.

Letter from Adam Smith, LL. D., to William Strahan, Esq., giving some account of Mr. Hume, during his last sickness.

Kirkaldy, Fife Shire, Nov. 9, 1776.

Dear Sir,

It is with a real, though a very melancholy pleasure, that I sit down to give you some account of the behavior of our late excellent friend, Mr. Hume, during his last illness. Though, in his own judgment, his disease was mortal and incurable, yet he allowed himself to be prevailed upon, by the entreaty of his friends, to try what might be the effects of a long journey. A few days before he set out, he wrote that account of his own life, which, together with his other papers, he left to your care. My account, therefore, shall begin where his ends.

He set out for London towards the end of April, and at Morpeth met with Mr. John Home and myself, who had both come down from London on purpose to see him, expecting to have found him at Edinburgh. Mr. Home returned with him, and attended him during the whole of his stay in England, with that care and attention which might be expected from a temper so perfectly friendly and affectionate. As I had written to my mother that she might expect me in Scotland, I was under the necessity of continuing my journey. His disease seemed to yield to exercise and change of air; and when he arrived in London, he was apparently in much better health than when he left Edinburgh. He was advised to go to Bath to drink the waters, which appeared for some time to have so good an effect upon him, that even he himself began to entertain, what he was not apt to do, a better opinion of his own health. His symptoms, however, soon returned with their usual violence; and from that moment he gave up all thoughts of recovery, but submitted with the utmost cheerfulness, and the most perfect complacency and resignation. Upon his return to Edinburgh, though he found himself much weaker, yet his cheerfulness never abated, and he continued to divert himself, as usual, with correcting his own works for a new edition, with reading books of amusement, with the conversation of his friends;

and, sometimes in the evening, with a party at his favorite game of whist. His cheerfulness was so great, and his conversation and amusements run so much in their usual strain, that, notwithstanding all bad symptoms, many people could not believe he was dying. "I shall tell your friend, Colonel Edmonstone," said Doctor Dundas to him one day, "that I left you much better, and in a fair way of recovery." "Doctor," said he, "as I believe you would not choose to tell any thing but the truth, you had better tell him that I am dying as fast as my enemies, if I have any, could wish, and as easily and cheerfully as my best friends could desire."

Colonel Edmonstone soon after came to see him, and take leave of him; and on his way home, he could not forbear writing him a letter, bidding him once more an eternal adieu, and applying to him, as to a dying man, the beautiful French verses, in which the Abbe Chaulieu, in expectation of his own death, laments his approaching separatien from his friend, the Marquis De La Fare.

Mr. Hume's magnanimity and firmness were such, that his most affectionate friends knew that they hazarded nothing in talking or writing to him as to a dying man, and that so far from being hurt by this frankness, he was rather pleased and flattered by it. I happened to come into his room while he was reading this letter.

which he had just received, and which he immediately showed me. I told him, that though I was sensible how very much he was weakened, and that appearances were in many respects very bad, yet his cheerfulness was still so great, the spirit of life seemed to be still so very strong in him, that I could not help entertaining some faint hopes. He answered, "Your hopes are groundless. An habitual diarrhea of more than a year's standing, would be a very bad disease at any age: at my age it is a mortal one. When I lie down in the evening, I feel myself weaker than when I rose in the morning; and when I rise in the morning, I feel myself weaker than when I lay down in the evening. I am sensible, besides, that some of my vital parts are affected, so that I must soon die." "Well," said I, "if it must be so, you have at least the satisfaction of leaving all your friends, your brother's family in particular, in great prosperity." He said that he felt that satisfaction so sensibly, that when he was reading a few days before, Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead, among all the excuses which are alledged to Charon, for not entering readily into his boat, he could not find one that fitted him; he had no house to finish, he had no daughter to provide for, he had no enemies upon whom he wished to revenge himself. "I could not well imagine," said he, "what excuse I could make to Charon,

in order to obtain a little delay. I have done every thing of consequence which I ever meant to do; and I could at no time expect to leave my relations and friends in a better situation than that in which I am now likely to leave them; I, therefore, have all reason to die contented." He then diverted himself with inventing several jocular excuses which he supposed he might make to Charon, and with imagining the very surly answers which it might suit the character of Charon to return to them. "Upon further consideration," said he, "I thought I might say to him, 'Good Charon, I have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time that I may see how the public receives the alterations.' But Charon would answer, 'When you have seen the effect of these, you will be for making other alterations. There will be no end of such excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the boat.' But I might still urge, 'Have a little patience, good Charon; I have been endeavoring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of superstition.' But Charon would then lose all temper and decency. 'You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy, loitering rogue.'"

But, though Mr. Hume always talked of his approaching dissolution with great cheerfulness, he never affected to make any parade of his magnanimity. He never mentioned the subject but when the conversation naturally led to it, and dwelt no longer upon it than the conversation happened to require: it was a subject, indeed, which occurred pretty frequently, in consequence of the inquiries which his friends, who came to see him, naturally made concerning the state of his health. The conversation which I mentioned above, and which passed on Thursday, the 8th of August, was the last, except one, that I ever had with him. He had now become so very weak, that the company of his most intimate friends fatigued him; for his cheerfulness was still so great, his complaisance, and social disposition were still so entire, that when any friend was with him, he could not help talking more, and with greater exertion, than suited the weakness of his body. At his own desire, therefore, I agreed to leave Edinburgh, where I was staying partly upon his account, and returned to my mother's house here, at Kirkaldy, upon condition that he would send for me whenever he wished to see me; the physician who saw him most frequently, Dr. Black, undertaking in the mean time, to write me occasionally an account of the state of his health. On the 22d

of August, the Doctor wrote me the following letter:

"Since my last, Mr. Hume has passed his time pretty easily, but is much weaker. He sits up, goes down stairs once a day, and amuses himself with reading, but seldom sees any body. He finds that even the conversation of his most intimate friends fatigues and oppresses him; and it is happy that he does not need it, for he is quite free from anxiety, impatience, or low spirits; and passes his time very well with the assistance of amusing books."

I received, the day after, a letter from Mr. Hume, myself, of which the following is an extract:

Edinburgh, 23 August, 1776.

My dearest Friend,

I am obliged to make use of my nephew's hand in writing to you, as I do not rise to-day.

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* * * * * * *

I go very fast to decline, and last night had a small fever, which I hoped might put a quicker period to this tedious illness, but unluckily it has, in a great measure, gone off. I cannot submit to your coming over here on my account, as it is possible for me to see you so small a part of the day; but Doctor Black can better inform you concerning the degree of strength which

may from time to time remain with me. Adieu, &c."

Three days after, I received the following letter from Dr. Black:

Edinburgh, Monday, Aug. 26, 1776.

Dear Sir,

Yesterday, about four o'clock, afternoon, Mr. Hume expired. The near approach of his death became evident in the night between Thursday and Friday, when his disease became excessive, and soon weakened him so much, that he could no longer rise out of his bed. He continued to the last perfectly sensible, and free from much pain or feelings of distress. He never dropped the smallest expression of impatience; but when he had occasion to speak to the people about him, always did it with affection and tenderness. I thought it improper to write to bring you over, especially as I heard that he dictated a letter to you, desiring you not to come. When he became very weak it cost him an effort to speak, and he died in such a happy composure of mind, that nothing could exceed it.

Thus died our most excellent and never to be forgotten friend; concerning whose philosophical opinions men will no doubt judge variously, every one approving or condemning them, ac-

cording as they happen to coincide or disagree with his own; but concerning whose character and conduct there can scarce be a difference of opinion. His temper, indeed, seemed to be more happily balanced, if I may be allowed such an expression, than that perhaps of any other man I have ever known. Even in the lowest state of his fortune, his great and necessary frugality never hindered him from exercising, upon proper occasions, acts both of charity and generosity. It was a frugality founded not upon avarice, but upon the love of independency. The extreme gentleness of his nature never weakened either the firmness of his mind, or the steadiness of his resolutions. His constant pleasantry was the genuine effusion of good nature and good humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty, and without even the slightest tincture of malignity, so frequently the disagreeable source of what is called wit in other men. It never was the meaning of his raillery to mortify; and, therefere, far from offending, it seldom failed to please and delight, even those who were the objects of it. To his friends, who were frequently the objects of it, there was not perhaps any one of all his great and amiable qualities, which contributed more to endear his conversation. And that gayety of temper, so agreeable in society, but which is often accompanied with frivolous and superficial qualities, was, in him, certainly at-

tended with the most severe application, the most extensive learning, the greatest depth of thought, and a capacity in every respect the most comprehensive. Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.

I ever am,

Dear Sir,

Most affectionately yours,

ADAM SMITH.

Some of the last choice words of Doctor Samuel Finley, *President of the college of New Jersey.*

Friday, July 11, 1776. The Rev. Mr. Richard Treat came to visit the Doctor, who desired that he would pray by him. Being asked what he should pray for, he answered, "Beseech God that he would be pleased to let me feel just as I did at that time when I first closed with Christ, at which time I could scarce contain myself out of heaven."

Dr. S. acquainted him that he could live but a few days longer; at which he lifted up his eyes with much composure, saying, "Then welcome, Lord Jesus." He declared himself under the greatest obligations to the doctor for his kind and diligent attendance during his illness, and said, "I owe a large catalogue of debts to my friends, which will never be charged to my account; God will discharge them for me."

July 13th, Lord's-day, noon. Dr. C. came to his bed-side, and told him there appeared a very visible alteration in his countenance, by which he judged death was not far off. He raised himself upon his pillow, and broke out, "Then may the Lord bring me *near* to himself—I have waited with a *Canaan hunger* for the promised land—I have often wondered that God suffered

me to live—I have wondered more that ever he called me to be a minister of his word. He has often afforded me much strength, and though I have abused it, he has returned in mercy. Oh! how sweet are the promises of God! Oh! that I could see him as I have seen him heretofore in his sanctuary! Although I have earnestly desired death as the hireling pants for the evening shade, yet will I wait my appointed time. I have struggled with principalities and powers, and have been brought almost to despair—Lord, let it suffice."

He now closed his eyes, and fervently prayed that God would show him his glory before he departed hence—that he would enable him to endure patiently to the end—and, particularly, that he might be kept from dishonoring the ministry. He resumed his discourse, saying, "I can truly say that I have loved the service of God—I know not in what language to speak of my own unworthiness; I have been undutiful: I have honestly endeavored to act for God, but with much weakness and corruption." Here he lay down, and spoke as follows: "A Christian's death is the best part of his existence. The Lord has made provision for the whole way, provision for the soul and for the body. Oh! that I could recollect sabbath blessings! The Lord has given me many souls as a crown of my rejoicing. Blessed be God, eternal rest is at

hand: eternity is long enough to enjoy my God. This has animated me in my severest studies. I was ashamed to take rest here. Oh! that I could be filled with the fullness of God! that fullness which fills heaven!"

One asked him, if it was in his choice either to live or to die, which he would prefer? He replied, "To *die*. Though I cannot but say I feel the same difficulty with St. Paul. But should God by a miracle prolong my life, I will still continue to serve him: his service has ever been sweet to me. I have loved it much. I have tried my Master's yoke, and will never shrink my neck from it. His yoke is easy, and his burden light."

"You are more cheerful, sir," said one of the company. "Yes, I rise or fall as eternal rest appears nearer or further off."

It being observed to him, that he always used that expression "*Dear Lord*" in his prayers; he answered, "Oh! he is very dear, very precious indeed! How pretty for a minister to die upon the sabbath! I expect to spend the remaining part of this sabbath in heaven."

One said, "You will soon be joined to a blessed society; you will for ever converse with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, with the spirits of just men made perfect, with old friends, and many old-fashioned people." "Yes, sir," he re-

plied, with a smile, "but they are a most polite people now."

He frequently expressed great gratitude to his friends around him, but very particularly to the kind family he was in; and said, "May the Lord repay you for your tenderness of me; may he bless you abundantly, not only with temporal but spiritual blessings." Addressing himself to all that were present, he said, "Oh! that each of you may experience what, blessed be God, I do, when ye come to die! May you have the pleasure of reflecting in a dying hour, that with *faith* and *patience*, *zeal* and *sincerity*, you have endeavored to serve the Lord; that each of you may be impressed, as I have been, with God's word, looking upon it as substantial, and not only fearing, but unwilling to offend against it."

To a person about to return to Princeton, he said, "Give my love to the people of Princeton; tell them I am going to die, and that I am not afraid of death." He would sometimes cry out, "The Lord Jesus take care of his cause in the world."

Monday, 14th. Waking this morning, "Oh! what a disappointment have I met with; I expected this morning to have been in heaven!" His great weakness prevented his much speaking to-day: what few words he uttered, breathed the language of triumph.

Tuesday, 15th. With a pleasing smile and strong voice he cried out, "Oh! I shall triumph over every foe! The Lord hath given me the victory! I exult, I triumph. Oh! that I could see untainted purity! Now I know that it is impossible that faith should not triumph over earth and hell; I think I have nothing to do now but to die. Perhaps I have; Lord show me my task."

After expressing some fears that he did not endeavor to preserve his remaining life, through eagerness to depart, and being told he did nothing inconsistent with self-preservation, he said, "Lord Jesus, into thine hands I commit my spirit. *I do it with confidence, I do it with full assurance.* I know that thou wilt keep that which I have committed unto thee. I have been dreaming too fast of the time of my departure. I find it does not come; but the Lord is faithful, and will not tarry beyond his appointed time."

When one who attended him told him his pulse grew weaker, he expressed with pleasure, that it was well. He often would put forth his hand to his physicians, and ask them how his pulse beat; and would rejoice when he was told it was fluttering or irregular.

In the afternoon, the Rev. Mr. Spencer came to see him, and said, "I am come, dear sir, to hear you confirm by facts the gospel you have preached. Pray how do you feel?" The doc-

tor replied, "Full of triumph. I triumph through Christ. Nothing clips my wings but the thoughts of my dissolution being prolonged. Oh! that it was to-night. My very soul thirsts for eternal rest." Mr. Spencer asked him, what he saw in eternity to excite such vehement desires in his soul? He replied, "I see a God of love and goodness—I see the fullness of my Mediator—I see the love of Jesus. Oh! to be dissolved; to be with him! I long to be clothed with the complete righteousness of Christ, not only imputed but inherent." He desired Mr Spencer to pray before they parted. "Pray that God would preserve me from evil—that he would keep me from dishonoring his great name in this critical hour; and support me in my passage *through the valley of the shadow of death.*"

He spent the remaining part of the day in bidding farewell to, and blessing his friends; and exhorting such of his children as were with him. He would frequently cry out, "Why move the tardy hours so slow?"

July 16th, his speech failed him. He made many efforts to speak, but seldom so distinct as to be understood. Mr. Roberdeau desired him to give some token whereby his friends might know whether he still continued to triumph. He lifted up his hands and said, "Yes." This afternoon he uttered several sentences, but little could be collected from them.

Some of his very last words concerning himself were, "After one or two more engagements the conflict will be over." About nine o'clock he fell into a sound sleep, and appeared much freer from pain than for several days before. He continued to sleep without moving in the least till one o'clock; when he expired without a sigh or a groan, or any kind of motion, sufficient to alarm his wife, and those friends who were about his bed. During his whole sickness, he was never heard to utter one repining word. He was at times tortured with the most excruciating pains; yet he expressed in all his behavior an entire resignation to the divine will. In all his affecting farewells to his relations and friends, he was never seen to shed a tear, or show the least mark of sorrow. He often checked his affectionate wife when she was weeping; and he expressed his unshaken confidence in the promises of his God, whenever he spoke of his dear children.

His truly polite behavior continued to the last, and manifested itself whenever he called for a drop of drink to wet his lips. Every one around him was treated with that same sweetness and ease that were so peculiar and natural to him. In fine, he was a most striking example of that *faith* which kindles love in the heart, and produces the sweet fruits of meekness, gentleness, patience, and every Christian grace and virtue."

Remarks on the preceding accounts of the death of David Hume, Esq., and Samuel Finley, D. D.

The common sense and feelings of mankind, have always taught them to consider death as a most awful and interesting event. If it were nothing more than a separation from all that we love in this world; the dissolution of our bodies; and the termination of our present mode of existence; there would be sufficient reason for approaching it with tender and solemn reflection. But when we add those anticipations of which very few, if any, can wholly divest themselves; that scene of "untried being," which lies before us; and especially *that* eternity which the Christian revelation unfolds, death becomes an object of unutterable moment; and every sober thought of it bears upon the heart with a weight of solicitude which it is not in the power of unaided reason to remove. The mere *possibility* of our living hereafter, is enough to engage the attention of a wise man: the *probability* of it is too grave and affecting to leave an excuse for indifference: and the *certainty* with which the scriptures speak of it, as of an immortality of blessedness or of wo, allows to light and ludicrous

speculations concerning it, no other character than that of the insanity of wickedness.

When that hour draws nigh which shall close the business of life, and summon the spirit to the bar of "God who gave it," all the motives to deception cease, and those false reasonings which blind the judgment, are dissipated. It is the hour of truth, and of sincerity. Such, at least, is the *general* fact, which cannot be invalidated by the concession that, in some instances, men have been found to cherish their infatuation, and practice their knavery, to the very last. Their number in places which enjoy the pure gospel, the only ones in our present view, is too small to make any perceptible difference in the amount; or to disparage that respectful credence with which the rustic and the sage listen to the testimony of a dying bed.

By this testimony, the "gospel of the grace of God," has obtained, among every people and in every age, such strong confirmation, and has carried into the human conscience, such irresistible appeals for its truth, its power, and its glorious excellency, that its enemies have labored with all their might, to discredit these triumphs. They have attacked the principle upon which the testimony of a dying believer rests. They have said that the mind, being necessarily enfeebled by the ravages of mortal disease upon the body, is not a competent judge of its own

operations—that the looks, the tears, the whole conduct of surrounding friends, excite artificial emotions in the dying—that superstition has a prodigious ascendancy over their imagination—that their joyful impressions of heaven, are the mere reveries of a disturbed brain—that their serenity, their steady hope, their placid faith, are only the natural consequence of long habit, which never operates more freely than when the faculty of reflection is impaired. All this, and more like this, do unhappy mortals who take, or pretend to take, pleasure in putting an extinguisher upon the light of life, detail with an air of superiority, as if they had fallen upon a discovery which merits the plaudits of the world. But were it even so—were the Christian victory over death only a dream, it is a dream so sweet and blessed, that with the scourger of Lord Bolingbroke's philosophy, I should "account that man a villain that awoke me—awoke me to truth and misery."* But I am not going to discuss this question. The poor infidel does not believe himself, and why should others believe him? With one breath he endeavors to cry down the argument to be derived in favor of their religion, from the peaceful death of Christians; and with the next to enlist

* Hunter's view of the philosophical character and writings of Lord Viscount Bolingbroke.

it in his own service. He omits no opportunity of celebrating the intrepidity or composure displayed by sceptical brethren in their last moments. Let the letter of Dr. Adam Smith, concerning the death of David Hume, Esq., be a proof. Every sentence betrays his anxiety to set off his friend to the best advantage. The dullest observer cannot but perceive his design to compare Mr. Hume dying an infidel, with a Christian dying in the faith of Jesus. Let us draw out, at length, that comparison which he has only insinuated; and that the effect may be more decisive, let us remember, that the whole annals of unbelief do not furnish a more favorable example than he has selected. Mr. Hume was a man of undisputed genius. His versatile talent, his intense application, his large acquirements, and his uncommon acuteness, place him, perhaps, at the head of those enemies of revelation who attempt to *reason;* as Voltaire stands without a rival among those who only *scoff.* He had, besides, what rarely belongs to the ascertained infidel, a good moral reputation. We mean that he was not addicted to lewdness, to drunkenness, to knavery, to profane swearing,*

* On further recollection, we are compelled to deduct from Mr. Hume's morality, his freedom from profane swearing. For, in an account of the life and writings of the Rev. Dr. Robertson, the great historian, drawn up by Professor Dugald Stewart, there is a letter from Mr. Hume to the doctor, in which he descends to the coarse and vulgar profanity of the ale-house, and the main-deck.

or any of those grosser vices which are the natural and ordinary companions of enmity to the gospel. For otherwise, as he labored to unsettle all fixed principles of belief; to overturn the whole system of moral obligation; to obliterate a sense of God's authority from the

To ask his *reverend* correspondent, the principal of the University of Edinburgh; the ecclesiastical premier of the church of Scotland, "What *the devil* he had to do with that old fashioned, dangling word, *wherewith?*" and to tell him, "I will see you d——d sooner," viz. than "swallow your *hath.*"*—are such gross violations of decency, that unless Mr. Hume had been *accustomed* to adorn his speech with similar expletives, they never could have found their way into a familiar letter; much less into a letter designed for the eye of a man to whom, considering his *profession* only, they were a direct insult. We do not wonder that Mr. Stewart should "hesitate about the propriety of subjecting to the criticisms of the world so careless an effusion." But, knowing as we do, the urbanity of that gentleman's manners, the elegance of his mind, and his high sense of decorum, we much wonder that his hesitation had not a different issue. We fear that all men of sobriety, we are sure that all men of religion, will refuse to accept Mr. Hume's "gayety and affection," as an apology for his vileness; or to let it pass off under the mask of "playful and good-natured irony." If a philosopher's "affection" must vent itself in ribaldry, if he cannot be "playful and good-natured," without plundering the waterman and scavenger of their appropriate phraseology, we own, that his conversation has no attractions for us. Such a "glimpse" as this letter affords, of the "writer and his correspondent in the habits of private intercourse," is far from "suggesting not unpleasing pictures of the hours which they borrowed from business and study." But the most melancholy reflection is, that such intimacies and correspondences furnish an index of Dr. Robertson's own character. The infidels never allowed that he had any thing of the Christian minister but his canonicals and his sermons. With these exceptions they claimed him as their own, and their claim appears to have been too well founded.

* An account of the Life and writings of William Robertson, D. D., prefixed to his works, p. 80, 81.

conscience; and positively to inculcate the innocence of the greatest crimes, he must be accounted one of the most flagitiously immoral men that ever lived.

His panegyrist, too, was a man of superior parts and profound erudition. The name of *Adam Smith* will always rank high in the republic of letters, and will never be pronounced but with respect by the political economist. Mr. Hume can have lost nothing, has possibly gained much, by the pen of his friend. Taking him, therefore, as the letter to Mr. Strahan represents him, let us contrast him with that servant of the Lord Jesus Christ, *Dr. Samuel Finley.*

Whatever be a man's opinions, one of his most rational occupations in the prospect of leaving the world is to look back upon the manner in which he has passed through it, to compare his duties with his conduct, and to inquire how far he deserves the approbation or the reproach of his own conscience. With a Christian this admits not of dispute. Nor will it be disputed by a Deist, who professes his faith in the being and providence of God, and a state of rewards and punishments hereafter proportioned to the degree of crime or of virtue here. To such a one it is, upon his own principles, a question of unspeakable importance, whether he shall commence his future existence with hopes of happiness or with fears of misery; especially

as he relies much upon the efficacy of penitence and prayer in procuring forgiveness of his faults, indulgence to his infirmities, and a general mitigation of whatever is unfavorable. Nay, the mortal Deist, or the Atheist himself, for they are not worth the trouble of a distinction, ought, for their own sakes in this life, to be so employed. If, with the rejection of all religious constraint, they have not also uprooted every affection of their nature, nothing could afford them more gratification in the evening of their days than the consciousness of their having contributed something to the mass of human comfort. In short, whether we argue upon Christian or unchristian grounds, it can be the interest of none but the worthless and the malignant to shut their eyes upon their own history, and sink down in death as a bullock drops under the knife of his executioner.

Yet strange as it may appear, and inconsistent as it certainly is with his high pretensions, there are few things so rare as a dying infidel taking a deliberate retrospect of life. We say a *deliberate retrospect;* for it is undeniable, that on many of those, who, like the apostate Julian, waged implacable war with the Galilean, conscience, recovering from its slumbers, has at the hour of death, or the apprehension of it, forced an unwilling and tormenting recollection of their deeds. The point of honor in their philo-

sophy seems to be, and their utmost attainment is, to keep completely out of view both the past and the future. This was evidently the case with Mr. Hume. Read over again Dr. Smith's letter to Mr. Strahan, and you will not find a syllable from which you could gather that there is an hereafter, a providence, or a God—not a sentence to indicate that Mr. Hume believed he had ever committed a sin, or was in any respect an accountable being.

Turn now away from the philosopher, and hear what a believer in the Lord Jesus Christ has to say. Melting into gratitude for that mercy which he had received from his heavenly Father, he goes back to the commencement of his Christian course, and desires his friend to pray that God "would be pleased to let him feel just as he did at that time when he first closed with Christ," and the rapture of his soul came near to the blessedness of heaven. With deep humility he owns his sinfulness; not a whisper of extenuation or apology does he utter—"I know not in what language to speak of my own unworthiness—I have been undutiful." But with great tenderness, as in the presence of the Omniscient, he attests his satisfaction with time spent in his Christian duties and enjoyments. "I can truly say that I have loved the service of God—I have honestly endeavored to act for God, but with much weakness and corruption—I have

tried my Master's yoke, and will never shrink my neck from it." That he had been useful to others and instrumental in their salvation was to him a source of pure and elevated joy. "The Lord has given me many souls as a crown of my rejoicing."

What think you, now, reader, of Mr. Hume and Dr. Finley, with regard to their retrospect of life? Who evinces most of the good and the virtuous man? Whose reflections, is it reasonable to conclude, were the most delightful? *His*, who let none of them escape his lips? or *his*, whose words were inadequate to express their abundance or their sweetness? No; the one had not delightful recollections to communicate. High happiness is never selfish. The overflowing heart pours off its exuberance into the bosom of a friend. And had Mr. H. had any thing of this sort to impart, his companions and encomiasts would have shared in his pleasure, and would not have forgotten to tell the world of its luxury. Their silence is a sufficient comment.

Let us extend our comparison to a particular, which, more than almost any thing else, touches the pride of philosophy; we mean the *dignity* displayed by the infidel and by the Christian respectively.

Ask Dr. Smith. He will tell you that at the very time when he knew his dissolution was near, Mr. Hume continued to "divert himself as

usual, with correcting his own works for a new edition; with reading books of amusement; with the conversation of his friends; and sometimes, in the evening, with a party at his favorite game of whist." Behold the dying occupation of a captain of infidelity! Of one who is eulogized "as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will admit"—his most serious employment is "diverting himself." Just about to yield up his last breath, and "diverting himself!" *From* what? Let them answer who know that there are apt to be troublesome visitors to the imagination and the conscience of one who has prostituted his powers to the purpose of spreading rebellion against the God who made him! "Diverting himself!" *With* what? With correcting his *own works* for a new edition! a considerable portion of which "works" is destined to prove that justice, mercy, faith, and all the circle of both the duties and charities, are obligatory only because they are useful; and, by consequence, that their opposites shall be obligatory when they shall appear to be more useful—that the religion of the Lord Jesus, which has "brought life and immortality to light," is an imposture—that adultery is a bagatelle, and suicide a virtue! *With* what? With reading books of *amusement.* The adventures of Don Quixote; the tales of the genii; a

novel, a tragedy, a farce, a collection of sonnets; any thing but those sober and searching treatises which are fit for one who "considers his latter end." *With* what? With the conversation of his friends, such as Dr. Smith, and Dr. Black, another famous infidel, who, as they had nothing inviting to discuss about futurity, and Mr. H. could not bear the fatigue of abstruse speculation, must have entertained him with all that jejune small talk which makes great wits look so very contemptible when they have nothing to say. *With* what? With an evening party at his favorite game of whist! A card table! and all that nauseous gabble for which the card table is renowned! The question is to be decided, whether such stupendous faculties as had been lavished upon Mr. Hume were to be blasted into annihilation; or expanded to the vision and fruition of the INFINITE GOOD; or converted into inlets of endless pain, despair, and horror? A question which might convulse the abyss, and move the thrones of heaven—and while the decision is preparing, preparing for *him*, Mr. H. sits down to a gaming-board, with gambling companions, to be "diverted" with the chances of the cards and the edifying conversation to which they give rise! Such is the *dignity* of this almost "perfectly wise and virtuous man!" Such a *philosopher's* preparation for death!

Let us leave him at the card-table, and pay a second visit to Dr. Finley. From his gracious lips not a trifling word escapes. In his ardent soul, now ready to speed its flight to the spirits of the just, there is no room for "diversion," for "correcting" compositions, for "books of amusement," or for "games of whist." The everlasting life of those around him—the spiritual prosperity of a congregation dear to him—the interests of his Redeemer among the nations—these, these are the themes which fill his thoughts and dwell upon his tongue. "Oh that each of you," says he to the spectators of his pain, "may experience what, blessed be God, I do, when ye come to die."—"Give my love to the people of Princeton: tell them that I am going to die, and that I am not afraid of death. The Lord Jesus take care of his cause in the world."

The manner in which Mr. H. and Dr. F. directly contemplated death, and the effects of death, presents another strong point of contrast.

It is evident from the whole of Dr. Smith's narrative, that the former confined or wished to confine his view to the mere *physical* event—to the bodily anguish which it might create, and its putting a period to earthly enjoyments. The whole of the philosopher's "magnanimity" centres here. Allowing to his composure under these views of death as much as can reasonably be demanded, we do not perceive in it *all* that

"magnanimity" which is perceived by Dr. S. Thousands, who had no pretensions to philosophical pre-eminence, have been Mr. H.'s equals on this ground. If he had succeeded in persuading himself, as his writings tend to persuade others, that the spirit of man, like the spirit of a beast, "goeth downwards;" that when the breath should leave his body, there would be an end of Mr. Hume; that the only change would be to "turn a few ounces of blood into a different channel"—to vary the form of a cluster of corpuscles, or to scatter a bundle of perceptions up and down through that huge collection of impressions and ideas, that stupendous mass of *nothings* of which his philosophy had sagaciously discovered the whole material and intellectual world to be composed—if *this* were all, we cannot discern in what his magnanimity consisted. It is chiefly as a *moral* event that death is interesting—as an event, which, instead of putting an end to our existence, only introduces us to a mode of existence as much more interesting than the present as eternity is more interesting than time.

It is this view that chiefly engaged the attention of Dr. Finley. In common with others he was to undergo the pains of dissolution. But he rested not in these. He fixed his eye upon that new form which all his relations to God, to holiness, to sin, and the inhabitants of the future world, were shortly to assume. The

reader, we doubt not, perceives the immense disparity between these cases. Mr. H. looks at death as it affects the affairs of this world. Dr. F. as it involves eternal issues. Mr. H., according to his own notions, had nothing to encounter but the struggles of nature, and nothing to lose but a few temporal enjoyments. Before Dr. F. was the tribunal of God, and the stake at hazard was an immortal soul. An error here is irretrievable; the very thought of its possibility is enough to shake every fibre of the frame; and proportionably precious and certain must be that religion which can assure the believer of his safety, and convey him with peacefulness and pleasure to his Father's house.

This being the case, let us weigh the consolations of the philosopher against those of the Christian.

Dr. Smith has made the most of them in behalf of the former, but a very little scrutiny will show that they are light and meagre indeed. "I am dying," they are the words of Mr. H., "as easily and cheerfully as my best friends could desire." "When he became very weak," says Dr. Black, "it cost him an effort to speak; and he died in such a happy composure of mind, that nothing could exceed it."

We are not without suspicion, that on the part of Mr. H. there is some affectation here; and on the part of his friends, some pretty high color-

ing. In the mouth of a Christian, "composure," "cheerfulness," complacency," "resignation," "happiness," in death, have an exquisite meaning. But what meaning *can* they have in the mouth of one, the very best of whose expectations is the extinction of his being? Is there any "complacency" in the thought of perishing? any "happiness" in the dreary and dismal anticipation of being blotted out of life? It is a farce; it is a mockery of every human feeling; and every throbbing of the heart convicts it of a lie. But Mr. Hume expected a better state of existence—nay, talk not of that. There is not, either in his own expressions or those of his friends, the faintest allusion to futurity. That glorious light, which shines through the grave upon the redeemed of the Lord, was the object of his derision. No comfort from this quarter. The accomplishment of his earthly wishes and the prosperity of his near relatives are the only reasons assigned for his cheerfulness. But these are insufficient. In thousands and ten thousands they have not availed to preclude the most alarming forebodings; and why should they do more for Mr. Hume?

In the next place, how shall we interpret his "resignation?" Resignation to what? To the Divine Will? O no! God was not in all his thoughts. But death was at hand, and he could not escape; he submitted to a stroke which it

was impossible to avoid. And all that is said of his "composure," and "cheerfulness," and "resignation," and "complacency," when measured by the scale of truth, amounts to no more than a sottish unconcern set off with a fictitious gayety. It is easy to work up a fine description, and it is often most fine when most remote from the fact. Let any infidel between the poles produce, if he can, a reason that shall satisfy a child why one, who has lived without God, should find "complacency" in death. Nothing but that "hope which maketh not ashamed" is a cause equal to such an effect. But "hope" beyond the grave is a word which had no place in Mr. Hume's vocabulary, because the thing had no place in his soul. It is plain, however, that he

Felt his ruling passion strong in death.

Whatever his decay had weakened, his desire to see "the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of superstition," which with Mr. Hume meant neither more nor less than the destruction of Christianity, in every modification retained its whole vigor. And thus, while venting his spite at the only "system" which ever could render death comfortable, he goes to Lucian's dialogues, and edifies his friends with chattering nonsense about Charon and his boat! *O cæcas hominum mentes!* Nothing can be more blind

and infatuated than the fanaticism of philosophy "falsely so called." With this puerile levity before our eyes, and this contemptible babbling sounding in our ears, we must listen to tales of Mr. Hume's magnanimity, complacency, and resignation!

From a barren exhibition of atheism, let us repair once more to the servant of God. In Dr. Finley we see a man dying, not only with cheerfulness, but with ecstasy. Of his friends, his wife, his children, he takes a *joyful* leave; committing all that he held most dear in this world, not to the uncertainties of earthly fortune, but to the "promises of his God." Although his temporal circumstances were very moderate; although he *had* sons and daughters to provide for, and slender means of doing it, he felt not a moment's uneasiness—*Leave thy fatherless children with me; I will preserve them alive; and let thy widows trust in me*, was, in his estimation, a better security for their support than any inheritance in lands or lucre. And as to death itself—who but one "filled with hopes full of immortality" could use such language as this—"A Christian's death is the best part of his existence"—"Blessed be God! eternal rest is at hand." "O I shall triumph over every foe," (he meant sin, Satan, death, the grave,) "the Lord hath given me the victory—I exult; I triumph! Now I know that it is *impossible* that faith should

not triumph over earth and hell"—"Lord Jesus, into thy hands I commit my spirit; I do it with *confidence;* I do it with *full assurance.* I *know* that thou wilt keep that which I have committed unto thee?" We appeal to all the world, whether any thing like this, any thing that deserves so much as to be named in comparison, ever fell from the lips of an infidel. How poor, how mean, how miserable, does he look, when brought to the contrast! Let the reader review again the situation of Dr. Finley, ponder his words, and mark their spirit; and then let him go back to Mr. Hume's "diversion"—to his correcting his atheistical writings for a new edition—to his "books of amusement"—to his "game of whist"—to his insipid raillery about Charon and his boat! Truly the infidels have cause to look big, and despise the followers of Jesus Christ! "Pray, sir," said a young man to the late Dr. Black, in the presence of a juvenile company, at the Dr.'s own table, "Pray, sir, how did Mr. Hume die?" "Mr. Hume," answered the sceptical chemist, with an air of great significance, "Mr. Hume died as he lived, a *philosopher.*" Dr. Black himself has aided Dr. Smith in telling us what the death of a *philosopher is.* It has taught us, if nothing before did, that the pathetic exclamation, "Let my soul be with the philosophers," belongs to one who is a stranger to truth and happiness. If they resemble Mr.

Hume, we will most devoutly exclaim, "Furthest from them is best." Let *our* souls be with the Christians! with the humble believers in that Jesus who is "the resurrection and the life." Let them be with *Samuel Finley;* let them not be with *David Hume!*

We cannot close these strictures without again reminding the reader, that no instance of composure in death is to be found more favorable to the infidel boast than the instance of Mr. Hume. And yet, how jejune and forlorn does he appear in comparison of Dr. Finley. The latter *longs* for his departure, "as the hireling pants for the evening shade;" and when it comes, he pours around him his kindly benedictions; his eye beams with celestial brilliancy; he shouts, Salvation! and is away to "the bosom of his Father and his God."

But in the other all is blank. No joy sparkles in his eye; no hope swells his bosom; an unmeaning smile is on his countenance, and frigid ridicule dishonors his lips. Be it never forgotten, that *no infidels die in triumph!* The utmost to which they pretend is dying with calmness. Even this rarely happens; and, the scripture being judge, it is a part of their accursedness. It imparts the deepest horror to the *surprise* of the eternal world. But, if you reverse the picture, and ask how many infidels close their career in anguish, in distraction, in *a*

fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the ADVERSARIES? how endless is the train of wretches, how piercing their cry! That arch blasphemer, Voltaire, left the world with hell anticipated; and we hear so frequently of his disciples "going to their own place" in a similar manner, that the dreadful narratives lose their effect by repetition. It was quite recently that a youth in the state of New York, who had been debauched by the ribaldrous impiety of Paine, yielded up the ghost with dire imprecations on the hour when he first saw an infidel book, and on the murderer who first put it into his hand. But who ever heard of a dying man's cursing the day in which he believed in Jesus? While such an instance, we are bold to assert, never occurred, nothing is more common than the peaceful death of them who have "tasted that the Lord is gracious." They who see *practical* Christianity in those retreats which the eye of a profane philosopher seldom penetrates, could easily fill a long record of dying beds softened with that bland submission, and cheered with that victorious hope, which threw so heavenly a lustre round the bed of Dr. Finley.

These things carry with them their own recommendation to the conscience, which is not yet "seared as with a hot iron." If our pages fall into the hands of the young, we affectionately

entreat them to "remember their Creator in the days of *their youth*;" "to make their calling and their election sure," before they be "hardened by the deceitfulness of sin." Rich are the tints of that beauty, and sweet the fragrance of those blossoms, on which, in the morning of life, the Lord our God sheds down the dews of his blessing. You would not wish to be associated with infidels in their death; shun the contagion of their principles while you are in spirits and in health. Your hearts cannot but sigh, "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his." Cast in, then, your lot with him; choose for your own God the God of Samuel Finley; and like him, you shall have "hope in your death;" like him, you shall "be had in everlasting remembrance," when "the memory of the wicked shall rot."

CONVERSATION

WITH A

YOUNG TRAVELER.

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Every one has remarked the mixed, and often ill-assorted company, which meets in a public packet or stage-coach. The conversation, with all its variety, is commonly insipid, frequently disgusting, and sometimes insufferable. There are exceptions. An opportunity now and then occurs of spending an hour in a manner not unworthy of rational beings; and the incidents of a stage-coach produce or promote salutary impressions.

A few years ago, one of the stages which ply between our two principal cities, was filled with a group which could never have been drawn together by mutual choice. In the company was a young man of social temper, affable manners, and considerable information. His accent was barely sufficient to show that the English was not his native tongue, and a very slight peculi-

arity in the pronunciation of the *th* ascertained him to be a Hollander. He had early entered into military life; had borne both a Dutch and French commission; had seen real service, had traveled, was master of the English language; and evinced, by his deportment, that he was no stranger to the society of gentlemen. He had, however, in a very high degree, a fault too common among military men, and too absurd to find an advocate among men of sense: he swore profanely and incessantly.

While the horses were changing, a gentleman who sat on the same seat with him, took him by the arm, and requested the favor of his company in a short walk. When they were so far retired as not to be overheard, the former observed, "Although I have not the honour of your acquaintance, I perceive, sir, that your habits and feelings are those of a gentleman, and that nothing can be more repugnant to your wishes than giving unnecessary pain to any of your company." He started, and replied, "Most certainly, sir! I hope I have committed no offense of that sort."

"You will pardon me," replied the other, "for pointing out an instance in which you have not altogether avoided it."

"Sir," said he, "I shall be much your debtor for so friendly an act: for, upon my honor, I cannot conjecture in what I have transgressed."

"If you, sir," continued the former, "had a very dear friend to whom you were under unspeakable obligations, should you not be deeply wounded by any disrespect to him, or even by hearing his name introduced and used with a frequency of repetition and a levity of air incompatible with the regard due to his character?"

"Undoubtedly, and I should not permit it! but I know not that I am chargeable with indecorum to any of your friends."

"Sir, my God is my best friend, to whom I am under infinite obligations. I think you must recollect that you have very frequently, since we commenced our journey, taken his name in vain. *This* has given to me and to others of the company, excruciating pain."

"Sir," answered he, with very ingenuous emphasis, "I *have* done wrong. I confess the impropriety. I am ashamed of a practice which I am sensible has no excuse; but I have imperceptibly fallen into it, and I really swear without being conscious that I do so. I will endeavor to abstain from it in future; and as you are next me in the seat, I shall thank you to touch my elbow as often as I trespass." This was agreed upon: the horn sounded, and the travelers resumed their places.

In the space of four or five miles the officer's elbow was jogged every few seconds. He al-

ways colored, but bowed, and received the hint without the least symptom of displeasure; and in a few miles more so mastered his propensity to swearing, that not an oath was heard from his lips for the rest, which was the greater part of the journey.

He was evidently more grave; and having ruminated some time, after surveying first one and then another of the company, turned to his admonisher, and addressed him thus:

"You are a clergyman, I presume, sir."

"I am considered as such." He paused: and then, with a smile, indicated his disbelief in divine revelation, in a way which invited conversation on that subject.

"I have never been able to convince myself of the truth of revelation."

"Possibly not. But what is your difficulty?"

"I dislike the *nature of its proofs.* They are so subtle, so distant, so wrapt in mystery, so metaphysical, that I get lost, and can arrive at no certain conclusion."

"I cannot admit the fact to be as you represent it. My impressions are altogether different. Nothing seems to me more plain and popular; more level to every common understanding; more remote from all cloudy speculation, or teazing subtleties, than some of the principal proofs of divine revelation. They are drawn from great and incontestible facts; they are ac-

cumulating every hour. They have grown into such a mass of evidence, that the supposition of its falsehood is infinitely more incredible than any one mystery in the volumes of revelation, or even than all their mysteries put together. Your inquiries, sir, appear to have been unhappily directed—but what *sort* of proof do you desire, and what would satisfy you?"

"Such proofs as accompany physical science. This I have always loved; for I never find it deceive me. I rest upon it with entire conviction. There is no mistake, and can be no dispute in mathematics. And if a revelation comes from God, why have we not such evidence for it as mathematical demonstration?"

"Sir, you are too good a philosopher not to know that the nature of evidence must be adapted to the nature of its object: that if you break in upon this adaptation, you will have no evidence at all; seeing that evidence is no more interchangeable than objects. If you ask for mathematical evidence, you must confine yourself to mathematical disquisitions. Your subject must be *quantity*. If you wish to pursue a moral investigation, you must quit your mathematics, and confine yourself to moral evidence. Your subject must be the *relations which subsist between intelligent beings*. It would be quite as wise to apply a rule in ethics to the calculation of an eclipse, as to call for Euclid when we want

to know our duty, or to submit the question, "whether God has spoken," to the test of a problem in the conic sections. How would you prove mathematically that bread nourishes men, and that fevers kill them? Yet you and I both are as firmly convinced of the truth of these propositions, as of any mathematical demonstration whatever; and should I call them in question, my neighbors would either pity me as an idiot, or shut me up as a madman. It is, therefore, a great mistake to suppose, that there is no satisfactory nor certain evidence but what is reducible to mathematics."

This train of reflection appeared new to him. For, however obvious it is, we must remember, that nothing is more superficial than freethinking philosophy, and nothing more credulous than its unbelief. Dogmatical positions, asserted with confidence, set off with small ridicule, and favorable to native depravity, have a prodigious effect upon the volatile youth; and persuade him, that they have enlightened his understanding, when they have only flattered his vanity, or corrupted his heart.

The officer, though staggered, made an effort to maintain his ground, and lamented that the "objections to other modes of reasoning are numerous and perplexing, while the mathematical conclusion puts all scepticism at defiance."

"Sir," rejoined the clergyman, "objections against a thing fairly proved, are of no weight. The proof rests upon our knowledge, and the objections upon our ignorance. It is true, that moral demonstrations and religious doctrines may be attacked in a very ingenious and plausible manner, because they involve questions on which our ignorance is greater than our knowledge; but still our knowledge is knowledge; or, in other words, our certainty is certainty. In mathematical reasoning our knowledge is greater than our ignorance. When you have proved that *the three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles*, there is an end of doubt; because there are no materials for ignorance to work up into phantoms; but your knowledge is really no more certain than your knowledge on any other subject.

"There is also a deception in this matter. The defect complained of is supposed to exist in the *nature of the proof;* whereas it exists, for the most part, in the *mind of the inquirer.* It is impossible to tell how far the influence of human depravity obscures the light of human reason."

At the mention of "depravity," the officer smiled, and seemed inclined to jest: probably suspecting, as is common with men of that class, that his antagonist was going to retreat into his creed, and intrench himself behind a technical

term, instead of an argument. The triumph was premature.

"You do not imagine, sir," said he, continuing his discourse to the officer, "you do not imagine that a man who has been long addicted to stealing, feels the force of reasoning against theft as strongly as a man of tried honesty. If you hesitate, proceed a step further. You do not imagine that an habitual thief feels as much abhorrence of his own trade and character, as a man who never committed an act of theft in his whole life. And you will not deny that the practice of *any* crime gradually weakens, and frequently destroys, the sense of its turpitude. This is a strong *fact*, which as a philosopher, you are bound to explain. To me it is clear as the day, that his vice has debauched his intellect: for it is indisputable, that the considerations which *once* filled him with horror, produce *now* no more impression upon him than they would produce upon a horse. Why? Has the vice changed? Have the considerations changed? No. The vice is as pernicious, and the considerations are as strong, as ever. But his power of perceiving truth is diminished; and diminished by his vice; for, had he not fallen into it, the considerations would have retained, and, (should he be saved from it,) they would resume their original force upon his mind. Permit yourself, for one moment, to reflect how hard it is to persuade men

of the virtues of others against whom they are prejudiced! You shall bring no proof of the virtues which the prejudice shall not resist or evade. Remove the prejudice, and the proof appears invincible. Why? Have the virtues changed? has the proof been strengthened? No. But the power of perceiving truth is increased; or, which is the same thing, the impediment to perceiving it, is taken away. If, then, there are bad passions among men; and if the object of Divine revelation is to control and rectify them; it follows, that a man to whom the revelation is proposed, will be blind to its evidence, in exact proportion to the perverting influence of those passions. And were the human mind free from corruption, there is no reason whatever to think that a moral argument would not be as conclusive as a mathematical argument is now; and that the principles of moral and religious science would not command an assent as instantaneous and peremptory as that which is commanded by mathematical axioms."

After a short pause, in which no reply was made by the officer, and the looks of the company revealed their sentiments, the clergyman proceeded:

"But what will you say, sir, should I endeavor to turn the tables upon you, by showing that the evidence of your physical science is not without its difficulties; and that objections can

be urged against mathematical demonstration more puzzling and unanswerable than any objections against moral evidence?"

"I shall yield the cause; but I am sure that the condition is impossible."

"Let us try," said the other.

"I begin with a common case. The Newtonian system of the world is so perfectly settled, that no scholar presumes to question it. Go, then, to a peasant who never heard of Newton, nor Copernicus, nor the solar system; and tell him that the earth moves round its axis, and round the sun. He will stare at you, to see whether you be not jeering him; and when he sees you are in earnest, he will laugh at you for a fool. Ply him, now, with your mathematical and astronomical reasoning. He will answer you, that he believes his own eyesight more than your learning; and his eyesight tells him the sun moves round the earth. And as for the earth's turning round upon her axis, he will say, that 'he has often hung a kettle over the kitchen-fire at night, and when he came back in the morning, it was hanging there still, but, had the earth turned round, the kettle would have been turned over, and the mash spilled over the floor.' You are amused with the peasant's simplicity, but you cannot convince him. His objection is, in his own eyes, insurmountable: he will tell the affair to his neighbors as a good story; and they

will agree that he fairly shut the philosopher's mouth. You may reply, that 'the peasant was introduced into the middle of a matured science, and that, not having learned its elements, he was unsupplied with the principles of correct judgment.' True; but your solution has overthrown yourself. A freethinker, when he hears some great doctrine of Christianity, lets off a small objection, and runs away laughing at the folly, or railing at the imposture of all who venture to defend a divine revelation; he gathers his brother unbelievers, and they unite with him in wondering at the weakness or the impudence of Christians. He is in the very situation of the peasant. He bolts into the heart of a grand religious system; he has never adverted to its first principles, and then he complains that the evidence is bad. But the fault in neither case lies in the evidence: it lies in the ignorance or obstinacy of the objector. The peasant's ground is as firm as the infidel's. The proof of the Newtonian system is to the former as distant, subtle, and cloudy, as the proof of revelation can be to the latter; and the objection of the one, as good as the objection of the other. If the depravity of men had as much interest in persuading them that the earth is not globular, and does not move round the sun, as it has in persuading them that the Bible is not true, a mathematical demonstra-

tion would fail of converting them, although the demonstrator were an angel of God!

"But with respect to the other point, viz. that there are objections to mathematical evidence more puzzling and unanswerable than can be alledged against moral reasoning, take the two following instances:

"It is mathematically demonstrated that matter is *infinitely divisible:* that is, has an *infinite number of parts:* a line, then, of half an inch long, has an infinite number of parts. Who does not see the absurdity of an *infinite half-inch?* Try the difficulty another way. It requires *some* portion of time to pass any portion of space. Then as your half-inch has an infinite number of parts, it requires an infinite number of portions of time for a moving point to pass by the infinite number of parts: but an infinite number of portions of time, is an eternity! Consequently it requires an eternity, or something like it, to move *half an inch!*"

"But, sir," interposed the officer, "you do not deny the accuracy of the demonstration, that matter is infinitely divisible!" "Not in the least, sir; I perceive no flaw in the chain of demonstration, and yet I perceive the result to be infinitely absurd.

"Again: it is mathematically demonstrated that a straight line, called the *asymptote* of the hyperbola, may *eternally approach* the curve of

the hyperbola, and yet can never *meet it.* Now, as all demonstrations are built upon axioms, an axiom must always be plainer than a demonstration: and to my judgment it is as plain, that, if two lines continually approach, they shall meet, as that the whole is greater than its part. Here, therefore, I am fixed. I have a demonstration directly in the teeth of an axiom, and am equally incapable of denying either side of the contradiction."

"Sir," exclaimed the officer, clapping his hands together, "I own I am beat, completely beat: I have nothing more to say."

A silence of some minutes succeeded; when the young military traveler said to his theological friend, "I have studied *all* religions, and have not been able to satisfy myself."

"No, sir," answered he, "there is *one* religion which you have not yet studied."

"Pray, sir," cried the officer, roused and eager, "what is *that?*"

"The religion," replied the other, "of *salvation through the redemption of the Son of God:* the religion which will sweeten your pleasures, and soften your sorrows; which will give peace to your conscience, and joy to your heart; which will bear you up under the pressure of evils here, and shed the light of immortality on the gloom of the grave. *This* religion, I believe, sir, you have yet to study."

The officer put his hands upon his face; then languidly clasping them, let them fall down; forced a smile, and said, with a sigh, "We must all follow what we think best." His behavior afterward was perfectly decorous. Nothing further is known of him.

NOTE. The individual by whom the "Conversation with a Young Traveler" was held, was the Rev. Dr. JOHN MASON, the father of the author, the first pastor of the Scotch Presbyterian Church, in the city of New York.

A considerable time after it occurred, a knock was heard at the door of Dr. M. at a very early hour, and a note, addressed to him, was handed in, accompanied by a handsome *Beaver Hat.* The note was from the "*Young Traveler,*" and its purport "to remind Dr. M. of the circumstances under which he had once met with him; to inform him, that, in consequence of what he had then heard, he had been induced to study *the religion of Jesus;* that his investigation had resulted in an entire conviction of the divine origin of that religion; and that by the blessing of God, his remarks had been, as he hoped, made instrumental to the salvation of his soul."

He further added, "that he had recently received orders to return to Europe; had arrived in the city late on the preceding evening, and was about to sail that morning; that he should not have time to call on Dr. M., but begged him to accept the assurance of his affectionate regard; that in all human probability he should never see him on earth, but he indulged what he trusted was a well-founded hope, that they should spend a happy eternity together."

"A WORD SPOKEN IN SEASON, HOW GOOD IS IT!"

HINTS ON THE INSUFFICIENCY

OF

THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

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The light of nature looms largely in all our treatises upon the evidences of religion, forming in most of them a sort of groundwork upon which the fabric of revelation rests; and is esteemed of material importance in consulting the real glory of our nature, and its happiness through all the states of being which lie before it.

Its value is highly overrated, and that which I propose to prove, is, the utter insufficiency of unassisted reason to make those discoveries concerning God, ourselves, our duties, and our destination, which are simply necessary to our happiness, and, therefore, the absolute

need of a special communication, on all these particulars, from God himself; which communication we call *Revelation.*

This general position has much hostility to encounter. A great number of men, of whom there is no lack in our own country, deem what they term *natural religion*, or those deductions which we are able to make, by the force of our *reason* alone, from the works of creation and providence, concerning their Divine Author and our relations to him, and the duties required of us, to be amply sufficient for all the purposes of instruction and blessedness.

These men are distinguished by the name of *Deists*, i. e. who admit the being and government of God, but utterly deny the reality or necessity of a special revelation.

Of these there are, or have been two classes, known by the names of *mortal* and *immortal* Deists; the first bearing a strong resemblance to those philosophists of the French revolution, who pronounced Death to be an *eternal sleep;* the second, more sober and modest, conceding the immortality of the soul and a state of future rewards and punishments. Our debate is chiefly with these, the mortal Deists being rather Atheists than any thing else, (and for an Atheist I know of no more suitable argument than a shaven head and a blistering cap—a straight waistcoat and a maniac's cell.)

There is great and confident talk about natural religion even in the Christian world. The advocates of it here, it is true, expressly deny its sufficiency to lead men to eternal happiness; but they make it to contain a great many fundamental truths, and represent them as the discoveries of mere reason. The effect has been, and must be, the converting of the schools of natural religion and moral philosophy into mere hotbeds of *Deism;* and thus, with the very best intentions, good and upright men have in various parts of the world been undermining the foundations of that divine religion which is taught in the scriptures.

But that we may not do these worthy men injustice, we must remove a mistake into which they have fallen in supposing that the scriptures bear them out in their doctrine of this *natural religion.*

They read in their Bibles that *the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork.* They read that *that which may be known of God is manifest in them* who hold the truth in righteousness, *because God hath showed it unto them: (For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead:)* so THAT THEY ARE WITHOUT EXCUSE.

That God hath imprinted notices of himself—that he hath, so to speak, written his name upon his works in legible and luminous characters—that he hath made a loud proclamation of "his eternal power and Godhead" in the fabric of heaven and earth, and peculiarly in the structure of that strange compound, the soul and body of man—and therefore that every man living has access to important knowledge of his Maker, even in his own person—and such knowledge as must forever shame his ignorance and forgetfulness—is an indisputable truth. But to infer that all this is the discovery, or can be discovered, by our reason, corrupted and blind as it is, is certainly what the logicians call a *non sequitur*.

You would not say that the non-perception of a mathematical truth affords any presumption that the truth is not perfectly clear *in itself*. You may have met with instances where a person could not tell where even the centre of a circle is to be found, while to us it is perfectly plain; and the hesitation about it only proves the immense stupidity which could have any doubt about the matter. To a young child, that three and two are five may appear a very abstruse proposition; to us it is as clear as the day.

How many things, moreover, are there in the common works of creation, which cannot be discerned without previous instruction, and are

yet altogether obvious to a disciplined observer? The very flowers of the field, the common grass upon which you habitually tread, disclose beauties and wonders to the eye of a botanist, which are entirely hidden to our own eyes.

What miracles of wisdom, power, design, glory, does the contemplation of the starry heavens unfold! There, if I may dare so to express myself, is the walk of the Almighty God. There he *clothes himself with light as with a garment*, and every footstep leaves behind him a demonstration that the Creator is there: insomuch, that, to quote the words of the poet,

An undevout astronomer is mad.

Yet the ranks of modern philosophy are full of these madmen. How often have men gazed upon this theatre of glory, where their Maker unveils himself to their notice, without one single thought of his greatness, his grandeur, or even of his being?

In his written word God has been pleased to make a plain revelation of his perfections and of his grace, so that "he may run who readeth." Yet what multitudes are there, to whom the simplest truths of the gospel, the very A B C of religion, are riddles and mysteries insolvable throughout?

Now, what shall we say to all this? Is the fault in the *evidence*, or in the *observer*? In many,

if not all, of the instances I have mentioned, it will be acknowledged that the evidence is clear enough, but that something is wrong about the faculties which ought to perceive it. This is precisely the solution of the problem of natural religion. The scriptures speak only of the evidence itself which God has given of himself and his perfections in his works. From this, worthy men have drawn an inference respecting the powers of human perception. In this inference lies the whole fallacy. Evidence in abundance —evidence clear as "the sun shineth in its strength"—has he afforded of his "eternal power and Godhead." There it is, and there it shall remain, in the works of his hands, as long as those works endure. But man, miserable man, blinded and corrupted by his sin, cannot see that evidence—cannot read the letters of light in which the divine name is inscribed—cannot hear the proclamation which the voice of God utters throughout the universe. The argument, therefore, from the testimony of the scriptures, must be abandoned; and the question returns upon us in all its force, Can man, unaided by divine revelation, discover by nature's light what he ought to know of God and of himself, to lead him in the way of truth and blessedness?

It is quite obvious that the knowledge which men ought to have of God for this purpose is such as should mingle itself with all the operations of their minds; such as should ex-

tend to all the relations which they bear to him; such as should be perfectly clear to the feeblest understanding.

1. It is such as should mingle itself with all the operations of their minds. God, I now take for granted, is a Spirit—that his chief rule is in and over spirit, and, subordinate to this, over the material world. Now, if there be any operations of created mind, which the knowledge of God is not to influence, then to the whole extent of such operations the rational creature would be independent of him, which is neither more nor less than partial Atheism.

2. It should be such as extends to all our relations; for if it does not, if any be exempted, we cannot give him all the glory which is his due; and we shall be unable to tell whether the point in which we are deficient is not essential to both our duty and our blessedness.

3. It ought to be perfectly clear to the feeblest understanding. We inquire after that, which, by the nature of the case, ought to be universal. If, then, there be a single human being, in the ordinary exercise of his powers, who cannot attain it, the whole scheme of natural religion is ruined. It will not do to produce us examples of men of great sagacity, great leisure, and great advantages, as examples of what human reason can do in a case in which every one who breathes the breath of life has an equal interest.

All are concerned to know; and if *all* have not either powers or means of knowing, I repeat, the cause of natural religion is ruined.

4. It must not only be clear, but accompanied with indubitable proofs, such proofs as exclude all uncertainty; for in so momentous a question as that concerning God, our duties, and our destiny, doubt is equivalent to ignorance; and we may think we are honoring God, and making rapid advances in the way of life, when we are most highly dishonoring him, and going just as rapidly the road to death. There are two, and but two, methods of deciding this controversy. The first is from matters of fact; the second is *à priori*, from the nature of the human faculties compared with the object which they are to effect.

I. I begin with the first of these, inquiring what man is able to do by examining what he *has* done. Our work here is very short. We ask what nation upon earth can be pointed out, who, with all their *notions* of divinity, had clear and satisfactory ideas of the living and true God? What could they tell about his providence? What about the soul of man? Had they ascertained whether it is mortal or immortal? Did they know any thing about true holiness? about the chief good? about walking with God? about holding fellowship with him? If they did, let the fact be produced; if they did not,

they had no such thing as is called natural religion. But we rest not here. It may be thought that we demand too much when we call for a *nation* possessing this knowledge. Be it so; we are well aware that such a nation cannot be found. But let us waive our demand. I ask, then, when, where, and by whom, were these discoveries made? I do not mean by the vulgar, but by philosophers, who professedly sought after the truth; and some of whom were as close thinkers, as accurate reasoners, as patient and candid investigators, as the world ever saw. Bacon himself did not surpass Aristotle in natural sagacity, in strength of mind, in acuteness, in comprehension. Yet upon the simplest article of natural religion, the very being of a God, there were the most strange varieties of sentiment among them. Let *Cicero* save us the trouble of further detail: "Qui vero," says he, in his treatise De Natura Deorum, "Qui vero Deos esse dixerunt, tanta sunt in varietate ac dissentione, ut eorum molestum sit dinumerare sententias." (De Nat. Deor. page 6, Dav. 1744.) And, indeed, whoever shall be at the trouble of reading the treatise now quoted, will meet with such confusion, conjectures, contradiction—such a chaos of absurdities and nonsense on points of primary importance, as will sicken him to ulterior pursuit, and fill his heart with sadness and sorrow.

Now these were not the whims and guesses of the illiterate among the heathen, but the

grave conclusions of their wisest men; and well justifies the declaration of Paul, that *professing themselves to be wise, they became fools.*

It must be granted, however, that occasionally they dropped great expressions when speaking of the Divinity and of virtue. But here we must be on our guard against a very natural and dangerous illusion.

We, who have been brought up and educated in a Christian land, have imbibed all our ideas from the Bible, or those who have read and studied it. Those ideas are so familiar to our minds, and so deeply impressed upon them, that no art nor industry could make us for a moment, even when children, believe in the truth, for example, of Ovid's Metamorphoses, or in the existence of Homer's gods. Now, when we fall in with noble and lofty expressions of divine things among the Pagan writers, or with the same terms concerning the moral virtues as are in use among ourselves, we insensibly carry our own thoughts with us, and attribute them to the heathen, supposing that they meant the same thing with ourselves, whereas nothing can be farther from the fact. A little explanation, were it possible, would convince us that we had scarcely an idea in common with them.

Such, then, was the state of their theology among their best informed and most virtuous teachers. There was not a man among them,

no, not one man, who had any correct or consistent opinions, far less principles, upon those things which concern our most serious duties, our eternal blessedness.

The conclusion is plain. It is absurd to maintain that *every man*, in all ages and circumstances, *can* do, what no man, in any age or circumstances, has actually done. Revelation, therefore, is simply necessary, not for the vulgar, the illiterate mass only, but also for the wise, the cultivated, the most advanced philosophers, the greatest proficients in human knowledge.

Having seen that the powers of human reason never did, in fact, make the least progress in the discovery of the most necessary truths—that the world by wisdom never knew God—let us now proceed,

II. To inquire, *à priori*, from the nature of the human faculties, what they *can* do in this matter.

It is no doubt very easy for those, who have all their lives breathed the atmosphere of revelation, to demonstrate the being and many glorious excellencies of the First Cause, and to discourse learnedly and convincingly of his providence, of the dependence of all things upon him, upon the duty of worshiping him, the happiness of enjoying his favor, &c., from merely rational principles. All this appears to them quite plain, and whoever shall dispute it to be

hardly in the sober exercise of his reason. Well, we have no question but that these truths are perfectly reasonable, as all truth must be in the nature of things. But how, we may ask, did they come by their means of demonstration? and how has it happened that all these vigorous demonstrators have flourished in Christian lands, and not a single one of them where Christianity is unknown? It is the light of divine revelation that has shone upon their darkness, and caused them to see clearly where all was once the blackest midnight; and they have, with true philosophical gratitude, bedecked their reason with garlands stolen from the tree of life, and given themselves credit for the gift of God. This plagiarism runs manifestly through a Deistical book, formerly of some noise and note, though now nearly forgotten, (as all such books will be sooner or later,) entitled, "*Christianity as old as the creation.*" Many things are perfectly evident to our understanding when *once they are pointed out*, which, if left to ourselves, would never have come into our minds.

Let us begin with interrogating reason concerning God and his attributes; though here we must be somewhat at a loss; for really, human reason is so much improved by the light of the gospel, that it is very difficult to distinguish her answers from those of the superior power speaking in her and through her. But if, with all this

high advantage, she be caught tripping, we may easily conceive how completely her mouth would be stopped in the deprivation of all supernatural aid.

It is supposed to be one of the simplest and most obvious truths of natural religion, that there is but one God, the Creator and Governor of all things. If you demand of her advocate how he came by this knowledge, he will reply, that from the unity of design in the works of creation, common sense will of itself infer the unity of their Author. But I am not to be so easily satisfied. I ask farther, how do you *know* this unity of design? Is it not strange that a thing so very obvious should have escaped the notice of the most acute observers for four thousand years? Was there no common sense in the world during all that time? But it must be left for men since the Christian era to perceive this unity? Evident to you it may be; but why was it not evident to Zoroaster, to Thales, to Socrates, to Aristotle, to Plato? They certainly either did not perceive it, or at least did not make this deduction of common sense from it.

Let us, however, consider whether, granting the premises, the inference follows as a matter of course. Does common sense tell me, or any one else, that *several* deities may not with perfect harmony *concur* in one and the same design,

and keep up the execution of that design? If they could, where is your proof from the unity of design? and how are you to prove that they could not? If you draw your proof from the disagreement which must necessarily take place among men, you then judge of the divinities by yourselves, making yourselves the standard of their actions, and making them no more gods than you are. This looks much more like the theology of Homer, who, Longinus being judge, has represented his gods like men, and his men like gods. The alternative is manifestly this: twenty gods may agree in producing the harmony of the universe; or should they disagree, that disagreement would prove that there are no gods, which contradicts the very terms of the argument, and is a begging of the question. My argument is a very plain one. Twenty true gods might agree perfectly, and you answer this by showing that they could not be gods at all! Well, then, your reason even now, with all that revelation has done for it, fails most lamentably in the proof that there is only one living and true God. In fact the doctrine of the ancient Persians, and later of the Manichees, that there are *two* principles, one good and the other evil, appears to be more consonant to depraved reason than the doctrine of the divine unity.

In the same manner it may be shown, that mere reason will not bear you out in the posi-

tion that the one God is necessarily the Eternal, Immutable, Omnipresent, Omniscient. When you come to the consideration of his *goodness*, your difficulties increase. He does, indeed, pour his bounty upon the earth; but he also pours out his curse. A fruitful season is balanced by one of sterility. If you have one year abundance of food, you have a famine in another. If the heavens are now serene and pleasing, they are again charged with thunder and lightning, pregnant with hail-storm and tempest. To-day the genial shower descends; to-morrow a flood sweeps off together the fruits of human industry and of the earth's fertility, and carries away both man and beast in its impetuous torrent. At one time the atmosphere is benign and exhilarating; at another, charged with the pestilence, it causes us to inhale our death with the very instrument of life. Nature's light furnishes not the key to these apparent contradictions, nor enables us to conceive how a Being of boundless goodness can inflict so much suffering. *Conjectures*, *probable* conjectures, we may have, but none can say that his conjectures are *demonstrated;* and therefore none can show a solid foundation on which the mind can rest.

This deep and dreadful fluctuation of opinion, arising from the variations we perceive in the government of the world, shakes all our ideas at the same time of the divine *immutability;*

and a *changeling* God is a most fearful thought.

Should ever the query arise in our minds, and it has often arisen in the minds of many, *what is the mode of subsistence in the divine nature?* we stand at once aghast. "It is high as heaven, what can we know? Deeper than hell, what can we do?" Who among the children of men is not subdued, confounded, annihilated, by the majesty of the theme, by his own daring presumption? Here we stand, young and old, learned and unlearned, wise and foolish, alike petrified by our own intrusion "into those things which we have not seen." And who would ever have dreamed of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in that one God, had he not been pleased to reveal the fact by that Spirit who searcheth "the deep things of God?" Yet if the true knowledge of the true God be essential in all circumstances to our duty and our happiness, the doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity must be a branch, and a material branch, of natural religion.

That the soul of man is immortal, has been argued from its immateriality—from its capacities—from its desires—and from the course of providence—all of which, when weighed in the balance, will be found wanting. None, upon which, in the hour of your utmost need, you could with confidence stake your eternity.

1. It has been argued that because the soul is immaterial, it must necessarily be immortal—because from its immateriality, it has no principle of dissolution. Now death is a dissolution, and that which cannot be dissolved, cannot die.

Granting that all this, except the conclusion, is correctly spoken; that there is no sophistry in the argument, no play upon the terms; how does the conclusion follow? Life and death depend upon the sovereign pleasure of God. Now where has he told you that he will never command an immaterial being back again into its original nothing? When did he deprive himself of his power to annihilate any of his creatures, and to create others in their stead? It will not do to say, that whatever be his power, it is not his purpose. How do you know that? Search the earth and the heavens till you find a proof of it. For aught that appears from nature's light, God may have many wise reasons to deprive even immaterial beings of existence. They come into the world by his almighty fiat. They there answer a temporary purpose, and then are ordered out of it. What have you to say, why it should not be so? You may not pretend that it contradicts all your ideas of the divine goodness and wisdom. But how are you sure that your ideas are right? In many other things they are manifestly wrong. A short proof

is, that your goodness and wisdom would do every thing in the government of the universe different from what he does. And suppose it be the same case here. You cannot show that it is not. Therefore, for aught you can tell, the soul's immateriality is no bar to its annihilation.

2. When we draw an inference from the *capacities* of the soul to its immortality, we talk at random. Those capacities are, indeed, in our view, stupendous. We can form no conception of the improvement and powers which the most unpromising of human beings may in due season develop. But what are these to the Infinite One? He could, with perfect ease, vacate all their stations in the scale of being, and instantly replace them with creatures far nobler, and of still greater capacities. The world, for aught we can tell, would be no loser by the exchange, and his glory might be a great gainer. What has your reason to say to the contrary? You may guess, you may conjecture: but guessing and conjecturing afford a very miserable foothold when you are about stepping into a state of untried being. And I will venture to say, that no man ever yet enjoyed any solid comfort, from the mere consciousness of a capacity fitted for lasting good. He must be equally conscious of a capacity of lasting wo. And the idea of miserable existence cannot be comfortable.

Besides, men's capacities are not fully employed here. Genius of the highest order often languishes, is smothered, does not display the thousandth partof its riches, dies unknown, disappears, and is forgotten. How do you know but something of the same kind may occur hereafter? Many, multitudes of things, in the animal and material creation, have valuable properties, which, nevertheless, are not unfolded. And I presume your reason is not of so morbid a quality as to persuade you of the immortal life of horses, of trees, and cabbages. Millions of creatures perish, without even evolving the germ of such faculties as they possess. How can we determine what exhibitions of wisdom the Creator may please to make by this use of his creatures? We never were of his counsel, and where we know nothing, we must not decide: our best course is to "lay our hands on our mouths, and our mouths in the dust," and to ask no impertinent nor curious questions.

3. But we have large desires; vehement longings; and intense appetite for immortality. Why were these desires given? this longing excited? this appetite implanted? Only to be disappointed? To teach us to expect mighty things, and vanish like a dream? Verily, this looks like charging our Maker with a deliberate mockery.

Not so hasty, if you please. Are there not in other things, much desire, ardent longing, intense appetite, which, however, are in fact disappointed? Is your Maker obliged to gratify your wishes, however unreasonable or extravagant, under the penalty of being accused of mockery if he does not. Suppose one man has a passion for being a king; another for an endless succession of pleasures; a third for more wealth than is to be found in both the Indies. Is your Maker under any possible necessity of satisfying this desire, this longing, this appetite. And must we, wretched beings of a day, presume to impeach his wisdom or goodness, if he refuse?

It will not be denied that we are sinful creatures. What if all this desire after immortality should proceed from a sinful bias of our nature? What if it should be nothing but a longing, inherited from our first mother, who, as the scripture informs us, wished very much to be like God? What if it should meet with his rebuke instead of his indulgence? What if it should, after all, be nothing more than that love of life which all beings have, and strong in proportion to their perception of its sweetness? Is this really a ground upon which you rest your hope?

But why did not all these satisfy inquirers of old? Men had as large capacities, as insatiable desires and longings, then, as they have now.

Yet Plato, even Plato, the prince of philosophers, put his argument for futurity, I do not say immortality, upon a childish analogy. Day succeeds night; and night day. Therefore, as death succeeds life, so life must succeed death. And to make this sophism appear the worse, he has put it into the mouth of the grave, acute, sententious Socrates. Plainly showing that even that wonderful man had nothing better to offer.

If we have recourse to a moral plea from the inequalities of God's government here, vice often triumphant, virtue depressed, it would seem that his justice requires an hereafter: and so it has been, and is yet, very confidently alledged, that if God be just, he must in a future state show that righteous impartiality which we do not observe to obtain here.

The utmost that can be concluded from this argument, even if we were to grant its assumptions, is that there shall be a *future* state; but how it proves that an *immortal* one, I am unable to see. For of all arguments it appears to be the weakest among the weak. A single remark will be enough to refute it. Who among the children of men will undertake to affirm that the Most High God cannot rectify in a given time all the inequalities which have taken place in a given time? That he requires an eternity to set right what ever has gone wrong in this temporary existence? Immortality, then, the une-

qual dispensations of Divine Providence here cannot prove. I will go farther, and perhaps deny that they prove even a *future* state. The plea which we are now considering, takes for granted, that there *is* great inequality in the divine administration. How do you *know* that? Who erected you into judges, and especially *competent* judges? "You see vice prospering," you say, "virtue depressed and despised." But can you tell what passes within the bosoms of men? We know from matter of fact, that vicious men, though surrounded with wealth, and honors, and flatterers, are sometimes very miserable. They confess it, in spite of their flatterers. Memorable is the acknowledgment of Col. Gardiner, before he was brought to the knowledge, or had tasted the love of God. He was handsome, gay, gallant, accomplished, versed in every form of elegant dissipation, and on all sides, complimented and flattered. Here is an example of prosperous vice: but he owned, afterwards, that in the very moments of gayety, in the very riots of joy, when all the sons and daughters of mirth and pleasure were paying him homage, he has often said to himself, when a dog accidentally came into the room, "O that *I were that dog!*" On the contrary, a virtuous man in affliction has often consolations which he would not exchange for the prosperity of vice. If it should be otherwise, remember that

we are poor judges. The all-penetrating eye of God, may detect some flaw in his virtue for which he deserves to be punished. Suppose, now, that the secret dealings of God with virtuous and vicious individuals, should completely and exactly balance the difference of their outward lot—and that they do not is more than nature's light can demonstrate—where is your argument for a future state. The accounts of men are finally settled, and there is no room for another state in order to adjust them. I say, then, that mere unaided reason, when she so confidently vaunts her ability to show the certainty of a future and an immortal state, and comes to grapple with the proof and the difficulties, finds her strength to fail her, and she faints and falls in the struggle.

I readily allow that all these things, our capacities, our wishes, and other natural feelings, of which no human being can entirely divest himself, and which render our nature an everlasting puzzle to our understandings, most admirably coincide with the doctrine of our immortality, when once made known and certain from divine revelation, while without it they afford nothing satisfying, but leave the mind a prey to anxiety, immerse it in doubt, and all the distractions inseparable from suspense. Such, then, is the miserable estate of a man

destitute of the benefit of God's revelation. He hopes, and he knows not why: he fears, and he knows not what. His conscience fills him with awful forebodings which he can neither explain nor avoid: all around him is intellectual and moral chaos. It may be he shall live hereafter: it may be God shall call him to account: it may be there is happiness and glory in a world to come: but it may be also, a world of wo. The forms which pass and repass before his mental vision, are forms of undefined horror. He has light enough to let him see that he is inexcusable: but not near enough to discover the cause of his perplexity; not enough to see that he is ruined; and far, far too little to espy his relief. Despair broods over the scene; and nothing will ever dissipate the gloom, but the "light of the knowledge of God, shining in the face of Jesus Christ."

On the supposition that there is a happy hereafter, a most serious question and a most tremendous difficulty instantly occur. The question is, "How shall we attain it?" If you answer "by doing the will of God," the difficulty immediately faces you, "How do you *know the will* of God?" Hic labor, hoc opus. What can our unassisted reason discover of that will? The sum and the substance of all she can say, Mr. Addison has put into the mouth of Cato, at

the very time when he was meditating and about to perpetrate suicide,

> If there's a power above, (and that there is
> All nature cries aloud through all her works,)
> He must delight in virtue: and that which he delights in
> Must be happy.

Very poetically spoken: but poetry will not quiet a troubled conscience. The difficulty still remains. It is a hideous spectre, which all the art of poetical necromancy cannot charm down. What is *virtue?* Is it conformity to the divine will? But then, again, How am I to *ascertain* the divine will? Till this point be settled, I am at as great a loss as ever. "You must search it out in his works," replies the advocate of nature's power. "Where?" I impatiently ask, "Where? Is it in these heavens? Is it in yonder deep? Does it shine in the spangled firmament, or is it spread on the face of the earth? Is it written upon the leaves of the trees, on the flowrets of the field, or to be heard in the howl of the beasts of the forest? Show it, O show it to me!

You will tell me that it can be deduced as a very plain inference from the works which we behold. That from the marks of skill and design, every where visible in creation, we very naturally infer, the goodness, the truth, the kindness of their author. I answer, that this is not satisfactory to my mind; that the conclu-

sion is by much too far from the premises; that there is no natural nor necessary proportion between intellectual and moral attributes, nor any inference that can at all be drawn from his *works* to his *will.* That I indeed see, in common with millions more, abundant traces of wisdom and power, but what does all this teach me of the divine *will?* It is true, that from the conformation of certain creatures, I can certainly infer his pleasure in some particulars: for example, from the structure of our teeth, and the cravings of our stomach, I may conclude, without hesitation, that my Maker intended I should eat: and so of many other physical things. But this has no sort of connection with my moral duties. It does not inform me how I am to worship him, nor what course I am to pursue toward my fellow-creatures. I might eat to the full, and never think of him; nor feel myself impelled to one act of kindness to my fellow-man.

When we see a clock performing its complicated movement with precision, we can and do pronounce, immediately, upon the *skill* of the clockmaker; but whoever thought of looking at a *clock* to determine the moral character of the man? So in the machinery of the world. It is self-evident that it could not be constructed but by a being superlatively wise and skillful. But it warrants no further conclusion.

The great question, what does God require of me to secure his favor, and my own blessedness, is hidden in impenetrable darkness, notwithstanding the clear proofs of his skill and wisdom in the creation. Nor can I derive any, the most remote consolation, from his being possessed of boundless skill and power. Who shall inform me, with *certainty*, that his infinite resources shall not be put in requisition to make me miserable? Or who shall quiet the misgivings of my conscience on this head? That there *are* such misgivings, and very vehement ones, is a fact for which I have as many vouchers as there are men in the world. But the *origin* of these misgivings is the point, as well as all the other aberrations of the human mind. That these are very often sinful, that they give to our thoughts and purposes a criminal bias, and are the source of criminal actions, who can deny, or who explain?

Here, then, a new difficulty occurs. How shall we account for the introduction of moral evil, I do not say into the universe, but into our world? If we know nothing of its original, we must be ignorant of its cure.

Shall we say that our Creator *made* us so? That it was intermixed with the elements of our constitution *ab initio?* How, then, shall we excuse our Maker from being the Author of evil? How reconcile it with his *justice* to pu-

nish man for the very things which he laid him under a necessity of committing? And of what use would a pure law of obedience be, suppose we had it, if by our very nature we cannot help transgressing it?

Is it an adventitious affection of our being? How came it? Does it excuse us from the charge of offending God? Who will demonstrate this? On all these points, momentous as they are, we are utterly in the dark. The darkness thickens upon us the moment we proceed a step farther and ask about our deliverance.

Will the Most High God pardon sin? O yes! say the advocates of nature's light, *he is very merciful.* It may be so, but where is your proof? Is it in the pain, sickness, sorrow, and death, of which the world is full? Is it in the sad solicitude of men's minds whenever they seriously ask such a question? Can you show by facts that God in his dealings with men actually forgives sin? Can you point me out one sinner whom he has thus forgiven? Methinks, if it were so plain, so much a matter of course, there could be no want of those happy individuals to whom he has been gracious. I wish to see the man who can say, upon other than scriptural grounds, that *his iniquities are taken away, and his sin purged.* One fact is worth a million speculations. If I can see a man walking in the peace of his conscience, and under a sense

of forgiving love, I have done. We can show thousands of such men upon the Christian plan, who can give a rational account how they came by their peace, and why they believe, that, although sinners, God has most graciously forgiven their sins. But if I shut up the Bible, I shut up your hearts in midnight darkness, in ill-boding anticipations.

The idea of *repentance* for your sins will perhaps afford you relief. Man is frail, you think. God is most gracious, and what more can he ask of a poor offender than all he has, which is to be sorry for his offense and to labor after amendment?

The first question to be resolved here, is, what you understand by *repentance.* Is it merely sorrow for the *consequences* of sin? Men deprecate punishment, no doubt. No criminal can be in love with the gallows. But let him once free—let him escape the halter, and he will be as active as ever in the repetition of his crime. Is it *this* repentance with which you would put off your Maker? To tell him, in substance, that you are very sorry that he has detected you in your rebellion? very sorry that he is stronger than you, and that you cannot escape—that you are alike unable to resist and to flee? and, therefore, that he must of course pardon you, or else lose all credit for generosity with you and with rebels like you? Why not make yet shorter work of

it, and tell him that it is absurd to punish sin at all? and that if he does not issue an act of general indemnity, he will forfeit your good opinion forever afterwards? This is really the amount of the plea for pardon merely on account of your sorrow for sin.

Oh, but, say you, you connect with your repentance the purpose and promise of amendment. Well, and if you do, and if you even execute your purpose and fulfill your promise, what has that to do with the question? It is for your *past* transgressions that you are to be punished, and you purpose and promise to obey in *future!* Do you mean to *pay* your Creator? and to pay him with what is already his due? Or do you imagine you can save any thing over and above the demands of his law, and lay up a fund of merit out of which you may satisfy its claims on account of former transgressions? In moral matters this is the very rectified spirit of absurdity.

I would inquire, moreover, if there is any such thing as a penalty to God's law? The very notion of *pardon* seems to imply it; and it is argued that repentance is to procure the remission of the penalty, which remission is another word for pardon. Well, then, is this penalty a mere bugbear? a painted scourge, which is never to be used? If it is, then what becomes of the authority of the law, or the awful majesty of

the divine government—if men do what they please, have nothing to fear from God the Avenger? Oh, no! will it be said, it will be strictly executed upon impenitent offenders, while to the penitent mercy will be extended. That is to say, that God makes, through means of nature, a proclamation of pardon to all rebels who are willing to be pardoned! For this wish to be pardoned lies at the bottom of all repentance. Is not this, now, a pretty government? a model of impotence or indolence, which would be overwhelmed with ridicule in the affairs of men? And shall we dare to attribute to the "only wise God" a constitution which would be laughed at for its folly, if it were attempted among men? Of all the dreams which have at various times filled their heads on the subject of government, there is none half so crazy, so bereft of common sense, as this; and such a stupid constitution men would palm upon their Maker!

Let me ask yet again, Can the Most High God justly punish a repenting sinner in *any* case? Or must all crimes whatever be forgiven, provided the criminal repents? If not, if he may punish notwithstanding repentance, then you cannot be sure of pardon, repent never so much. But if pardon must necessarily ensue upon repentance, I ask farther, can the sinner repent when he pleases, or must his repentance be the gift of God? If the former, if his repentance

be purely an act of his own will, I see not but there is a necessary abolition of all the sanction of God's law; or which comes to the same thing, a sinner can evade it whenever he pleases, for he can repent whenever he pleases, and when he repents he is pardoned, i. e. he can escape punishment whenever he pleases. But if repentance be a gift of God, he must depend upon the will of another for his pardon; and as the acts of that will cannot be compelled, he must owe his forgiveness to the good pleasure of God. Now, whether he will ever interfere thus or not in behalf of man, he only can tell; and if he tells it, that is revelation. Say not he tells it in his works of creation and providence. I once more ask, *where?* In the leaves of the trees? In the feathers of the birds? In the stones of the ground? In the streams of water? It is really trifling with our most awful concerns to pretend to find it here.

But still there are strong indications of God's forgiveness in the course of his providence—that his *long forbearance* bespeaks his graciousness and encourages hopes of pardon. His forbearance does indeed mark his graciousness, and wo to them whom it never leads to repentance! But it extends equally to the penitent and to the impenitent. If the penitent only were objects of the divine forbearance, something like an argument might be founded upon it. But what if

this forbearance be only until sinners have filled up the measure of their iniquities? Will punishment be the lighter because it has been long delayed? Shutting a man up in prison, and sparing his forfeited life until the day of execution comes, does not make execution at last either less certain or more tolerable.

After all, is it true that we can fairly argue any purpose of forgiveness from the acts of Divine Providence? I mean, do these demonstrate the connection between forgiveness of sin and the repentance of the sinner?

In human governments, where we find men's most sober judgment, it is evident they do not; and in the view of the most wise and compassionate of the community, they ought not.

When men are convicted of crime, they very often show great sorrow for their fault; but what should we think of the judge who should liberate a prisoner upon this plea? Nay, the sentence of the law must be heard, must take its course in the infliction of punishment, even to the loss of life itself. And do we not see in the government of God, as administered in his providence, innumerable instances when the penalty annexed to transgression actually follows the offense, be the offender never so contrite?

A man impoverishes himself by his extravagance, and ruins his family besides. He wastes his health, and becomes a prey to lingering and

loathsome disorders by his dissipation. He may become extremely sorry for his excesses, but does that for one moment arrest the penalty? Does his penitence drive poverty from his door, or restore his family to comfort? Does penitence heal his diseases, and sweeten his body? Penitent, truly penitent, he may be; ay, and his sins may be forgiven, too, for the world to come, and the fruits of them may be death without mercy here.

Whether, then, we consult the nature of the case, or hearken to the voice of God speaking in the acts of his government, the only conclusion to be drawn from both, is, that repentance does not procure forgiveness; so that for any thing nature's light or the light of reason can show us, the hope of a sinner is as the giving up of the ghost.

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